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Abstract 
 
This dissertation is a discussion of representations and misrepresentations of US public 
nuclear anxiety in nuclear apocalyptic popular culture and civil defence initiatives, 
respectively. Focusing on particular peaks in nuclear anxiety during the 1950s, early 1960s 
and 1980s, this thesis analyses the ways in which visual nuclear apocalyptic popular culture, 
in film and video games, consistently reflected contextual American nuclear anxieties and 
can be seen to represent shifting anxieties across the Cold War. In turn, by comparing such 
representations with civil defence initiatives this study will investigate the means by which 
the popular, post-Cold War nuclear apocalyptic video game series Fallout can be seen to 
create a caricature of government propaganda seen during the Cold War and eventually 
move away from the contextually representative norms of previous nuclear apocalyptic 
culture. This work's contribution to knowledge in the subject of history is the study of 
nuclear anxieties as reflected and represented by nuclear apocalyptic culture over the 
course of Cold War. Furthermore, the comparative analysis of nuclear apocalyptic culture 
and civil defence initiatives is intended to bring to light the proliferation of the 
misrepresentation of nuclear anxieties and civil defence initiatives that now exist primarily 
in contemporary nuclear apocalyptic video game culture, as epitomised by the Fallout 
franchise.   
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Introduction 
 
For fans of the post-apocalyptic video game franchise, Fallout, the phrase "War. War never 
changes" is well-known.1 In fact, it is the first thing players hear when starting a new 
adventure in any Fallout game and has arguably become a defining feature of the series. Yet 
its use relies heavily on the players' acceptance of the unchanging nature of war. When the 
nature of war is analysed in regards to the games' primary influence of US nuclear anxiety 
during the Cold War, the term becomes questionable. After all, for the American public in 
the second half of the twentieth century, war had most certainly changed. With the end of 
World War II had come the atomic bomb, and as an atomic monopoly kept the United 
States in a position of nearly unquestionable power the US public experienced a period of 
national optimism.2 Soon, however, this optimism descended into uncertainty and 
pessimism as the power of the atomic bomb became apparent and the public feared 
another war.3 On September 23 1949, after US airborne sampling flights detected signs of 
radiation in the deserts of Kazakhstan, President Harry S. Truman announced to the public 
that the Soviet Union had developed its own atomic bomb.  
 With their atomic monopoly gone, fears among the US public that American cities 
would soon be bombed by the USSR dramatically increased. Such fears were made worse 
still, when on August 12 1953, the Soviets succeeded in testing the first ever hydrogen 
bomb.4 As the 1950s wore on, public nuclear anxieties increased to infect almost every facet 
of American life. With levels of nuclear fear varying over the course of the Cold War it can 
be seen to have impacted large swathes of US culture and society. From magazines to films 
to video games, representations of nuclear anxiety can be seen throughout US culture in the 
Cold War, with particular emphasis on the 1950s, early 1960s and 1980s.  
 However, with the Cold War at an end and these same fears largely defunct, the 
Fallout series has now become the most successful and most popular representation of 
                                            
1 Fallout: A Post Nuclear Role Playing Game, Beverly Hills, CA: Interplay Entertainment, 
1997. 
2 Williaŵ L. O͛Neill, American High: The Years of Confidence, 1945-1960, (Free Press, 1986), 
p.7. 
3 Kenneth D. Rose, One Nation Underground: The Fallout Shelter in American Culture, (New 
York University Press, 2001), pp.14-17. 
4 Ibid., p.18. 
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these extreme anxieties.5 Beginning in 1997, Fallout is a popular video game franchise that 
allows players to explore the fascinatingly macabre wastelands of a futuristic, post-
apocalyptic USA, heavily inspired by the culture surrounding nuclear anxieties throughout 
the second half of the twentieth century. It remains a staple of video games and nuclear 
apocalyptic culture today, with its latest iteration, Fallout 4 (2015), being the most 
commercially successful release in the series to date.6 Yet the series' influences stem largely 
from civil defence initiatives, which will be seen to be predominantly unrepresentative of 
nuclear anxieties during the Cold War. As well as this, such propagandistic initiatives fail to 
represent the manner in which these anxieties altered over the course of the conflict. When 
the gaŵes͛ pƌiŵaƌǇ, histoƌiĐal iŶflueŶĐes aƌe ĐoŶsideƌed iŶ ƌegaƌds to theiƌ aďilitǇ to 
ƌepƌeseŶt the ƌealitǇ of ĐoŶteǆtual ŶuĐleaƌ aŶǆieties, the phƌase ͞Waƌ Ŷeǀeƌ ĐhaŶges͟, a 
phrase which the Fallout production companies might favour, is merely a conceit around 
which the game is constructed, and presents a caricature of nuclear anxiety and civil 
defence initiative. 
This thesis therefore explores representations and misrepresentations of nuclear 
anxiety via the medium of contextually contemporary popular culture, a term explained 
below. It ascertains the elements of civil defence initiatives and nuclear apocalyptic culture 
that persisted throughout the conflict during particularly high levels of nuclear anxiety 
among the US public in the 1950s, early 1960s and 1980s. This informs an analysis of their 
representations in the apocalyptic video game series, Fallout; a game franchise whose 
thematic basis is influenced almost exclusively by these representations and 
misrepresentations of nuclear anxiety. This thesis argues that propagandistic 
representations of nuclear war have led to the creation of the caricature of civil defence 
initiatives and nuclear anxiety in Fallout leading to the development of a contemporary 
commentary that fails to recognise the reality of its influences. While both film and video 
games can be seen as merely entertainment, it must be recognised that no matter the 
cultural medium any representation of history or reflection of either reality or real concerns 
must be viewed with a critical eye. As this thesis will demonstrate, culture assists us in 
                                            
5 MaƌĐus “Đhulke, ͚‘efightiŶg the Cold Waƌ: Video Gaŵes aŶd “peĐulatiǀe HistoƌǇ͛, iŶ 
Matthews Wilhelm Kapell and Andrew B.R. Elliott, ed., Playing With the Past: Digital Games 
and the Simulation of History, (Bloomsbury, 2013), pp.266-267. 
6 ͚Fallout ϰ͛, VGChartz, http://bit.ly/2azk1c7, last accessed 05 Aug 2016. 
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developing a greater understanding of a period or idea, therefore it is ignorant to suggest 
that something should be overlooked or disregarded merely because societal opinion deems 
that films and, in particular, video games can be nothing more than entertainment. 
By analysing filmic and video game case studies from each of the aforementioned 
periods, we will see that while certain elements of civil defence and nuclear apocalyptic 
culture persisted during the Cold War, those in the 1950s, 1960s and 1980s consisted of 
remarkably different perspectives of nuclear war, despite appearing similar when viewed 
through the lens of civil defence initiatives. It must be noted that the switch of medium 
from film to video games in the thesis is done to establish the expressions of contemporary 
popular culture in each of the periods under consideration. This allows for a greater 
understanding of the influences that carried over from the 1950s into the Fallout franchise. 
These analyses inform what can be seen in the original Fallout's representation of its 
cultural influences to form a game that continued the trend among nuclear apocalyptic 
culture of representing contextual nuclear anxieties. However, this contextual 
representation is formed despite its primary influences of civil defence initiatives being 
predominantly unrepresentative of their own contextual anxieties. The results of this 
research are intended to bring to light the caricatures and misrepresentation of civil defence 
initiatives and nuclear anxiety in the Fallout franchise, an extremely popular game series 
that has come to be regarded as an important representation of perspectives of nuclear war 
in the Cold War. 
This thesis is divided into five analytical sections. Chapter one analyses the realities 
of nuclear anxiety in the 1950s in relation to their differing representation in civil defence 
initiatives and nuclear apocalyptic culture seen in speculative magazine articles, such as 
Collier’s ͚Hiƌoshiŵa U.“.A.͛. The chapter then charts and assesses the manner in which 
nuclear anxieties shifted in the early 1960s during the fallout shelter controversy and 
compares the shift with unaltered civil defence initiatives. With the disparity between civil 
defence initiatives and the shifting realities of nuclear anxiety highlighted, chapter two 
focuses on two filmic case studies. Five (1951) is the first direct depiction of a post-nuclear 
apocalypse seen in film and effectively represents pessimistic feelings and anxieties felt 
towards solitude and radiation in a post-nuclear world. Panic in Year Zero (1962) on the 
other hand represents the moral ambiguity surrounding survival during the fallout shelter 
debates. This chapter analyses each film as representations of the shift in nuclear anxieties 
8 
 
established in chapter one to form a greater understanding of how nuclear apocalyptic 
culture succeeds in reflecting shifting public anxieties.  
Chapter three assesses the shift in nuclear anxieties during the 1980s in relation to 
‘oŶald ‘eagaŶ͛s aƌŵs ďuild-up and the resurgence of civil defence. It analyses the manner 
in which nuclear anxieties had once again changed since the early 1960s while highlighting 
elements of civil defence that persisted from the earlier decades to create similar 
misrepresentations of nuclear anxiety. In a similar vein to chapter two, chapter four 
analyses nuclear apocalyptic culture from the 1980s to assess the manner in which cultural 
representations of nuclear anxiety remain effective in reflecting reality. Just as nuclear 
apocalyptic film was the most popular contemporary cultural medium in the 1950s, the 
1980s witnessed the popularisation of video games. Therefore, this chapter analyses the 
games Missile Command (1980) and Wasteland (1988), which can likewise be seen to 
represent a shift in anxieties absent in civil defence initiatives. In the final chapter, an 
analysis of Fallout (1997) and its popular sequel Fallout 3 (2008) will be conducted in an 
effort to ascertain the extent to which the series' representation of its civil defence 
influences are unrepresentative of real nuclear anxieties. Furthermore, it discusses the 
extent to which Fallout͛s once contextually representative caricature has since been 
reshaped to create a franchise of nuclear apocalyptic fiction that no longer represents the 
contextual realities of nuclear anxiety and can to some extent be seen as a 
misrepresentation of history. 
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Literature Review 
 
In order to understand the formulation of American nuclear anxieties we must first 
understand the field of study surrounding representations of nuclear anxiety, which are 
most often found in works on US civil defence. One of the first studies into such ideas is 
Kenneth D. Rose's One Nation Underground, in which he analyses the prevalence of the 
fallout shelter in US culture. This provides an overview of civil defence initiatives and 
nuclear apocalyptic culture in relation to their role in forming public nuclear anxiety during 
the early Cold War, leading up to the fallout shelter debates. These debates of the early 
1960s witnessed a period of public confusion, bordering on hysteria, regarding the 
uncertainty surrounding the need and effectiveness of fallout shelters, largely fuelled by the 
disparity of expert opinions. Appropriately for this study, Rose contends that nuclear 
apoĐalǇptiĐ Đultuƌe ͞spoke to a geŶeƌatioŶ that saǁ the FiŶal DaǇs Ŷot as ďiďliĐal 
abstraction, but as a concrete, immediate, even probable reality.1  However, a major 
problem is the approach taken by Rose, in that his discourse is overwhelmingly top-down; 
focusing on how government elites propagandised nuclear war through civil defence 
initiatives. This thesis addresses this shortcoming by building upon Rose's approach and the 
topic from a cultural standpoint in an attempt to assess representations of the anxieties of 
the public juxtaposed against propagandistic government initiatives rather than viewing 
such propaganda as responsible for such anxieties. 
This issue in early civil defence research is addressed by later works, such as David 
Monteyne's Fallout Shelter, which approaches the study of civil defence from an 
architectural standpoint, to view initiatives focused on designating and building fallout 
shelters as representative of the society's fearful state and the implications of technological 
advancement during the decade following 1962. He states that "the partnership between 
architecture and civil defence produced a discourse about shelters and national security 
that both guided professional practice and laid a framework for interpreting the cultural 
meanings of public buildings."2 Monteyne's argument therefore focuses heavily on public 
nuclear anxiety represented by architecture, building upon Rose's top-down view to present 
                                            
1 Rose, One Nation Underground, p.77. 
2 David Monteyne, Fallout Shelter: Designing for Civil Defense in the Cold War, (University of 
Minnesota Press, 2011), p.xxi. 
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a fuller image of society in the period. GiǀeŶ the suďjeĐt of his studǇ, MoŶteǇŶe͛s ǁoƌk is 
ŶeĐessaƌilǇ liŵited iŶ sĐope; piĐkiŶg up ǁheƌe MoŶteǇŶe͛s ǁoƌk eŶds, this thesis ĐoŶsideƌs 
these same fears, but through the lens of cultural representations. 
While researchers have discussed the impact of civil defence initiatives on culture, 
architecture and society, a broader analysis of how representations of nuclear anxiety relate 
to civil defence is required. Melvin E. Matthews' analysis of images of civil defence in film 
and television fills in areas previously left open by Rose and Monteyne. Matthews, in his 
discussion of early Cold Waƌ ĐiŶeŵa, aƌgues that ͞HollǇǁood filŵŵakeƌs eǆploited ŶuĐleaƌ 
feaƌs as a ǁaǇ to eŶteƌtaiŶ audieŶĐes iŶ filŵ.͟3 This argument aligns with Rose's assertion 
regarding nuclear apocalyptic culture ƌefleĐtiŶg puďliĐ peƌĐeptioŶs of the ͞FiŶal DaǇs͟ to 
build upon the notion of representative culture and while this thesis will not focus on the 
notion of exploitation in cinema, Matthews' argument remains relevant to the cultural 
approach taken by this study. However, Matthews elects to focus on the impact of civil 
defence initiatives in shaping perceptions of nuclear war as seen in culture, as opposed to 
approaching the study of nuclear apocalyptic culture as reflective of existing anxieties. While 
Matthews approach is more grounded in the anxieties of the public rather than taking a top-
down perspective like Rose, his argument nonetheless fails to recognise the capacity of 
nuclear apocalyptic culture as a representation of anxieties, an area this thesis builds upon.  
Spencer R. Weart's more direct approach to nuclear anxieties in his work Rise of 
Nuclear Fear provides an excellent dialogue into fear as an inherent aspect of nuclear 
discourse, arguing that the potential of nuclear energy tapped into deep-rooted myths of 
power and weakness among humans. Furthermore, he points to nuclear fear as an influence 
on government policy as guards against hypothetical, unproven dangers resulted in extreme 
safety measures, such as protection against nuclear reactor meltdowns. While Weart's focus 
is far more related to nuclear fear and anxiety as an almost inherent part of the nuclear age, 
his discourse is predominantly focused on critiquing the manner in which nuclear fear has 
hindered the advancement of the nuclear energy industry and the focus such fears took 
away from concerns about climate change. While Weart elects to focus on supporting his 
beliefs about climate change in relation to nuclear anxiety, his analysis of nuclear fear during 
the Cold War is built upon in this thesis to better understand representations of such 
                                            
3 Melvin E. Matthews, Duck and Cover: Civil Defense Images in Film and Television from the 
Cold War to 9/11, (McFarland & Company, Inc., 2012), p.34. 
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notions in culture. However, what each of these arguments lack is a critical analysis of why 
nuclear apocalyptic culture representative of contextual nuclear anxieties remains impactful 
on contemporary, post-Cold War culture considering that nuclear anxieties have subsided to 
the point where exploiting them for entertainment is practically implausible. This thesis 
therefore asks, why do current games such as Fallout continue to represent nuclear 
anxieties despite the fact that these anxieties have largely subsided in the present? By 
exploring this question, this thesis sheds new light on our contemporary culture and its 
relationship with twentieth century history 
The study of cinema, especially science-fiction cinema, in the 1950s/60s is a well-
documented area of study, with crucial attention paid to subtle reflections of nuclear 
anxiety, particularly regarding radiation, seen in more nuanced films like The Day the Earth 
Stood Still (1951), Them! (1954) and The Blob (1958). However, less attention, especially 
from a historical perspective, has been paid to more direct depictions of nuclear war and 
apocalypse. The two films discussed in this dissertation are Five (1951) and Panic in Year 
Zero (1962). In analysing Five, Bob Stephens contends that the film is representative of the 
pessimistic tone that peƌǀaded the eaƌlǇ ϭϵϱϬs, ǁhiĐh aligŶs ǁith Mattheǁs͛ aƌguŵeŶt of 
exploitative cinema.4 Hoǁeǀeƌ, “tepheŶs goes oŶto disĐuss the filŵ͛s use of ƌeligious 
allegory to present its audience with a moral code in such a bleak and desolate world. What 
is lacking here is the manner in which this similarly reflects elements of nuclear anxiety. 
Instead, Stephens focuses on the direct biblical allegories as opposed to the contextual 
relations of such allegory to the film's nuclear apocalyptic depictions. On the other hand, Bill 
Warren, in his discussion of Panic in Year Zero ĐoŶteŶds that the filŵ ͞dodges ŵaŶǇ of the 
issues iŵplied ďǇ the suďjeĐt ŵatteƌ͟.5 While this can indeed be seen, what Warren fails to 
note about the film is the contextual reflection of its depiction, as erroneous information 
means little to reflections of public nuclear anxiety. Unlike Stephens, who notes the films 
pessimistic and thus reflective tone, Warren neglects to approach the film from a contextual 
standpoint, instead merely critiquing it for its lack of factual accuracy. In this regard, this 
thesis remedies the gap in cultural knowledge by approaching each film in the manner of its 
context and build upon these arguments. 
                                            
4 Boď “tepheŶs, ͚͟D͟ is foƌ DooŵsdaǇ: Five͛, iŶ Gƌegg ‘iĐkŵaŶ, ed., The Science Fiction Film 
Reader, (2004: Limelight Editions, 2009), p.119. 
5 Bill Warren, Keep Watching the Skies!: Vol. II, (McFarland & Company, Inc., 1986), p.678. 
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While representations of nuclear anxiety in images of civil defence and nuclear 
apocalyptic culture have been analysed extensively in the last two decades, the impact of 
these perceptions of nuclear anxiety have been less regarded in relation to video games, 
within which we have witnessed a surge in popularity of the nuclear apocalyptic genre. 
William Knoblauch's discourse about the role of video games in forming a better public 
understanding of Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) is one such area, as he 
contends that video games that involved depictions or mechanics closely related to SDI 
were "the closest the public ever came to assessing, firsthand, and for themselves, SDI."6 
This argument is prevalent in regards to the representational capabilities of video games as 
it shows the manner in which games can help in forming a greater understanding of an 
aspect of history that would otherwise remain unknown. However, Knoblauch's limited 
discussion of nuclear anxieties in regards to Missile Command and similarly reflective games 
is an area better discoursed by Joseph A. November. In his discussion of the video game 
series, Fallout, he compares the game's fictional timeline with reality's as each diverged 
from their shared pre-1945 history to differ dramatically. He contends that Fallout offers 
players a chance to explore the dichotomy "between American liberal, democratic ideals 
and Americans' aspirations to develop the technologies of their dreams."7 In his discussion 
he addresses the manner in which Fallout represents the futuristic views of the 1950s to 
form a fictional society based around totalitarianism. However, while this argument briefly 
discusses the game's representation of nuclear anxiety, it largely glosses over the manner in 
which it utilises representations of nuclear anxiety. This thesis will remedy this by utilising 
November's argument to indicate Fallout's representational capacity. It must be noted, 
hoǁeǀeƌ, that Noǀeŵďeƌ͛s ŵaiŶ aƌguŵeŶt is ďeǇoŶd the sĐope of this pƌojeĐt. Similarly, 
Marcus Schulke presents arguments surrounding the representation of the Cold War in 
post-apocalyptic video games, suggesting they provide insight into the mentality of the Cold 
War.8 Like Noǀeŵďeƌ, “hulke͛s illuŵiŶatiŶg studǇ is ŶoŶetheless liŵited iŶ sĐope; his 
analysis of the Fallout seƌies͛ Cold War anxieties indeed fails to fully consider their evolution 
                                            
6 Williaŵ M. KŶoďlauĐh, ͚“tƌategiĐ Digital DefeŶse: Video Gaŵes aŶd ‘eagaŶ͛s ͞“taƌ Waƌs͟ 
Program, 1980-1987͛, iŶ Kapell aŶd Elliott, ed., Playing With the Past, p.291. 
7 Joseph A. Noǀeŵďeƌ, ͚Fallout aŶd YesteƌdaǇ͛s Iŵpossiďle Toŵoƌƌoǁ͛, iŶ Kapell aŶd Elliott, 
ed., Playing With the Past, p.309. 
8 Schulke, ͚‘efightiŶg the Cold Waƌ: Video Gaŵes aŶd “peĐulatiǀe HistoƌǇ͛, iŶ Kapell aŶd 
Elliott, ed., Playing With the Past, p.267. 
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over the course of the conflict. By considering the ways in which nuclear anxieties shifted 
over the course of the Cold War, this thesis contributes to a more nuanced understanding of 
the legacies of the conflict in a series like Fallout. 
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Methodology 
 
 This study has been conducted as a means of better understanding representations 
and misrepresentations of public nuclear anxiety in the United States over the course of the 
Cold War in order to establish the manner in which nuclear apocalyptic culture and civil 
defence initiatives reflected public sentiment towards nuclear war during the conflict. This is 
done by comparing and contrasting multiple forms of contextually contemporary nuclear 
apocalyptic culture with their civil defence counterparts during three peaks in public nuclear 
anxiety - the 1950s, early 1960s and 1980s. This cross-medium study of representations of 
Cold War nuclear anxiety informs our understanding of the influences behind contemporary 
nuclear apocalyptic popular culture and why such culture can now be seen as 
unrepresentative of its historical influences as well as being non-reflective of its contextual 
reality in a contemporary sense. 
 This thesis utilises contextually contemporary nuclear apocalyptic culture to assess 
representations of nuclear anxiety in an effort to better display the manner in which video 
games can be viewed as historical artefacts, capable of representations like any other 
established medium. This is done using two films and two video games. Five (1951) and 
Panic in Year Zero (1962) represent forms of contextually contemporary nuclear apocalyptic 
culture, as films only began to incorporate themes of nuclear war previously seen in books 
and magazines at the start of the 1950s. Missile Command (1980) and Wasteland (1988) 
represent their context as the popularisation of video games in the 1970s led to themes of 
nuclear war entering the medium. Furthermore, as nuclear apocalyptic culture continues to 
be popular almost exclusively in video games today, this study will bridge the gap between 
contextually representational popular culture and contemporary popular culture influenced 
by said representations. The Fallout series can be seen to be a continuation of 
contemporary nuclear apocalyptic culture, representing the advancement of technology as 
video games became capable of greater graphical fidelity and therefore better visual 
representation. 
 Visual representation is the primary focus of this study as it remains a consistent 
element of the nuclear apocalyptic culture analysed. Although video games offer a unique 
element of interactivity that amplifies their representational capabilities, the scope of this 
thesis limits the cross-medium possibilities thereby forcing other elements of Game Studies, 
15 
 
such as gameplay or mechanics, to be disregarded for the sake of consistency. Instead, 
persistent visual elements of filmic nuclear apocalyptic culture and civil defence initiatives 
are highlighted in the video game case studies. 
Nonetheless, this study adds to the growing field of historical game studies by 
considering nuclear apocalyptic video games as a representation of contextual nuclear 
anxieties. The approach taken to analysing the video games in relation to the context of 
their releases is done using Alexander R. GalloǁaǇ͛s aƌguŵeŶt ƌegaƌdiŶg soĐial ƌealisŵ iŶ 
video games, which builds upon social realism in film. Galloway's definition of social realism 
is applied to this studǇ͛s pƌiŵaƌǇ gaŵes iŶ oƌdeƌ to deteƌŵiŶe theiƌ ƌefleĐtioŶs of ƌealitǇ, as 
well as the analyses of film to allow for a consistent definition of contextual representation. 
Completely separate from ideas of historical realism which will not be discussed, social 
realism can be defined using renowned film theorist André BaziŶ͛s definition – a ͞teĐhŶiƋue 
[in film] to appƌoǆiŵate the ďasiĐ pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal Ƌualities of the ƌeal ǁoƌld͟, oƌ iŶ 
GalloǁaǇ's ǁoƌds, soĐial ƌealisŵ ƌefleĐts ͞ƌeal life iŶ all its diƌtǇ details, hopeful desiƌes aŶd 
abysmal defeats͟.1 Galloway contends that, as well as this, in order to determine whether a 
film or game is socially realist it must be considered in its context otherwise it cannot be 
considered realist. For example, an American military shooting video game, such as 
AŵeriĐa’s Arŵy (2002), can be described as ͚ƌealistiĐ͛ iŶ its poƌtƌaǇal of Đoŵďat oƌ ǁeapoŶƌǇ 
but not realist, as to the American public it represents a scenario outside of their context. 
Nuclear apocalyptic films and games, while inherently fantastical, can utilise multiple 
elements to create realism, such as Missile Command͛s use of ƌeal-world weaponry to 
represent real nuclear anxieties and Wasteland͛s ƌeal-world inspired geo-political backstory. 
GalloǁaǇ͛s defiŶitioŶ of ƌealisŵ ǁill therefore be used to analyse the extent to which Five, 
Panic, Missile Command and Wasteland accurately reflect the contextual social-realism of 
nuclear anxiety in their representations of nuclear war and apocalypse. This offers insight 
and assists in highlighting the elements of civil defence that persisted and caused it to 
remain stagnant while nuclear apocalyptic culture continually and effectively reflected 
shiftiŶg ŶuĐleaƌ aŶǆieties. UltiŵatelǇ, GalloǁaǇ͛s defiŶitioŶ of soĐial ƌealisŵ indicates the 
                                            
1 Cited in AleǆaŶdeƌ ‘. GalloǁaǇ, ͚“oĐial ‘ealisŵ iŶ GaŵiŶg͛, Game Studies, (Vol 4, No.1, 
2004), http://bit.ly/1p5yEGm, last accessed Ϭϴ “ept ϮϬϭϲ: GalloǁaǇ, ͚“oĐial ‘ealisŵ iŶ 
GaŵiŶg͛, Game Studies, (Vol 4, No.1, 2004), http://bit.ly/1p5yEGm, last accessed 08 Sept 
2016. 
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progression of reflective and thus representational qualities in each film and game to then 
better understand the reasons behind the caricature of civil defence seen in Fallout.   
 Before proceeding, some terms ŵust fiƌst ďe defiŶed. ͚NuĐleaƌ apocalyptic͛ culture is 
a termed borrowed from Kenneth D. Rose in his book One Nation Underground: The Fallout 
Shelter in American Culture. Here, Rose defines the term as culture "based on anxieties 
about nuclear war and its aftermath".2 This term is used throughout this thesis in reference 
to this definition. Secondly, the term ͚ĐoŶteǆtuallǇ ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ Đultuƌe͛ is used iŶ ǀaƌious 
forms throughout this study. This phrase is best defined from a Cultural Studies perspective 
and is iŵpleŵeŶted iŶ the appƌoaĐh to this studǇ͛s Đultuƌal aƌtefaĐts iŶ ƌelatioŶ to ͞the 
social relations of production, distribution, consumption and use out of which they 
eŵeƌge.͟3 For example, Five is analysed in the context of its 1951 release to assess the 
extent to which it reflects the nuclear anxieties of that period. Furthermore, it must be 
noted that the terms 'atomic', 'hydrogen' and 'nuclear' are used often in this study in 
reference to weaponry. It is important to highlight that the word 'nuclear' is an umbrella 
term under which 'atomic' and 'hydrogen' fall. Atomic bombs, otherwise known as fission 
bombs, and hydrogen bombs, otherwise known as thermonuclear bombs, are both types of 
nuclear weapons.4 
  
                                            
2 Rose, One Nation Underground, p.38. 
3 Douglas KellŶeƌ, ͚Toǁaƌd a CƌitiĐal Media/ Cultuƌal “tudies͛, iŶ ‘hoŶda Haŵŵer & Douglas 
Kellner, ed., Media/ Cultural Studies, (Peter Lang Publishing, 2009), p.20.  
4 Stephanie Pappas, 'Hydrogen Bomb vs Atomic Bomb: What's the Difference?', Live Science, 
http://bit.ly/1Rgp8iy, last accessed 31 Aug 2016. 
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  Chapter One 
Civil Defence & the Shelter Debates 
 
This chapter analyses the dichotomy between real fears and propagandistic 
optimism in nuclear anxieties among the American public during the civil defence and 
fallout shelter debates of the 1950s and early 1960s. By comparing government propaganda 
and nuclear apocalyptic culture as seen in the press, it assesses the extent to which these 
formats effectively represent the reality of nuclear anxiety during the period and how far 
they attempted to pacify the American population. This chapter also highlights the 
persistent elements of civil defence initiatives that continued into the early 1960s in order 
to better establish the manner in which civil defence failed to change with the times and 
thus remained unrepresentative of contextual nuclear anxieties.  
 
The 1950s  
After 324 days of the US airlifting in supplies to circumvent StaliŶ͛s ďloĐkade of BeƌliŶ 
from 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949, Moscow finally conceded. Throughout the incident the 
Soviets still possessed no atomic bomb, yet many Americans believed that war had become 
inevitable and that the use of nuclear weapons was a certainty.1 These concerns were soon 
realised when the Soviets developed their own bomb. The US, having lost its atomic 
monopoly, was intimidated by this parity.2 While this moment catalysed US-Soviet political 
tensions throughout the following four decades, in the 1950s and early 1960s its 
psychological impact was felt by the American public. More so than ever before, the 
prospect of a war in which nuclear weapons would be used now loomed over the nation. 
Fears among the US public that the Soviet Union would attack American cities with atomic 
weapons began to increase and throughout the 1950s polls returned results that found 
public anxiety towards such weapons to be on the rise.3 However, while expectations of a 
nuclear war increased, preparedness did not, and by 1961 and the peak of the Berlin Crisis, 
                                            
1 Martin McCauley, Russia, America and the Cold War, 1949-1991, (Pearson Longman, 
2004), p.35 
2 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War, (2005; Penguin Books, 2007), p.35. 
3 Hazel Gaudet EƌskiŶe, ͚The Polls: AtoŵiĐ WeapoŶs aŶd NuĐleaƌ EŶeƌgǇ͛, Public Opinion 
Quarterly, (Vol.27, No.2, 1963), p.157. 
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an overwhelming majority of Americans had not considered making the preparations 
thought necessary to survive such an event.4  
 This lack of preparation became increasingly obvious during the flashpoints of 
conflict, such as the Korean War which began in June 1950 and ravaged the North-east 
Asian peninsula for three years. While the war provided no definitive outcome, what it 
produĐed ǁas a pƌeĐedeŶt; that a ͚hot͛ ǁaƌ Đould take plaĐe, ǁith the ĐouŶtƌies ǁieldiŶg 
atomic weapons without said arms being used.5 But most tellingly during the conflict, 76 
percent of the American public believed another World War would take place in the next 
five years, and following it, anxieties regarding war and nuclear war changed little until the 
early 1960s.6 These early fears were reflected in a Collier’s magazine article entitled 
͚Hiƌoshiŵa U.“.A.͛. Puďlished iŶ August ϭϵϱϬ, the aƌtiĐle theoƌised the impact of the same 
atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima hitting New York City. Inspired by John 
HeƌseǇ͛s Hiroshima, a narrative re-creation of the atomic attack using the stories of 
suƌǀiǀoƌs, ͚Hiƌoshiŵa U.“.A.͛ aŶd siŵilaƌ speĐulatiǀe aƌtiĐles that followed were more 
extravagant treatments of such ideas. These articles were written, as Monteyne argues, in 
an attempt to ͞Ŷatuƌalize the daŶgeƌs of ŶuĐleaƌ ǁaƌ͟, to ŵake it seeŵ as ͞iŶeǀitaďle, 
teŵpoƌaƌǇ aŶd suƌǀiǀaďle͟ as aŶǇ Ŷatuƌal disasteƌ.7 This idea was reinforced not only due to 
the use of Hersey's Hiroshima account, but thanks to the authoƌ͛s utilisatioŶ of ͞IŶĐideŶts ... 
related in circumstances identical with or extremely close to those which really happened 
elseǁheƌe iŶ Woƌld Waƌ II.͟8 Readers in the 1950s, familiar with descriptions and images of 
bombings in World War II would have thus associated the destruction described in 
speculative atomic attack articles with their understandings of destruction in WWII, and 
particularly the devastation of Hiroshima, that had been so heavily publicised.9 However, 
the authoƌs͛ ǀaƌǇiŶg attitudes toǁaƌds atoŵiĐ ǁaƌ ǁould ƌesult iŶ eitheƌ a stoƌǇ that tells of 
the slow death of its main characters or the rebirth of society, which would often see the 
                                            
4 Rose, One Nation Underground, p.18. 
5 Gaddis, The Cold War, p.50. 
6 Toŵ W. “ŵith, ͚TƌeŶds: The CuďaŶ Missile Cƌisis aŶd U.“. PuďliĐ OpiŶioŶ͛ iŶ The Public 
Opinion Quarterly, (Vol.67, No.2, 2003), p.267. 
7 Monteyne, Fallout Shelter, pp.1-2. 
8 JohŶ Leaƌ, ͚The “toƌǇ of this “toƌǇ͛, Collier’s, (August 5 1950), p.11. 
9 Monteyne, Fallout Shelter, p.3: 'Atomic Age', Time, (Aug 20 1945), pp.29-36. 
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world purged of the unworthy, a persistent element in earlier nuclear apocalyptic culture.10 
Regardless, articles that attempted to naturalise nuclear war were nonetheless based in 
reality; reflecting the anxieties of the time - that atomic war with the Soviet Union was 
inevitable and would be devastating, even if its victims were to survive.11 
But despite their intended message or accurate representation, these narratives 
ǁeƌe iŶspiƌed ŵoƌe ďǇ ͞seŶsatioŶalisŵ aŶd pƌopagaŶda͟ thaŶ geŶuiŶe faĐtual aŶalǇsis.12 
WheŶ ǁe ĐoŶsideƌ that U“ Điǀil defeŶĐe plaŶŶeƌs iŵpleŵeŶted the aƌtiĐles' ͞seƌious, if 
flaǁed, pƌojeĐtioŶs of huŵaŶ aŶd stƌuĐtuƌal ďehaǀiouƌ iŶ the afteƌŵath of attaĐk͟ as the 
primary basis for official government survival guidance, civil defence initiatives were 
therefore formed around sensationalism, even utilising the notions of a biblical purge or 
judgement to inspire preparedness among the public.13 In doing so, civil defence planning 
attempted to naturalise war just as speculative magazine articles had, to make it seem 
inevitable yet survivable. But instead, attempts to use sensationalism as official advice can 
be seen to go beyond the images portrayed in Collier’s to present misguided and overly 
optimistic perceptions of nuclear war.  
Survival Under Atomic Attack (1950) was the first attempt by the Office of Civil 
Defense, the agency in charge of civilian care in the case of a military attack on the US, to 
educate the US public about the dangers of nuclear war. On its first page, in bold print, the 
manual offeƌed ƌeadeƌs ƌeassuƌaŶĐe that ͞You CaŶ “U‘VIVE. You ĐaŶ liǀe thƌough aŶ atoŵ 
ďoŵď ƌaid aŶd Ǉou ǁoŶ͛t haǀe to haǀe a Geigeƌ ĐouŶteƌ, pƌoteĐtiǀe ĐlothiŶg, oƌ speĐial 
tƌaiŶiŶg iŶ oƌdeƌ to do it.͟14 From the outset, Survival can be seen to exaggerate the 
likelihood of survival during nuclear war even more so than Collier’s. For example, 
͚Hiƌoshiŵa U.“.A.͛ desĐƌiďed high leǀels of destƌuĐtioŶ aŶd the hoƌƌoƌs of ƌadiatioŶ ďuƌŶs, 
eǆpƌessiŶg that ͞“oŵe ǁeƌe ďuƌŶed so ďadlǇ theiƌ skiŶ Đaŵe off iŶ shƌeds. Otheƌs were 
ǀoŵitiŶg.͟15 Survival, on the other hand, reassured readers that there is little to fear from 
radiation as it ͞is Ŷot Ŷeǁ oƌ ŵǇsteƌious͟; afteƌ all, ͞all of us haǀe ďeeŶ ĐoŶtiŶuallǇ 
                                            
10 Monteyne, Fallout Shelter, p.5 
11 Rose, One Nation Underground, p.56. 
12 Cited in Monteyne, Fallout Shelter, p.5. 
13 Monteyne, Fallout Shelter, p.5 
14 Survival Under Atomic Attack, (United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p.3: Cited 
in Rose, One Nation Underground, p.23. 
15 JohŶ Leaƌ, ͚Hiƌoshiŵa U.“.A.͛, Collier’s, (August 5 1950), p.13. 
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ďoŵďaƌded ďǇ ƌadiatioŶ eǀeƌǇ houƌ aŶd daǇ of ouƌ liǀes.͟16 Optimistic and misguided 
reassurances such as this are key aspects of civil defence and remain persistent over the 
course of the conflict. But in reality, public opinion regarding the threat of nuclear war 
aligned far more with the morbidity of speculative articles than with such propagandistic 
civil defence initiatives, which failed to represent the reality of public nuclear anxiety. 
Public opinion polls in August 1950 found that of the 73 percent of people who 
believed the Soviet Union possessed an atomic bomb, 91 percent agreed that it was likely 
they would use them on American cities.17 Despite the fact that the Soviets would not 
develop a hydrogen bomb for another three years, the same poll also found that of the 85 
percent of people who had heard of the hydrogen bomb, 80 percent believed the USSR 
would use it against the US.18 Reminiscing about the period, one-peƌsoŶ Ŷoted that ͞I Ŷeǀeƌ 
knew much about the bomb, but it was something to be afraid of. It was something to kill 
off a ďuŶĐh of people … the ŵost gƌeatest daŶgeƌous thiŶg iŶ the ǁoƌld.͟ AŶotheƌ defiŶed 
ǁhat theǇ ďelieǀed to ďe the ďoŵď͛s poǁeƌ – ͞DestƌuĐtioŶ, just plaiŶ eǀeƌǇthiŶg is ďuƌŶiŶg 
up, eǀeƌǇthiŶg is dead. It ǁas just goiŶg to kill off eǀeƌǇthiŶg͟.19 Speculations about the 
likelihood and consequences of nuclear war among the US public were seemingly rampant. 
While magazine articles mirrored these concerns, portraying famous American cities and 
landmarks destroyed by atomic fire and the people scalded by radiation, early civil defence 
initiatives, as epitomised by Survival, failed to tackle such anxieties. 
Speculative nuclear attacks exemplified the 1950s as the public developed a morbid 
fascination with them, leading to their widespread publication in national, state and local 
newspapers. For example, The Syracuse Herald-American published an article in November 
ϭϵϱϬ eŶtitled ͞MǇthiĐal Foe Tells Hoǁ CitǇ Was Boŵďed͟; aŶ aƌtiĐle that desĐƌiďed the 
destruction of Syracuse, New York from the perspective of the Soviet soldier who bombed 
the city.20 Meanwhile, Collier’s iŶ its OĐtoďeƌ ϭϵϱϭ issue, eŶtitled ͞Pƌeǀieǁ of the Waƌ We 
Do Not WaŶt͟ desĐƌiďed the iŵpaĐts of Woƌld Waƌ III. AƌtiĐles like this ĐoŶtiŶued to appeaƌ 
                                            
16
 Survival Under Atomic Attack, (United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p.8. 
17 Hazel Gaudet EƌskiŶe, ͚The Polls: AtoŵiĐ WeapoŶs aŶd NuĐleaƌ EŶeƌgǇ͛, Public Opinion 
Quarterly, (Vol.27, No.2, 1963), p.157. 
18 Ibid., p.157. 
19 MiĐhael J CaƌeǇ, ͚PsǇĐhologiĐal fallout͛, in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, (Vol.38, No.1, 
1982), p.21. 
20 ͚MǇthiĐal Foe Tells Hoǁ CitǇ Was Boŵďed͛, Syracuse Herald-American, (November 12 
1950), http://bit.ly/2bZ03q3, last accessed 05 Sept 2016. 
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across the country throughout the 1950s and into the early 1960s, with more and more 
adventurous and graphic descriptions. Rose cites two examples of such articles that 
encapsulate the way in which such stories were seeping into popular culture in diverse 
ways. Good Housekeeping͛s out of ĐhaƌaĐteƌ destƌuĐtioŶ of “t. Louis iŶ ϭϵϱϴ aŶd the Los 
Angeles Times͛ deǀastatioŶ of theiƌ oǁŶ ĐitǇ iŶ ϭϵϲϭ, (rarely the subject of such attacks due 
to its sprawling nature) illustrate the increased popularity of such stories.21 By the mid-
1950s even the civil defence planners began to take advantage of them. 
Following World War II, the Office of Civil Defense was under the authority of the 
National Security Resources Board (NSRB). In 1950 the NSRB produced bulletins that 
provided civil defence guidance to individual states; however, they were met with extreme 
criticism. In particular, the Mayor of San Francisco, Elmer E. Robinson, complained that the 
attitude towards nuclear war presented by the bulletins was to merely accept the 
inevitable.22 In the interest of developing more informative guidelines, executive action 
brought about the creation of the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), established 
in 1950. Every year following its formation the FCDA conducted its ǇeaƌlǇ ͞OpeƌatioŶ Aleƌt͟ 
exercise; a programme designed to test the preparedness of the American public. However, 
in 1956, Operation Alert saw official civil defence planners encouraging the publication of 
speculative nuclear apocalyptic articles. Intended to test the preparedness of US cities, the 
FCDA created newspaper special editions that many feared would stand to scare more 
people than educate them.23 The edition of the Buffalo Evening News from July 20 1956 is a 
pƌiŵe eǆaŵple of this as the headliŶe ƌead ͞ϭϮϱ,ϬϬϬ KŶoǁŶ Dead, DoǁŶtoǁŶ IŶ ‘uiŶs͟.24 
The storǇ told of the deǀastatioŶ iŶ Buffalo, Neǁ Yoƌk, statiŶg that ͞UŶkŶoǁŶ thousaŶds of 
BuffaloŶiaŶs aƌe pƌesuŵed dead͟. ͞The Buffalo skǇliŶe has disappeaƌed͟ aŶd ͞NothiŶg 
distiŶguishaďle ƌeŵaiŶs͟ ǁith ͞The eŶtiƌe Niagaƌa FƌoŶtieƌ … uŶdeƌ a state of eŵeƌgeŶĐǇ.͟25 
One might be forgiven for thinking that such devastation is reminiscent of the horrors 
described in other similar articles. However, the FCDA͛s OpeƌatioŶ Aleƌt also saǁ otheƌ 
                                            
21 Cited in Rose, One Nation Underground, pp.56-61. 
22 Robinson quoted in Harry B. Yoshpe, Our Missing Shield: The U.S. Civil Defense Program in 
Historical Perspective, (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1981), p.115: Cited in 
Rose, One Nation Underground, p.23. 
23 Rose, One Nation Underground, (2001), p.62. 
24 ͚ϭϮϱ,ϬϬϬ KŶoǁŶ Dead, DoǁŶtoǁŶ IŶ ‘uiŶs͛, iŶ Buffalo Evening News, (July 20 1956), p.1. 
25 Ibid. 
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special edition newspaper stories that pushed the organisation's own propagandistic 
agenda.26 
The Grand Rapids Herald͛s OpeƌatioŶ Aleƌt stoƌǇ, siŵilaƌlǇ titled ͞ϭϲ,ϮϬϬ Die as H-
Boŵď Leǀels GƌaŶd ‘apids͟ had a ǀeƌǇ siŵilaƌ toŶe to Buffalo͛s iŵagiŶed attaĐk, hoǁeǀeƌ 
here readers were told that the FCDA had successfully evacuated the city, saving the lives of 
136,000 people. Readers were also pƌeseŶted ǁith aŶ illustƌatioŶ titled ͞DeadlǇ Path of H-
Boŵď Fallout͟ that shoǁed the ƌadiatioŶ fƌoŵ a ŵushƌooŵ Đloud spƌeadiŶg outǁaƌd.27 The 
FCDA pushed their own propagandistic notions of nuclear war survival, reflecting the same 
optimism seen in Survival juxtaposed against the representative morbidity of speculative 
attack articles. This strange melding of the tone of otherwise competing media was not seen 
again in official civil defence planning, as the puďliĐ͛s fasĐiŶatioŶ ǁith suĐh aƌtiĐles ǁaŶed 
following the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, some depictions of nuclear war and anxiety, 
unintentionally reminiscent of Operation Alert, will be seen. For example, the manner in 
which morbidity and reassurance are combined here to form a confused meaning can be 
seen in the civil defence guide Fallout Protection (1961), discussed below, which presented 
its own disorderly perception of nuclear war survival. 
                                            
26 Rose, One Nation Underground, (2001), p.62. 
27 ͚16,200 Die as H-Boŵď Leǀels GƌaŶd ‘apids͛, Grand Rapids Herald, (July 21 1956), p.1. 
Figure 1 - Screenshot from Duck and Cover, Dir. Anthony Rizzo, (Archer Productions, Federal 
Ciǀil DefeŶse AgeŶĐy, ϭ9ϱϭͿ, Filŵ., aĐĐessed ǀia ͚DuĐk AŶd Coǀer ;ϭ9ϱϭͿ Bert The Turtle͛. 
Online Video Clip. Youtube. Accessed 06 April 2016. <http://bit.ly/MeAWC9>. 
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But even before the FCDA͛s OpeƌatioŶ Aleƌt iŶitiatiǀes saǁ a fiĐtioŶal ĐƌossiŶg oǀeƌ of 
fear and reassurance, they had created multiple forms of preparatory advice. A different 
form of muddled guidance can be seen clearly in their 1951 Duck and Cover instructional 
survival video. This information regarding nuclear attack preparations was designed to 
educate school children with comic books and films using the character Bert the Turtle to 
teaĐh theŵ hoǁ to ͚duĐk aŶd Đoǀeƌ͛.28 These light-hearted depictions of civil defence 
pƌepaƌatioŶ ǁeƌe iŶteŶded to ͞defaŶg͟ the idea of ŶuĐleaƌ attaĐk aŶd ƌeassuƌe ĐhildƌeŶ that 
knowing how to respond to atomic attack was half the battle. Figure one demonstrates such 
imagery. But in reality, just like Survival, they did little to relieve fear and failed as a 
representation of anxiety in the early 1950s.29 
The Duck and Cover instructional video contains official advice from the FCDA to 
provide children with the then necessary guidance on how to respond to an atomic attack. 
The cartoon character of Bert the Turtle is used to ease children into the idea of being 
prepared, but the bulk of the film grounds itself in reality by using live action footage. Paul 
aŶd PattǇ kŶoǁ that ďeiŶg ƌeadǇ ͞ŵeaŶs ǁe ǁill all haǀe to ďe aďle to take Đaƌe of 
ourselves.͟ TheǇ kŶoǁ theǇ ŵust duĐk aŶd Đoǀeƌ if a ŶuĐleaƌ ďoŵď eǆplodes ǁithout 
warning and, as the video shows, they do so. As they walk down a pavement with no 
protection other than a brick wall, seen in figure two, Paul and Patty duck and cover and are 
commended on their speed and precision in doing so. Meanwhile, on his way to a cub scout 
meeting, Tony sees a flash and, following the instructions of Duck and Cover jumps off his 
ďike to Đuƌl up Ŷeǆt to a sŵall pieĐe of ĐoŶĐƌete iŶ the ƌoad. ͞ToŶǇ kŶoǁs that it helps to get 
to aŶǇ kiŶd of Đoǀeƌ͟ aŶd ͞he staǇs doǁŶ uŶtil he is suƌe the daŶgeƌ is oǀeƌ.͟ At the saŵe 
time, while barbequing on holiday, a family sees the flash of a nuclear explosion. Instantly, 
they press themselves to the ground and hide beneath the picnic blanket. The family 
͞kŶoǁs ǁhat to do, just as Ǉouƌ oǁŶ faŵilǇ should.͟30 It cannot be denied that in each of 
these scenarios there is little else that can be done for protection, and perhaps the given 
instructions provided a sense of reassurance regardless of how flawed it may have been. 
                                            
28 United States Federal Civil Defense Administration, Bert the Turtle says Duck and Cover, 
(U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951). 
29 Rose, One Nation Underground, (2001), pp.128-131. 
30 Duck and Cover, Dir. Anthony Rizzo, (Archer Productions, Federal Civil Defense Agency, 
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However, the film is undeniably more concerned with making people feel safe as opposed 
to actually keeping them safe; after all, without providing any in-depth understanding of 
what the flash or heat of a nuclear attack could do to you, the film tells us that ͞EǀeŶ a 
Ŷeǁspapeƌ ĐaŶ saǀe Ǉou fƌoŵ a ďad ďuƌŶ.͟31  
As Rose states, this was the one theme that encapsulated civil defence education: 
the insistence that nuclear war be presented to its audience in the most routine way 
possible.32 But in an attempt to reassure children of their safety using the thin veil of 
cartoon characters, simple slogans and easy to follow instructions, these videos did in fact 
make the experience of regular, in-school air raid drills, conducted in roughly one quarter of 
all schools by 1951, all the more terrifying.33 In interviews conducted by journalist Michael J. 
Carey printed in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, adults reminisced about their time as 
ĐhildƌeŶ duƌiŶg the ϭϵϱϬs. OŶe stated that he kŶeǁ ͞No desk is goiŶg to stop ŵe fƌoŵ 
getting completely wiped out, and the people they sent around from Civil Defense to lecture 
us ĐoŶfiƌŵed ŵǇ ǁoƌst douďts.͟ EǀeŶ CaƌeǇ hiŵself Ŷoted that ͞The ŵushƌooŵ Đloud, 
which I had seen in newsreels and newspapers, visited my dreams. I knew that if the bomb 
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Figure 2 - Screenshot from Duck and Cover, Dir. Anthony Rizzo, (Archer Productions, 
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ǁeƌe dƌopped, I ǁould ďe a ǀiĐtiŵ.͟34 Children were given little sense of ease by these 
images, let alone were such possibilities naturalised or defanged for them.  
After all, the images seen in school, supported by air raid drills that consistently 
forced children to cower in the basement with no indication of whether it was in fact a drill 
or the real thing, were strengthened by media. Films like Them (1954) and It Came from 
Beneath the Sea (1955) consistently reminded children of their closeness to nuclear attack 
and radioactive dangers.35 In fact, in the same interviews with Michael Carey, one person 
Ŷoted of ŶuĐleaƌ ǁeapoŶs that ƌadiatioŶ ͞ǁould kiŶd of ŵutate people aŶd kiŶd of ŵake 
them something like lepeƌs.͟ AŶotheƌ Ŷoted that ͞theǇ [atomic weapons] were creators of 
soŵethiŶg ƌeallǇ ŵoŶstƌous͟. CaƌeǇ, iŶ his ĐoŶteǆtual uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg, fiŶishes the ŵaŶ͛s 
stateŵeŶt ĐlaiŵiŶg these ĐƌeatioŶs to ďe ͞ƌadiatioŶ ŵutaŶts͟.36 Film critic Bob Stephens, 
noted of the film Five (1951), watching it in the cinema as a child, that he ͞ǁas ǀeƌǇ 
receptive to Fiǀe’s spirit of pessiŵisŵ͟ aŶd that ͞the filŵ ƌeallǇ sĐaƌed͟ hiŵ.37 While Five will 
be discussed below, from this it can be seen that multiple cultural influences meant that the 
normalisation of nuclear war among children seemingly failed despite propagandistic 
reassurances. Historian Doris Kearns Goodwin summarises this anxiety, noting of her own 
Đhildhood that despite ďeiŶg ďoŵďaƌded ǁith iŶstƌuĐtioŶal iŵageƌǇ, ͞the Cold Waƌ ǁas Ŷot 
an abstraction. It was the air-raid drills in school, the call for bomb shelters, and exposure to 
the deliberately unsettling horror of civil-defeŶse filŵs.͟38  
While most forms of civil defence propaganda in the 1950s can be seen to fail as a 
representation of the anxieties, it is more important to note that the same attempts at 
normalisation, seen somewhat in Survival but clearly in Duck and Cover, remain prevalent in 
both the early 1960s and 1980s. Despite shifting perceptions of nuclear war and general 
nuclear anxieties, civil defence did little to change with the times while nuclear apocalyptic 
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culture adapted to represent the moral ambiguities that arose with the fallout shelter 
debates of the early 1960s, as discussed below. 
 
The 1960s  
Throughout the 1950s the American public experienced a rather fatalist view of the Cold 
War. Pessimism pervaded the air as many believed that their chances of survival were next 
to none, so there was little use preparing.39 But in 1961, a less than friendly meeting 
between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev set in motion events that would cause 
debates regarding the survivability of nuclear war to become headline news.  The June 1961 
Vienna summit saw the Soviet leader express his wish to renegotiate access routes across 
East GeƌŵaŶǇ to West BeƌliŶ, statiŶg that ͞If theƌe is aŶǇ atteŵpt ďǇ the West to interfere, 
theƌe ǁill ďe ǁaƌ.͟ KhƌushĐheǀ͛s pƌoĐlaŵatioŶ, sooŶ to ďe ƌealised ďǇ the puďliĐ iŶ a less 
thaŶ ƌeassuƌiŶg ŶatioŶal speeĐh ďǇ the PƌesideŶt, ǁas ŵet ďǇ KeŶŶedǇ͛s ƌespoŶse – ͞TheŶ 
theƌe ǁill ďe ǁaƌ, Mƌ. ChaiƌŵaŶ. It͛s goiŶg to ďe a ǀeƌǇ Đold ǁiŶteƌ.͟40  
On July 25 1961, Kennedy told the American public of the Soviet threat in Berlin, 
calling for a $3.24 billion budget increase for the military and a $207 million fund for civil 
defeŶĐe, statiŶg ͞We have another sober responsibility: to recognize the possibilities of 
nuclear war in the missile age, without our citizens knowing what they should do and where 
theǇ should go if ďoŵďs ďegiŶ to fall, ǁould ďe a failuƌe of ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ.͟41 But Kennedy 
was unwilling to ask for the multibillion dollar civil defence programme experts 
recommended to prove that the US remained strong in the face of Soviet threats.42  Instead 
he Đalled foƌ AŵeƌiĐaŶ faŵilies to ďuild theiƌ oǁŶ ďoŵď shelteƌs so theǇ ͞ĐaŶ still ďe 
saǀed͟.43 He ended the speech with a bleak summary of the times, reminding the US public 
that ͞iŶ a theƌŵoŶuĐleaƌ age, aŶǇ ŵisjudgeŵeŶt oŶ eitheƌ side aďout the iŶteŶtioŶs of the 
other could rain more devastation in several hours than has been wrought in all the wars of 
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huŵaŶ histoƌǇ.͟44 As ‘ose ĐoŶteŶds, KeŶŶedǇ͛s speeĐh indicated what many had feared; 
that the American home had been moved to the frontlines of the Cold War.45 But 
regardless, motivation for the US to construct shelters to protect against what Kennedy 
indicated to be a likely nuclear war was lacking despite being given ample reason. 
KeŶŶedǇ͛s atteŵpt to fulfil his ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ of eduĐatiŶg the puďliĐ Đaŵe iŶ 
December 1961, in the form of a government survival pamphlet entitled Fallout Protection: 
What to Know and Do about Nuclear Attack. Endorsed primarily by Kennedy and Secretary 
of Defence Robert McNamara, this peculiar publication suffered from a similar problem as 
previous civil defence initiatives. By portraying to its readers the seriousness of nuclear war 
while also reassuring them that they could survive, Fallout Protection positioned itself in a 
self-contradictory position. The manual starts by discussing the severity of a nuclear war, 
statiŶg ͞The aƌeas of ďlast aŶd fiƌe ǁould be scenes of havoc, devastation, and death … it 
would be a time of extraordinary hardship – ďoth foƌ the NatioŶ aŶd foƌ the iŶdiǀidual͟ ǁho 
͞ǁould ďe pƌeǇ to stƌaŶge ƌuŵouƌs aŶd feaƌs.͟46 It cannot seem to emphasize strongly 
enough how awful such an event would be, before then conflictingly statiŶg that ͞if 
effeĐtiǀe pƌeĐautioŶs haǀe ďeeŶ takeŶ iŶ adǀaŶĐe, it Ŷeed Ŷot ďe a tiŵe of despaiƌ.͟47 The 
contrast in message is reminiscent of the Operation Alert newspaper articles that adopted 
depressingly realist outlooks of nuclear war that mirrored public anxiety while contrasting 
them with optimistic information that attempted to reassure. Crucially, Fallout Protection 
ĐleaƌlǇ ƌeseŵďles ϭϵϱϭ͛s Survival in its use of reassuring optimism. Despite the fact that its 
information regarding the effects nuclear war is updated to match the period, the façade of 
optimism and normalisation presented to readers remains much the same. As a result of 
these mixed messages, the pamphlet was panned by critics for its limited scope and lack of 
effective advice for use outside of the very specific parameters of its five megaton blast 
standard. After all, such a standard was an obsolete consideration as the Soviets had 
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developed a hydrogen bomb with a yield of roughly fifty-eight megatons in that same 
year.48 
This confusion in message is illustrative of a trend which extended beyond the scope 
of this pamphlet alone. A survey conducted in November 1961 found that of 1,474 
respondents, only 0.4 percent, equal to six families, had taken precautionary measures in 
case of nuclear attack.49 So while the government and the media urged people to prepare, 
few listened. While notions of fatalism in the face of nuclear war were partially to blame, 
with one-peƌsoŶ statiŶg ͞If it happeŶs, it happeŶs͟, the Đost of suĐh shelteƌs had a major 
impact. Surveys revealed that of the families who had constructed shelters, half belonged to 
those with an income of $15,000 or more, which is just below $10,000 more than the 
average household income at the time.50 But it ǁas people͛s peƌĐeptions of fallout after a 
nuclear attack that seemingly contributed to a lack of family shelter construction, as surveys 
found that 27 percent of those without shelters were confused about the effects of fallout 
while 25 percent had either the wrong information or knew nothing about it whatsoever. In 
fact, of those who owned shelters, the figures were similar with 25 percent of people being 
confused and 21 percent possessing incorrect or no information.51 This was not helped 
when businessmen, eager to capitalise on these fears, subsequently declared themselves 
experts in the fallout shelter business, as their television adverts encouraged anxieties and 
confusion.52 Ultimately, public opinion was largely shaped by the media who had arguably 
incited the shelter debates with the misinformation they had been provided with by experts 
who hotly debated the effectiveness of a fallout shelter programme.53 
Fallout shelters now became the hot topic for magazines and newspapers. While the 
popularity of shelters as a topic of discussion had seeped into magazines to create 
ƌefleĐtioŶs of OpeƌatioŶ Aleƌt͛s Đƌossoǀeƌ of Điǀil defeŶĐe aŶd ŵedia, Life went one step too 
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far, making claims that caused the vilification of home fallout shelters among the US 
public.54 In an issue of Life published in September 1961, the magazine laid out guidance 
and plans for homemade fallout shelters along with a page dedicated to a supportive 
message from President Kennedy.55 In weighty, realistically presented articles, Life 
showcased the ͞“iŵple ‘ooŵ iŶ BaseŵeŶt Built ǁith CoŶĐƌete BloĐks͟, the ͞Big Pipe iŶ the 
BaĐkǇaƌd uŶdeƌ Thƌee Feet of Eaƌth͟ aŶd ͞A Douďle-walled Bunker for Safety above 
GƌouŶd͟.56 All three of these sections discussed the pros and cons of each construction, 
each with a sense of morbid optimism – ͞EǆĐept foƌ the ĐoŶĐƌete flooƌ, the shelteƌ Đould ďe 
built by any enterprising do-it-Ǉouƌself faŵilǇ.͟57  
Declaring that shelters could save 97 percent of the population in the event of 
nuclear attack in September 1961, by January the following year they had retracted the 
claim.58 Instead, Life was now less certain, insisting that ǁhile ͞shelteƌs ǁould soŵeǁhat 
iŶĐƌease the ĐhaŶĐes of suƌǀiǀal͟, theǇ Ŷoǁ oŶlǇ ͞ŵight saǀe ŵillioŶs of liǀes͟.59 But the 
updated advice still failed to create a consensus on home fallout shelters. After all, in 
December 1961 it was reported by a Kennedy aide "that shelters had become the chief 
domestic concern" and the confusion surrounding their effectiveness was "a fad verging on 
hysteria."60 Confusion gripped the nation even further as a lack of agreed guidance from the 
government, scientists and other experts confused the information provided by Life and 
thus worsened understandings of nuclear attack, fallout and fallout shelters for the public. 
Life͛s shiftiŶg peƌĐeptioŶs ƌepƌeseŶt a diffeƌeŶt seŶse of ŶuĐleaƌ aŶǆietǇ thaŶ that of the 
1950s seen in speculative articles, as the debates regarding fallout shelters saw a divided 
public, confused by the disparity of expert opinions. These Life articles therefore effectively 
represent the shifting paradigms of public anxiety more so than the civil defence initiatives 
of the early 1960s which continued to attempt normalisation. 
Due to this confusion, rather than being told that shelters were the effective course 
of action, it was instead left up to the individual to decide whether they constructed their 
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oǁŶ shelteƌ oƌ ǁhetheƌ theǇ should ͞tƌust iŶ luĐk aŶd goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͟ to get ďǇ.61 The public 
ǁeƌe thus foƌĐed to ĐoŶsideƌ the ƋuestioŶ that ͞ǁheŶ the sĐieŶtists aŶd eǆpeƌts so hotlǇ 
disagƌee oǀeƌ ŵatteƌs of faĐt, ǁhiĐh side should he ďelieǀe?͟62 This lack of guidance 
surrounding the issue shifted nuclear anxiety to match the confusion seen in the shelter 
debates. In December 1961, 49 percent of people believed that their chances of surviving a 
nuclear attack were either 50-50 or below, while 43 percent believed they had a very good 
chance of survival. When compared to levels of anxiety in the UK and Canada, where 
chances of survival were believed to be 50-50 or below by just 34 and 36 percent 
respectively, public sentiment in the US is effectively reflected by the dramatic shift 
portrayed in Life. In comparison, the strange dichotomy of morbidity and optimism seen in 
the Kennedy administration's Fallout Protection fails as a representation of reality.63 In Life͛s 
January 1962 issue in which they retracted their claims about fallout shelters, members of 
the public expressed their opinions, clearly indicating the disparity of public opinion. One 
ŵaŶ Đlaiŵed that ͞Life has to go oŶ. Foƌ that shelteƌs ŵust ďe ďig eŶough foƌ huŶdƌeds … 
theǇ should ďe ďuilt uŶdeƌ fedeƌal oƌ state pƌogƌaŵs͟. Otheƌs Đlaiŵed that "the ĐouŶtry 
should ďe ŵade so stƌoŶg Ŷo oŶe ǁould daƌe attaĐk us, aŶd ǁe ǁouldŶ͛t Ŷeed shelteƌs at 
all.͟64 Regardless of their stance, the likelihood of nuclear war, brought about by the shelter 
debates, was a leading topic of discussion. As these public quotations further demonstrate, 
Life had shifted their own perception on the fallout shelter debates to closely resemble the 
public sentiment of confusion. Therefore, Life͛s iŶitial aƌtiĐles ƌegaƌdiŶg fallout shelteƌs ĐaŶ 
be seen to reflect the misinformed civil defence initiatives of the 1950s while it's retraction 
in 1962 represents the shifting public perceptions of nuclear war. 
The American public were never convinced of their need to retreat underground, but 
the period saw a great debate perpetuated by propagandistic civil defence initiatives that 
failed to reflect nuclear anxieties in an attempt to alleviate them. Instead, civil defence 
initiatives persisted down a route of normalising nuclear war. On the other hand, Life 
magazine shifted their own perceptions to offer at least some insight into the reality of 
puďliĐ aŶǆieties. KeŶŶedǇ͛s aĐĐeptaŶĐe of his ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ to pƌoteĐt the AŵeƌiĐaŶ people 
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incited the shelter debates through fears over Soviet action in Berlin and the likelihood of 
nuclear war as an outcome. However, the nuclear anxiety witnessed in the period can be 
seen to stem from the presence of misinformation and optimism seen in civil defence 
propaganda throughout the 1950s that seemingly infected the shelter debates. 
 
Conclusion 
While speculative nuclear attack articles can be seen to represent elements of 
misinformation, they were based on understandings of war and destruction witnessed 
during World War II and did not endeavour to educate but merely to naturalise. This 
allowed for the stories to be imbued with realistic portrayals of destruction and can 
therefore be seen to effectively represent the realities of public nuclear anxiety. However, 
nuclear survival propaganda utilised reassurance and optimism to try and further normalise 
and educate the public about the same events seen in Collier’s and other publications. Such 
attempts tried overly hard to reassure readers and can be seen to fail in their representation 
of actual anxieties when used as an analytical window into the period. Furthermore, civil 
defence propaganda in the form of Bert the Turtle and the Duck and Cover initiative cannot 
be said to reflect the anxieties of children either, as their fears were bolstered by attempts 
to normalise nuclear war through regular air raid drills. Therefore, speculative magazine 
aƌtiĐles that satiated the audieŶĐe͛s appetite foƌ ŵaĐaďƌe depiĐtioŶs of ŶuĐleaƌ attaĐk aƌe 
more representative of genuine nuclear anxiety in the 1950s. 
However, the former separation of civil defence and nuclear speculation which 
collided in the Operation Alert special edition newspapers saw the blending of both the 
morbidity that reflected real anxieties and the reassuring optimism that did not. While it 
cannot be said that the shelter debates witnessed a direct development of this fusion, 
insofar as they were influenced by media and informed by disparate expert opinion, 
magazines nevertheless became crucial in determining the trajectory of public anxiety due 
to their contrasting, misinformed and generally confused advice. Therefore, while 
speculative articles can be seen to represent early nuclear anxieties, civil defence initiatives 
did not, with the FCDA's Operation Alert articles drawing together both to incite a uniquely 
misguided and contradictory attempt at normalising nuclear war. 
Much like Survival, Fallout Protection consisted largely of these attempts to 
normalise nuclear war through reassurance, an aspect of civil defence that failed to 
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disappear throughout this period or with the resurgence of civil defence in the 1980s.  On 
the other hand, while Life magazine articles presented fallout shelters in a manner that 
incited confusion, their retraction of such information can in fact be seen to represent the 
public perception of shelters and the confusion surrounding them. This is indicative of the 
shift away from nuclear fear in the 1950s towards the anxious confusion of the early 1960s. 
As the Kennedy administration attempted to fulfil the PƌesideŶt͛s pƌoŵised responsibility to 
protect the nation, the debates that ensued caused confusion among the public. While this 
was worsened by the disparity between experts, civil defence changed little with these 
shiftiŶg peƌĐeptioŶs of ŶuĐleaƌ ǁaƌ, ŵakiŶg suĐh iŶitiatiǀes uŶƌepƌeseŶtatiǀe of the puďliĐ͛s 
nuclear anxieties in both the 1950s and early 1960s. 
The following chapter will analyse the manner in which direct depictions of nuclear 
war and apocalypse in film can be seen to represent the realities of shifting perceptions of 
nuclear war, so as to understand later representations and inform the analysis of post-Cold 
War nuclear apocalyptic culture as seen in the video game Fallout (1997).  
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Chapter Two 
Nuclear Apocalyptic Films 
 
 Following the employment of Hollywood by the US government and Committee of 
Public Information to spread patriotism invoking propaganda during World War II, the 
American film industry dominated the international cinema market. Therefore, upon 
returning to its regular output after the war, Hollywood became a world entertainer and, as 
a ƌesult, ͞a ŵajoƌ pƌopagaŶdizeƌ foƌ the AŵeƌiĐaŶ ǁaǇ of life.͟1 While science fiction 
magazines had been the first to tap into early nuclear tensions prior to the development of 
the Soviet bomb, the 1950s, as we have seen, saw a surge in nuclear apocalyptic fiction 
across a broad spectrum of mediums.2 As well as magazines, books were a popular and 
powerful means of telling nuclear apocalyptic stories. On the Beach (1957) offered 
audiences a glimpse into the depressing futility of survival, A Canticle for Lebowitz (1959) 
chronicled the fictional purging of intellectuals in the aftermath of a nuclear apocalypse and 
Level 7 ;ϭϵϱϵͿ plaĐed huŵaŶitǇ͛s suƌǀiǀal iŶ the haŶds of ƌesideŶts aŶd peƌsoŶŶel of aŶ 
uŶdeƌgƌouŶd shelteƌ. But ĐiŶeŵa, as a ǀisual ŵediuŵ, ŵoƌe ĐapaďlǇ tapped iŶto the puďliĐ͛s 
anxieties, portraying the end of the world, the loneliness of a holocaust and hopes for the 
future. But while some films might be regarded as propagandistic of ͞the American way of 
life͟, ŶuĐleaƌ apocalyptic films reflected public anxieties, representing an aspect of reality 
rather than the perception of it which civil defence initiatives can be seen to do. 
The fiƌst filŵ to diƌeĐtlǇ depiĐt a ŶuĐleaƌ apoĐalǇpse oŶ sĐƌeeŶ ǁas AƌĐh Oďoleƌ͛s Five 
(1951). A deconstruction of public anxieties surrounding radiation and societal renewal, Five 
presents us with multiple representations of nuclear war and apocalypse that represent 
anxieties of the period. While it contains elements of misinformation regarding the effects 
of nuclear war and circumstances of a post-nuclear world, the film presents a pessimistic 
and overall bleak tone that resembles the nature of speculative newspaper articles. While 
‘aǇ MillaŶd͛s Panic in Year Zero (1962) is reminiscent of propagandistic attempts to 
reassure the public and normalise nuclear war, its messy interpretation of moral turmoil in 
the face of post-apocalyptic survival encapsulates the same confusion seen in media during 
                                            
1 Gaƌth “. Joǁett, ͚HollǇǁood, PƌopagaŶda aŶd the Boŵď: NuĐleaƌ Iŵages iŶ Post Woƌld Waƌ 
II Filŵs͛, Film & History, (Vol.18, No.2, 1988), p.30. 
2 Rose, One Nation Underground, (2001), p.41. 
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the shelter debates. As we have seen, speculative nuclear apocalyptic magazine fiction is an 
effective tool by which to assess the reality of nuclear anxiety in the 1950s, with the turmoil 
of the early 1960s reflected in flip-flopping magazine articles. However, propagandistic civil 
defence guides and education failed to reflect public anxieties or the shifting perceptions of 
nuclear war throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s. When we compare Five and Panic 
with the representations of anxiety previously discussed, to what extent can each film be 
seen as an effective representation of nuclear anxiety during the period? 
 
The 1950s – Five (1951) 
 Survival Under Atomic Attack sold itself as a ŵeaŶs ďǇ ǁhiĐh people Đould leaƌŶ ͞the 
ďoŵď͛s tƌue daŶgeƌs.͟ Survival's committed optimistic reassurances regarding radiation told 
the puďliĐ that ͞IŶ spite of the huge ƋuaŶtities of liŶgeƌiŶg ƌadioaĐtiǀitǇ loosed ďǇ atoŵiĐ 
eǆplosioŶs, people foƌtuŶatelǇ aƌe Ŷot likelǇ to ďe eǆposed to daŶgeƌous aŵouŶts͟.3 But as 
we have seen, public anxieties did not match the attitudes towards nuclear war that Survival 
suggested. Five plays heavily on the fears and anxieties similarly seen in speculative articles, 
particularly those surrounding the effects of fallout, which, while retrospectively erroneous, 
can be seen to reflect public anxieties, propped up by same notions of idyllic societal rebirth 
previously mentioned.  
 
Plot Summary 
We are first introduced to Rosanne (Susan Douglas), as she frantically ventures 
through the mountains and various small towns looking for signs of life. Soon she comes 
across a house and inside, a man named Michael (William Phipps). Michael tells Rosanne 
that he survived the deadly, radioactive clouds of nuclear war quite implausibly in an 
elevator at the top of the Empire State Building. A pregnant Rosanne confesses she was in 
hospital protected by a lead-lined x-ray room. Soon, Charles (Charles Lampkin) and Mr 
Barnstaple (Earl Lee) arrive. Both are bank workers who survived by hiding in the bank's 
vault. Barnstaple, sick with radiation poisoning, then asks to be taken to the beach. Soon 
after they arrive, he dies, but not before Eric (James Anderson), the final member of the 
group, washes up on shore. In the most ludicrous tale of all, Eric recounts how he survived 
                                            
3 Survival Under Atomic Attack, (United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p.3: p.21 
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the holocaust atop Mount Everest. Convinced the group are all immune to the dust clouds, 
Eric believes they should go to the city to find more people, while Michael and Charles 
disagree. Rosanne goes with Eric to the city in search of her husband and when leaving, Eric 
kills the suspicious Charles. In the city the pair find numerous bodies, one of which belongs 
to ‘osaŶŶe͛s spouse. As EƌiĐ ĐhaŶges faĐe, aggƌessiǀelǇ foƌĐiŶg ‘osaŶŶe to staǇ ǁith hiŵ, he 
notices the same boil-like marks on his chest that killed Barnstaple. He runs away and 
Rosanne walks back to the mountains. But while en-route her new-born baby dies. She 
eventually finds Michael and the two are left to evidently rebuild the world anew. 
 
Nuclear Depiction 
As the film opens, peaceful clouds drift by before giving way to a large nuclear explosion. 
Superimposed lettering fills the screen as the mushroom cloud expands, informing the 
audieŶĐe that this ǁill ďe ͞a stoƌǇ aďout the daǇ afteƌ toŵoƌƌoǁ͟. As a seĐoŶd nuclear 
explosion is seen, another superimposed paragraph appears, further assuring us of the 
iŵpeŶdiŶg fate of huŵaŶitǇ: ͞The deadlǇ ǁiŶd passeth oǀeƌ it/ AŶd it is goŶe; AŶd the plaĐe 
theƌeof/ “hall kŶoǁ it Ŷo ŵoƌe….͟4 Nuclear gases surround famous landmarks in places like 
Paris, Moscow and New York before an air raid siren can be heard alongside the agonising 
screams of a dying world.  
We are provided with very little sense as to the scale of physical destruction caused 
by the nuclear attack at the start of Five other than that it has killed everyone. Initially, it 
must be noted that the 1950s saw a large amount of uncertainty regarding the size, scale 
and side-effects of a nuclear explosion and because of this, Stephens argues, Five is able to 
take many artistic liberties.5 These can be seen clearly in the manner in which both Michael 
and Eric survived. The implausibility of both circumstances detract from the seriousness of 
the situatioŶ ďǇ todaǇ͛s staŶdaƌds, ďut iŶ Đontext they act as believable possibilities 
considering limited factual understandings at the time. This especially is prevalent when 
considering that Survival Under Atomic Attack, ĐoŶsisteŶtlǇ suggests that to ͞Fall flat oŶ 
Ǉouƌ faĐe͟ offeƌs a ďetteƌ ĐhaŶĐe of survival and that the spreading ƌadiatioŶ ͞ǁould ďe 
                                            
4 Five, Diƌ. AƌĐh Oďoleƌ, ;Coluŵďia PiĐtuƌes, ϭϵϱϭͿ, Filŵ: “tepheŶs, ͚D is foƌ DooŵsdaǇ: Fiǀe͛, 
in Rickman, ed., The Science Fiction Film Reader, p.120. 
5 “tepheŶs, ͚D is foƌ DooŵsdaǇ: Fiǀe͛, iŶ ‘iĐkŵaŶ, ed., The Science Fiction Film Reader, 
p.129. 
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ďloĐked ďǇ the gƌouŶd oƌ ďǇ ďuildiŶgs.͟6 The same absurdity can be said for all the 
circumstances under which the group survived as none offer any assurance of protection in 
reality.7 However, Oboler does well to highlight legitimate notions of lingering radiation as 
Michael stresses that ͞It͛s the Đities theŵselǀes, ǁheƌe the ďoŵďs fell the ƌadiatioŶ͛s 
thiĐkest.͟8 Much like how speculative magazine and newspaper articles were based more 
around sensationalism, as previously mentioned, Five can be seen to contain similar 
misconceptions of the effects of nuclear war and radiation. But much like such articles, this 
does not stop Five from representing nuclear anxieties in its use of tone. Rather than the 
effects of radiation being the prevalent issue, it is the ĐhaƌaĐteƌ͛s feaƌ of ƌadiatioŶ iŶ the 
cities that reflects reality, thereby creating an accurate representation of anxiety.  
While the liďeƌties takeŶ ďǇ Oďoleƌ ŵight Đall iŶto ƋuestioŶ the filŵ͛s ƋualitǇ ďǇ 
ŵoƌe ŵodeƌŶ staŶdaƌds, the filŵ͛s iŶteŶtioŶ ǁas to ďe a ĐautioŶaƌǇ aŶd dƌaŵatiĐ ŵessage.9 
Due to this, instead of considering its misperceptions of nuclear effects, its reception in 
                                            
6 Survival Under Atomic Attack, (United States Government Printing Office, 1950), pp.6-10. 
7 “tepheŶs, ͚D is foƌ DooŵsdaǇ: Fiǀe͛, iŶ ‘iĐkŵaŶ, ed., The Science Fiction Film Reader, 
p.129. 
8 Perf. William Phipps, Five, Dir. Oboler, Film. 
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Figure 3 - Screenshot from Five, Dir. Arch Oboler, (Columbia Pictures, 1951), Film. 
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1951 must be considered by the standards of both its cautionary intent and its reflection of 
ŶuĐleaƌ aŶǆietǇ. As “tepheŶs ƌightlǇ poiŶts out, ͞it is ĐoŶtaŵiŶated ďǇ aŶǆieties that ǁeƌe 
prevalent in the year of its ŵakiŶg͟, eŶĐapsulatiŶg ͞The feaƌ of the Gƌeat Fiƌe aŶd death-by-
ƌadiatioŶ͟ that ƌuŶs ͞iŶ its ďoŶes.͟10 Foƌ these ƌeasoŶs it ŵust ĐoŶteŶded that the filŵ͛s 
faĐtuallǇ liďeƌal depiĐtioŶ of ŶuĐleaƌ ǁaƌ, ǁhile possiďlǇ daŵagiŶg to the audieŶĐes͛ 
understandings of the topic, reflected public sentiment towards the possibility of an atomic 
holoĐaust, as speĐified iŶ Đhapteƌ oŶe. But this is just oŶe ĐƌuĐial aspeĐt of Oďoleƌ͛s 
representation of this setting. 
 Another key feature used by Oboler in depicting the apocalypse is the overwhelming 
sense of emptiness, as shown in figure three. Rather than the attempt to portray frantic 
paranoia and fear like Ray Milland does in Panic in Year Zero, Oboler elected for the 
opposite. But this presents an altogether unique issue.  The notion that a nuclear disaster 
Đould ǁipe out all life, spaƌiŶg oŶlǇ fiǀe people, is ͞aŶ oǀeƌstateŵeŶt͟, EƌŶest MaƌtiŶ 
ĐoŶteŶds, that seƌǀes to Đƌeate ͞ŵisĐoŶĐeptioŶs aďout poteŶtial ŶuĐleaƌ ǁaƌfaƌe.͟11 But 
while these misconceptions were worsening as a result of public confusion and fear invoked 
by a lack of information and helplessness, it cannot be said that Five perpetuated such 
notions among the public. An American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) poll from June 
1950 shows that 19 percent of those interviewed agreed that another world war could 
mean the end of mankind. A second poll in September 1955 shows an increase, as 27 
percent of people now believed that a war between the US and Russia would mean the end 
of mankind.12 While this ĐaŶŶot pƌoǀe oƌ dispƌoǀe MaƌtiŶ͛s ĐoŶĐeƌŶ that Five perpetuated 
misconceptions, it shows that regardless, Five reflected a shift in nuclear anxieties and 
gradually worsening perceptions of nuclear war between 1950 and 1955, even if that shift is 
only minor. 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, as WaƌƌeŶ ƌightfullǇ states, the filŵ͛s foĐus oŶ a soleŵŶ ǁoƌld aŶd its 
͞ŵoƌaliziŶg toŶe͟ aĐt oŶlǇ to ͞hiŶdeƌ appƌeĐiatioŶ͟ of it.13 While this is true, it is also a 
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ĐƌitiĐal eleŵeŶt of the filŵ͛s ƌepƌeseŶtative capabilities. While today, Five can be seen as 
bleak and dry, when considered in the context of its release period, its serious subject 
ŵatteƌ aŶd doǁŶďeat toŶe taĐkled ͞a theŵe that ǁas on eǀeƌǇoŶe͛s ŵiŶd iŶ the eaƌlǇ 
ϭϵϱϬs.͟14 Therefore, its release, which at the time was met with generally favourable 
ƌeǀieǁs, ͞tǇpified the ŶuĐleaƌ ǁaƌ filŵ͟.15 In doing so, Five͛s theŵe of ŶuĐleaƌ attaĐk aŶd 
holocaust were popularised in American cinema, later to be seen in films like The World, the 
Flesh and the Devil (1959), On the Beach (1959) and Panic in Year Zero (1962). However, 
more can be said for its other, often more dominating themes. These predominantly 
concerned the notions of a biblical societal rebirth, reminiscent of the biblical purges seen in 
speculative articles and used to incite misguided preparedness by the Office of Civil 
Defense.16 This focus was also well in-step with the mood of helplessness that pervaded 
American society in the mid-century.17  
 
Societal Renewal 
To understand the films representation of a societal rebirth, we must first look at the 
disparity between the characters. Eric, a totalitarian racist who believes himself to be of 
Aryan decent, enters the small community only to abruptly and selfishly tear it apart. He 
threatens the group and thus MiĐhael͛s idǇlliĐ ideas of a Ŷeǁ aŶd ďetteƌ ǁoƌld, ǁhiĐh is Ǉet 
another prolific theme of the genre, popularised by Five.18 Both Michael and Charles are 
deĐeŶt, likeaďle ŵeŶ, ŵade ƌelataďle ďǇ eaĐh oŶe͛s geŶeƌal dissatisfaĐtioŶ ǁith life. Chaƌles 
is held back by his skin colour while Michael never attained the success he believes his 
university degree afforded him. Eric, on the other hand, is arrogant and successful. In 
igŶoƌiŶg MiĐhael͛s ƌole as the aĐĐepted soĐietal leadeƌ aŶd iŶ his iŵpeƌsoŶal tƌeatment of 
Chaƌles as a ďlaĐk ŵaŶ, EƌiĐ͛s deĐeitful aŶd despiĐaďle aĐtioŶs seƌǀe as aŶ allegoƌǇ foƌ the 
violence and hatred that tore apart the previous society.19 Indicative of what would come of 
society with the allowance of such malicious ways, the audience is taught to hate Eric as the 
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 Warren, Keep Watching the Skies! Vol. I, p.30. 
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͞oƌdiŶaƌǇ͟ huŵaŶ as he represents the corruption and sin that consumed the pre-
apocalyptic world. As a result, the film suggests that a new world is indeed attainable 
through the destruction of the old, but only through the eradication of all that made the old 
world collapse. The racially motivated murder of Charles is representative of this attitude as 
his role as the only black character exists predominantly to prove Eric as the symbol of 
racism and corruption. When this is compared to some later notions of race in survivalist 
fiction, as shown by The World the Flesh and the Devil, in which ͞‘ace became meaningless 
when compared to the survival of humanity itself͟, it is apparent that the survival of non-
white people takes a backseat in Oďoleƌ͛s post-apocalypse.20 
While the links between a biblical judgment and nuclear war can be seen in 
speculative magazine articles, they find their roots elsewhere. The first test of the atom 
bomb saw Robert Oppenheimer express his solemnity in a quote from Vishnu in The 
Bhagavad Gita ;ϭϴϴϱͿ, deĐlaƌiŶg that ͞I aŵ ďeĐoŵe Death, destƌoǇeƌ of ǁoƌlds͟.21 While 
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 Warren, Keep Watching the Skies!: Vol. II, p.375. 
21 Robert Opennheimer, quoting from The Bhagavad Gita, July 12 1945, http://www.sacred-
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Figure 4 - Screenshot from Five, Dir. Arch Oboler, (Columbia Pictures, 1951), Film. 
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this has been removed from its intended context, the notion of man becoming god-like in 
his destructive abilities is apt in relation to Five as an early depiction of such concerns: as 
previously mentioned, the emptiness and solitude seen in the film taps into anxieties 
relating to nuclear war being the end of mankind. However, what this quote shows us is that 
prior to the invention of the atomic bomb and the creation of culture surrounding it, 
ŵaŶkiŶd͛s Đlosest seŶse of worldwide cataclysm came from religious text, with only natural 
disasters being the closest tangible means of disaster.22 After all, Western narratives, 
starting with the Old and New testaments, have focused on a moral conclusion in the face of 
the end of the world heralding a new beginning, such as the destruction of Garden of 
Eden.23 It therefore seems logical that in an age of uncertainty and helplessness in the face 
of this destructive creation, people would look to traditional narratives to provide these 
moral messages. While Five does not necessarily concern itself with godlike notions of 
destruction beyond its depiction of emptiness, the world created by such an event is one 
which has an allegorical resemblance to the Book of Revelation. 
Such similaƌities aƌe depiĐted iŶ MiĐhael͛s ĐoŶtiŶual aŶd uŶiŵpeded ǁoƌkiŶg of the 
land which not only presents the audience with an idyllic notion of the end of the world, but 
also provides a more biblical perspective, setting up Eric to represent the remaining evils of 
the old ǁoƌld as he tƌies to hiŶdeƌ MiĐhael͛s effoƌts. Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, ĐoŶsideƌ that fƌoŵ the 
side of the house flows a spring, as seen in figure four, ŵuĐh like ͞the ƌiǀeƌ of the ǁateƌ of 
life, bright and crystal, flowing from the throne of God and of the Laŵď͟, as desĐƌiďed iŶ the 
Book of Revelation.24 It is as if everyone but Eric was led to their protective land after the 
evils of the old world were seemingly gone. Stephens even contends that the death of 
‘osaŶŶe͛s Đhild ĐaŶ ďe seeŶ as aŶ aĐt ďǇ a ͞Đƌuel God͟, puŶishiŶg ͞heƌ foƌ ƌetuƌŶiŶg to a 
͞foƌďiddeŶ͟, oƌ poisoŶed ĐitǇ͟ as heƌ dƌeaŵs of faŵilǇ ĐaŶŶot eǆist iŶ this ǁoƌld aŶd ͞heƌ 
destiny is unavoidably tied to the proliferation of her kind, the reproduction of many for the 
common good.͟25 God purges Rosanne of her attachment to the old world as she represents 
the hopes foƌ the futuƌe. With these aspeĐts of a ďiďliĐal apoĐalǇpse iŶ plaĐe, the filŵ͛s 
eŶdiŶg, ǁhiĐh sees MiĐhael aŶd ‘osaŶŶe left aloŶe to ƌestaƌt soĐietǇ afteƌ EƌiĐ͛s soĐietal evil 
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is removed, is set up to represent the idyllic world that was toyed with in speculative 
nuclear attack articles, used by civil defence planners and summarised in Five by Michael –  
 
… it͛s like the ǁoƌld ǁas staƌtiŶg all oǀeƌ agaiŶ. We͛ǀe got a Ŷeǁ chance. To make 
the ǁoƌld that eǀeƌǇoŶe used to talk aďout. We͛ǀe got that ĐhaŶĐe, let͛s ŵake 
the ŵost of it. Let͛s Ŷot ŵake the ŵistakes theǇ did, the ŵillioŶs of theŵ. Let͛s 
Ŷot ďe at eaĐh otheƌ͛s thƌoats. Let͛s ǁoƌk togetheƌ, liǀe togetheƌ, like fƌieŶds.26 
 
Here, Michael encapsulates the hopes of the audience that the world will get better, thereby 
similarly reflecting an aspect of nuclear anxiety. Meanwhile the bleak tone of the film 
separates it from unrepresentative civil defence propaganda as the ending presents a new 
beginning at the expense of everyone except Michael and Rosanne.  
The helplessness of the American public is conveyed by the bleak depiction of an 
empty, lonely and deadly world, and traditional religious narratives succeed in imbuing the 
film with a resounding representational appeal. While the film is undeniably replete with 
misconceptions regarding the effects of nuclear war, as we have seen in chapter one, public 
anxieties related more to pessimistic perceptions of such possibilities. Even if those 
perceptions ended with the rebirth of society, they would more often than not present 
destruction and misery before such an event took place. Five can be seen to do much the 
same, therefore offering, much like Collier’s ͚Hiƌoshiŵa U.“.A.͛, an accurate representation 
of nuclear anxieties in the 1950s. 
 
The 1960s – Panic in Year Zero (1962) 
 Just as Five represented the nuclear anxieties of the early 1950s, Panic can be seen to 
represent the confusion of its own period as induced by the shelter debates. However, 
rather than creating the reflective representation intentionally, Panic is a mess of narrative 
ideas that accidentally mirror the era of its release. The notion of biblical purging and 
societal rebirth are absent here; instead, Panic's focus shifts in line with the changes in 
anxieties during the shelter debates to represent moralistic concerns primarily regarding the 
survival of family. The film has a number of continuity issues in regards to the writing and 
                                            
26 Perf. William Phipps, Five, Dir. Oboler, Film. 
42 
 
directing that make it difficult to successfully analyse its muddled representations of 
radiation and individual survival, theƌefoƌe, iŶstead, this seĐtioŶ ǁill foĐus oŶ the filŵ͛s 
portrayal of morals in regards to family. 
 
 
 
Plot Summary  
 The film opens with the Baldwin family packing their car to go on a camping trip. 
Harry Baldwin (Ray Milland), his wife Ann (Jean Hagen) and their two children Rick (Frankie 
Avalon) and Karen (May Mitchell) are soon on their way out of Los Angeles. After travelling 
for a short while the family see a bright flash. Assuming it to be the worst, they tune into the 
radio and hear nothing. Instead, they see a mushroom cloud rising from the LA skyline. As 
the faŵilǇ atteŵpt to ƌetuƌŶ to LA to saǀe AŶŶ͛s ŵotheƌ they quickly change track when they 
begin to witness the disintegration of society. Instead of returning to LA, Harry decides that 
the family should seek refuge in the mountains until civilisation returns. They stop in a 
nearby town, as yet untouched by the turmoil of nuclear war, to buy supplies. Harry lacks 
the money to pay the hardware store owner, Ed Johnson (Richard Garland), and instead robs 
him at gun point, promising to pay him back. The Baldwins leave, only to soon be accosted 
by three young men on the road. Rick scares them off and the family continue. Eventually 
the Baldwins reach their destination. After living peacefully for a short while, they discover 
that the store owner, Johnson and his wife are living nearby. But soon after, Harry discovers 
the Johnsons dead – killed by the young men from before. Later, Karen is raped by these 
same men before Ann drives them off. Once they hear about it, Harry and Rick track down 
the youths to a local house where the men have taken a girl named Marilyn (Joan Freeman) 
captive and killed her parents. Harry proceeds to kill them and save Marilyn, but the third 
youth, Carl (Richard Bakalyan), is absent. Soon Carl shows up at the family camp and shoots 
Rick. Marilyn exacts her revenge, killing Carl immediately afterwards. The family rush Rick to 
a nearby doctor who tells them to seek help with the army. As they arrive at the army 
outpost they are told that the radiation from the attack is receding and civilisation returning, 
marking the end of the film. 
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'Gun-Thy-Neighbor?' 
While Five presented an apocalypse in which survival was possible but extremely 
unlikely, what differentiates Panic is the notion that surviving nuclear war is more likely but 
is only a possibility if certain morals are abandoned and others adopted. While this moral 
ĐoŵŵeŶtaƌǇ is laƌgelǇ foƌŵed ďǇ the filŵ͛s oǁŶ iŶaďilitǇ to deĐide oŶ a speĐifiĐ ŵoƌal 
message it nonetheless exemplifies the shift in nuclear anxieties since Five. Primarily, the 
moral questions posed by Panic are seen in regards to an all-American family from suburban 
Los Angeles, which serves to ground the extreme circumstances and makes the film 
approachable for the viewing audience. This is especially prevalent as the opening scene of 
the film, in which the family are loading the car for their vacation, is reminiscent of family-
based, American television, situation comedies of the time, such as Father Knows Best 
(1954-60) and Leave it to Beaver (1957-63).27 While Panic was released after both Five and 
The World, the Flesh and the Devil it does even less to associate itself with matters of race as 
non-white characters are completely disregarded. Instead we see that survival in Panic is 
only for suburban families – fifty-percent male, fifty-percent female and one hundred-
percent white. 
Harry Baldwin takes the role of all-knowing patriarch, Ann is the loving yet worrisome 
ŵotheƌ, ‘iĐk is the steadfast, ͞“oŶ Who Gƌoǁs Up͟ aŶd KaƌeŶ is the damsel-like, ignorant 
teeŶage daughteƌ, siŵilaƌ to FƌedeƌiĐk KohŶeƌ͛s Gidget book series.28 Upon seeing the 
flashes of nuclear attack, Harry, all too suddenly begins his role as the all-knowing, family 
defeŶdeƌ ďǇ ĐoƌƌeĐtiŶg AŶŶ͛s optiŵisŵ that the light may have come from Las Vegas. They 
each see the mushroom cloud and Rick spurs his father into action by morbidly stating 
͞We͛ǀe had it Dad, haǀeŶ͛t ǁe?͟29 From here the film introduces its focus of survival in the 
nuclear world.  However, it predominantly ƌepƌeseŶts HaƌƌǇ͛s Ŷeed to pƌoteĐt the faŵilǇ. AŶ 
eǆĐhaŶge ďetǁeeŶ AŶŶ aŶd HaƌƌǇ eaƌlǇ oŶ the iŶ the filŵ ŶeatlǇ suŵs up HaƌƌǇ͛s ŶeǁfouŶd, 
post-nuclear values –  
 
                                            
27 ͚PaŶiĐ iŶ Yeaƌ )eƌo͛, Conelrad, http://bit.ly/28BR4Eg, last accessed 14 June 2016: Warren, 
Keep Watching the Skies!: Vol. II, p.681. 
28 Warren, Keep Watching the Skies!: Vol. II, p.684. 
29 Perf. Frankie Avalon, Panic in Year Zero, Dir. Ray Milland, (American International 
Pictures, 1962), Film. 
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Harry: Look sweetheart, for the next few weeks, survival is going to be on an 
individual basis. At the moment, we have to have food, a way to protect it and a 
ǁaǇ to get ŵoƌe ǁheŶ it͛s goŶe. 
Ann: What do you want to do? Write off the rest of the world? 
HarƌǇ: WheŶ ĐiǀilizatioŶ gets Điǀilized agaiŶ, I͛ll ƌe-join.30  
 
IŶ this ŵoŵeŶt, the audieŶĐe is plaĐed oŶ HaƌƌǇ͛s side as he tƌies to pƌoteĐt the faŵilǇ. But 
sooŶ, HaƌƌǇ͛s ĐhoiĐes ŵake his ŵoƌal ĐhaƌaĐteƌ ƋuestioŶaďle aŶd eǆtƌeŵelǇ ƌeleǀaŶt to the 
period. The fallout shelter debates were heavily embedded with this sense of moral 
ambiguity towards how one should treat other survivors. In an article in Time magazine 
eŶtitled ͚GuŶ ThǇ Neighďoƌ?͛, a ŵeŵďeƌ of the puďliĐ stated that oŶĐe he had ĐoŶstƌuĐted 
his shelteƌ he ǁould ͞ŵouŶt a ŵaĐhiŶe guŶ at the hatĐh to keep the Ŷeighbours out if the 
ďoŵďs fall.͟31 This is one of the most frequently cited articles of the fallout shelter 
controversy and was a crucial aspect of editorial discussions and arguments, to the point 
where the topic became known as the gun-thy-neighbour debates.32 Many spoke out against 
this staŶĐe, ĐlaiŵiŶg that ͞theǇ plaŶ to take iŶ as ŵaŶǇ Ŷeighďouƌs as possiďle iŶ additioŶ to 
theiƌ oǁŶ faŵilies.͟33 The politiĐal jouƌŶalist, NoƌŵaŶ CousiŶs, ďelieǀed that ͞The iŶdiǀidual 
                                            
30 Perf. Ray Milland and Jean Hagen, Panic in Year Zero, Dir. Ray Milland, (American 
International Pictures, 1962), Film. 
31 ͚GuŶ ThǇ Neighďoƌ?͛, Time, (August 18 1961), p.58. 
32 Rose, One Nation Underground, pp.93-94 
33 ͚GuŶ ThǇ Neighďoƌ?͛, Time, (August 18 1961), p.58. 
Figure 5 - Screenshot from Panic in Year Zero, Dir. Ray Milland, (American International Pictures, 1962), Film. 
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must make up his own mind based on his own best understanding of the range of 
pƌoďaďilities iŶ a ŶuĐleaƌ ǁaƌ aŶd his oǁŶ philosophǇ of life͟ as the OffiĐe of Ciǀil DefeŶse 
held no official stance on the matter.34  
This moral ambiguity is witnessed on screen as Harry is initially cautious and cagey 
towards others. He shows extreme distrust towards strangers, as figure five demonstrates, 
foƌ the sake of pƌoteĐtiŶg his faŵilǇ uŶtil the filŵ͛s Đliŵaǆ. At this poiŶt AŶŶ͛s Ŷeaƌ-constant, 
never changing moralistic reminders towards Harry eventually and quite unbelievably cause 
him to lose almost all scepticism towards strangers. He quickly and with little debate agrees 
to invite the hardware store owner, Ed Johnson, back to their camp, despite him being one 
of the few characters with a genuine reason to dislike Harry. While this presents a strange 
change of mind, it portrays both sides to gun-thy-neighbour debates as Harry can be seen to 
finally see the moral light. In terms of quality, this is poorly written and executed as a plot 
point, but in terms of its representation, Panic can here be seen to match the changing 
attitude of Life magazine that quickly changed their stance towards fallout shelters following 
criticisms arising from disparate public and expert opinion. 
The gun-thy-neighbour debates are further represented when Ann is given a 
moment of moral change when she fires upon two men assaulting Karen. Here the film 
attempts to depict Ann as human and thus capable of ǀioleŶĐe despite ƋuestioŶiŶg HaƌƌǇ͛s 
aĐtioŶs thƌoughout the filŵ. AŶŶ͛s ǀioleŶĐe is aŶ aĐt of defeŶĐe – a call to arms without time 
to consider. This is representative of the gun-thy-neighbour debates which saw people claim 
that ͞If Ǉou alloǁ a tƌaŵp to take the place of your children in your shelter, you are in 
eƌƌoƌ.͟35 Ann can be seen to be enacting one side of the moral ambiguities of the period as 
she shoots at the two men to defend Karen. Harry on the other hand represents another 
aspect of these moral questions as his tumultuous moral journey comes to a head when he 
kills the two men who raped his daughter.  
Afteƌ ĐoŵŵittiŶg this aĐt, HaƌƌǇ soleŵŶlǇ states ͞I look foƌ the ǁoƌst iŶ otheƌs aŶd I 
fouŶd it iŶ ŵǇself.͟36 While this character transition is poorly written, it nonetheless 
represents elements of the gun-thy-Ŷeighďouƌ deďates. AƌguaďlǇ, HaƌƌǇ͛s aĐtioŶs aƌe 
                                            
34 NoƌŵaŶ CousiŶs, ͚“helteƌs, “uƌǀiǀal, aŶd CoŵŵoŶ “eŶse͛, Saturday Review, (October 21 
1961), p.66: Rose, One Nation Underground, p.98. 
35 ͞GuŶ ThǇ Neighďoƌ?͟, Time, (August 18 1961), p.58. 
36 Perf. Ray Milland, Panic in Year Zero, Dir. Ray Milland, (American International Pictures, 
1962), Film. 
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ǁaƌƌaŶted uŶdeƌ the ďeliefs of ŵaŶǇ as ͞The faŵilǇ uŶit is assuŵed to ďe the ŵost 
iŵpoƌtaŶt siŶgle eleŵeŶt of ĐiǀilizatioŶ͟ aŶd thus ͞ŵoƌality is a function of faŵilǇ suƌǀiǀal͟ 
meaning that ͞aŶǇthiŶg doŶe to keep the faŵilǇ iŶtaĐt is judged to ďe ŵoƌal͟.37 This is 
where the film presents an unintentionally, particularly confused, yet representative 
depiĐtioŶ of the peƌiod. Despite HaƌƌǇ͛s iŶĐlination that he has gone too far, the film 
ĐoŶtƌadiĐts its pƌotagoŶist ďǇ deeŵiŶg it aŶ aĐt of defeŶĐe to pƌoteĐt the faŵilǇ. HaƌƌǇ͛s 
actions creates ƋuestioŶs aŵoŶg the filŵ͛s audieŶĐe, ǁho theŵselǀes ǁeƌe split iŶ ƌegaƌds 
to the shelter debates in general, as discussed in chapter one. Warren contends that this 
suppoƌts the ŶotioŶ that to suƌǀiǀe the Đollapse of ĐiǀilisatioŶ oŶe ŵust ͞ďe ƌuthless, ďƌutal, 
violent – and be those things first͟ ďefoƌe aŶǇǁaǇ ďeats Ǉou to it.38 The message presented 
here poses several questions to the audience as to whether Harry was right in his actions, 
and what they mean for civilisation. But arguably, his actions are unintentionally 
representative of a pro-gun-thy-neighbour stance, as the faŵilǇ͛s suƌǀiǀal suggests that 
HaƌƌǇ has doŶe ǁell. Despite AŶŶ͛s ŵoƌalistiĐ ĐoŶfliĐt ǁith HaƌƌǇ aŶd HaƌƌǇ͛s ƌegƌet oǀeƌ 
killing, initially Harry wins and the audience can see his actions as fruitful. 
While the filŵ͛s ƌefleĐtioŶ of suĐh ŵoƌal ƋuestioŶs ĐaŶ ofteŶ stƌuggle to piĐk a 
definitive side due to continuity errors in the film's plot, they nonetheless represent the 
reality of the shelter debates through its decision to adopt a pro-gun-thy-neighbour stance 
foƌ the sake of pƌoteĐtiŶg oŶe͛s faŵilǇ. While this ĐaŶŶot ďe said to ƌefleĐt the peƌiod iŶ its 
entirety, it is clearly indicative of the shift in nuclear anxieties towards a focus on survival in 
fallout shelters and moral values towards other people. 
 
Conclusion 
 Over the course of the 1950s and into the 1960s, nuclear anxieties shifted 
dramatically, with the Berlin Crisis and the shelter debates causing the greatest change to 
public perceptions. While chapter one discussed the reflection of public anxieties in 
speculative attack articles, here we can see that nuclear apocalyptic film are a continuation 
of such representations, depicting with greater fidelity the same concerns that the US public 
had. 
                                            
37 Warren, Keep Watching the Skies!: Vol. II, p.682. 
38 Ibid., p.681. 
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Five͛s ĐƌeatioŶ of a ďleak aŶd depressing post-apocalypse was the first time such a 
situation had been witnessed on screen. The film successfully reflects the sense of 
pessimism that the public largely felt towards nuclear war. In relation to concerns regarding 
fallout and total destruction that could be caused by nuclear war, Five succinctly represents 
the anxieties previously discussed. As well as this, it heavily implies a sense of hope behind 
its pessimistic tone, as its morbid attitude collides with religious perceptions of societal 
rebirth to mirror speculative magazine articles further. This juxtaposes any sense of 
reassurance seen in civil defence initiatives as the general morbidity of the film means its 
biblical allegory creates a commentary on the world before nuclear annihilation rather than 
presenting the apocalypse as a survivable situation. Five can therefore be seen as an 
accurate representation of anxieties in the period as well as opposing the messages 
presented by civil defence initiatives. 
 Panic effectively reflects the public anxieties and confusion invoked by the fallout 
shelter debates. While there are multiple meanings to Panic that have not been discussed 
here, but what we can see is that the film initially asks its audience to align itself with a 
moral perspective. While Harry represents the survivalist willing to do anything to protect 
his family, Ann is the moral constant. Poor writing and direction cause the film to 
prematurely abandon these questions in favour of a pro-gun-thy-neighbour stance, but the 
filŵ͛s ƌefleĐtioŶ of the eaƌlǇ 1960s stands, allowing for an accurate representation of the 
period in regards to the moral ambiguities of the fallout shelter debates. 
 Each film clearly demonstrates shifting anxieties over the course of the period, and 
when compared with civil defence initiatives discussed in chapter one can be considered 
accurate representations of such sentiment. However, the representational disparity 
between nuclear apocalyptic culture and civil defence initiatives analysed in these first two 
chapters continue in to the 1980s, and will be seen to heavily influence Fallout͛s own 
representational capacity, as the game utilises these representations and 
misrepresentations extensively. 
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Chapter Three 
Ronald Reagan & the Strategic Defence Initiative 
 
 This Đhapteƌ ǁill aŶalǇse seǀeƌal aspeĐts of PƌesideŶt ‘oŶald ‘eagaŶ͛s attitudes aŶd 
actions towards the Soviet Union during the early and mid-1980s in order to assess the 
reasons for the revival of nuclear anxiety in the US, as reflective nuclear apocalyptic culture 
will be seen to tap into specific characteristics of the period. This resurgence of nuclear 
anxiety followed a period of greater public understanding of nuclear war. People no longer 
looked to pessimistic fantasies for answers but instead towards their national leaders, as 
since 1963 and the Partial Test Ban Treaty, diplomacy was offering the nation and the world 
progressive steps towards nuclear peace.1 It is therefore the case that the speculative 
magazine culture of the 1950s/60s was no longer a prevalent medium reflective of public 
anxieties, so representations of such anxiety are better seen elsewhere. While chapter four 
will analyse competing representations in the video games Missile Command (1980) and 
Wasteland (1988), two contextually contemporary cultural representations of nuclear 
anxiety, this chapter will directly assess nuclear anxieties in relation to persistently 
unchanging civil defence initiatives. This will be done to evaluate the manner in which such 
initiatives once again failed to align with contextual perceptions of nuclear war, upon which 
chapter four will form its analyses. 
 
The Early 1980s 
In its second issue of 1980, Time ŵagaziŶe astutelǇ Ŷoted that ͞It ǁas as though a time warp 
had pluŶged the ǁoƌld ďaĐk iŶto aŶ eaƌlieƌ aŶd ŵoƌe daŶgeƌous eƌa.͟2 While the Cuban 
Missile Crisis of 1962 had arguably been the height of the nuclear anxiety, in the years 
following, the US and USSR found themselves on smoother diplomatic ground. In order to 
reduce the chances of an incident like the Cuban Missile Crisis happening again, a direct 
hotline between Washington D.C. and Moscow was installed, allowing each leader to more 
easily communicate with the other. With this set up, the two nations were able to strive 
towards an easing of tensions, exemplified by the Partial Test Ban Treaty in August 1963, 
the Outer Space Treaty in January 1967 and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in July 
                                            
1 Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear, p.228. 
2 '"MǇ OpiŶioŶ of the ‘ussiaŶs Has ChaŶged Most DƌastiĐallǇ…͛͟, Time, (Jan 14 1980), p.10. 
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1968. Each of these treaties shaped the building blocks on which détente was formed. As 
Moscow sought talks to limit strategic arms for the sake of security in Europe, the Nixon 
administration agreed, resulting in the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) 
in 1972. While new weapon developments quickly made SALT outdated, talks regarding 
SALT II started in 1972, but after years of negotiating difficulties, the talks collapsed 
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 24 1979. 
 President Ronald Reagan took office on January 20 1981, following a tumultuous end 
to JiŵŵǇ Caƌteƌ͛s pƌesideŶĐǇ, the eŶdiŶg of ǁhiĐh is ĐhaƌaĐteƌised ďǇ his dƌaŵatiĐ iŶĐƌease 
of the defence budget.3 Reagan expanded on this spending, presenting a strong and 
aggressive front to the Soviets, who he believed to be ahead of the US in the nuclear arms 
race. This aggression is of key importance as it sets in motion a resurgence of nuclear 
anxiety and a return to civil defence initiatives. As the Reagan administration increased arms 
spending and reintroduced civil defence planning that reflected the initiatives of the 1950s/ 
60s, they were able to convert many of their political critics to support them, eventually and 
practically justifying the President's aggressive stance towards the Soviets to the US public 
and critics of the administration by spinning their political rhetoric to be perceived as heroic.  
Foƌ ŵuĐh of his life, ‘oŶald ‘eagaŶ had paiŶted the “oǀiets as ͞alŵost all ďlaĐk͟, 
while, iŶ his iŶaĐĐuƌatelǇ Ŷoďle ǀieǁ of AŵeƌiĐaŶ histoƌǇ, the U“ ǁas ͞ǁhite͟.4 But for 
Reagan this vision meant more than accepting the status quo of the Cold War like several of 
his political contemporaries – e.g. George H. Bush – were inclined to do. Instead, he sought 
to ͞ďƌeak the staleŵate͟ usiŶg ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ.5 His overly simplistic view of politics and his 
ability to eloquently convey these opinions is perhaps the reason that polling data from the 
1980 and 1984 general elections show the public to be consistently more supportive of 
‘eagaŶ͛s peƌsoŶalitǇ thaŶ of his poliĐies.6 But this did not mean that support for his policies 
was absent. After years of being told that the stalemate of US-Soviet relations was simply a 
faĐt of life, ‘eagaŶ͛s deĐisiǀe toŶe iŶspiƌed Ŷeǁ fouŶd optiŵisŵ foƌ the “oǀiet UŶioŶ͛s 
                                            
3 ͚͟MǇ OpiŶioŶ of the ‘ussiaŶs Has ChaŶged Most DƌastiĐallǇ…͛͟, Time (January 14 1980), 
pp.10-11. 
4 BettǇ Glad, ͚BlaĐk-and-White ThiŶkiŶg: ‘oŶald ‘eagaŶ͛s AppƌoaĐh to FoƌeigŶ PoliĐǇ͛, 
Political Psychology, (Vol.4, No.1, 1983), p.44. 
5 Gaddis, The Cold War, p.218. 
6 Cited in DaŶ Thoŵas aŶd LaƌƌǇ ‘. Baas, ͚‘oŶald ‘eagaŶ iŶ the PuďliĐ MiŶd͛, Political 
Psychology, (Vol.14, No.1, 1993), p.56. 
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demise.7 It was this attitude of aggression towards the Soviet Union that greatly contributed 
to nuclear anxiety in the period.  
Ronald Reagan had spent a large portion of his early career as a Hollywood actor. 
Attaining moderate success as an actor prior to WWII, Reagan had become the president of 
the Screen Actors Guild during the communist purges of the late 1940s and 1950s, as a part 
of which he assisted in House of Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) hearings as a 
witness to supposed communist actions in Hollywood.8 As such, ‘eagaŶ͛s ǀieǁ of the 
Soviets was one formed by Hollywood - Communists were the villains and the West was the 
heroic saviour.9 This opinion was portrayed on June 8 1982 when Reagan gave a speech to 
the British Parliament in which he reaffirmed his stance towards the USSR, boosted by 
Communist action in Poland against Lech Walesa, strongly stating that the communist 
ŶatioŶ ͞ƌuŶs agaiŶst the tide of histoƌǇ͟ aŶd that ͞The deĐaǇ of “oǀiet eǆpeƌiŵeŶt should 
Đoŵe as Ŷo suƌpƌise.͟10 But this attitude was best exemplified less than one year later, when 
on March 8 1983, in a speech delivered to the National Association of Evangelicals, Reagan 
iŶfaŵouslǇ ƌefeƌƌed to “oǀiet poliĐǇ as the ͞aggƌessiǀe iŵpulses of aŶ eǀil eŵpiƌe͟.11  
However, this attitude of aggression was signposted far earlier. Ronald Reagan won 
a laŶdslide pƌesideŶtial ǀiĐtoƌǇ, alloǁed foƌ ďǇ his ͞jauŶtǇ self-ĐoŶfideŶĐe͟ that aďlǇ iŶstilled 
public trust in him.12 This was also partially thanks to the poor public opinion of Carter, 
whose approval ratings, while never particularly consistent, plummeted to a near all-time 
low in late 1980. Carter, who alienated his support base with a resurgence of arms 
expansion, left Reagan with an inheritance of a foreign policy that suited his aspirations. 
What Carter started as mere covert military aid to the resistance movement in Afghanistan, 
Reagan transformed into a refined effort to train Mujahidin fighters, supply them with arms 
                                            
7 Gaddis, The Cold War, p.223. 
8 'House Un-American Activities Committee Testimony, Ronald Reagan', (Oct 23 1947), 
http://bit.ly/2cAX8qd, last accessed 11 Sept 2016: 'Screen Actors Guild Presidents, Ronald 
Reagan, 1947-1952, 1959-1960', SAG History, http://bit.ly/2cvApgy, last accessed 11 Sept 
2016. 
9 Matthews Jr., Duck and Cover, pp.160-161. 
10 Ronald ‘eagaŶ, ͚Addƌess to Meŵďeƌs of the Bƌitish PaƌliaŵeŶt͛, ;PalaĐe of WestŵiŶsteƌ, 
London, UK, June 8 1982), http://bit.ly/2c7vTVm, last accessed 02 Aug 2016. 
11 ‘oŶald ‘eagaŶ, ͚‘eŵaƌks at the AŶŶual CoŶǀeŶtioŶ of the NatioŶal AssoĐiatioŶ of 
Evangelicals in OrlaŶdo, Floƌida͛, ;“heƌatoŶ TǁiŶ Toǁeƌs Hotel, OƌlaŶdo, Floƌida, U“A, MaƌĐh 
8 1983), http://bit.ly/2c7wAhn, last accessed 02 Aug 2016. 
12 Gaddis, The Cold War, p.218. 
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and generally fund all anti-Soviet operations in the region.13 ‘eagaŶ͛s aďilitǇ to adeptly 
communicate and justify actions such as these to the public gained him support. Regularly, 
Time ŵagaziŶe͛s opiŶioŶ ĐoluŵŶ pƌiŶted puďliĐ letteƌs iŶ suppoƌt of the PƌesideŶt͛s 
aggressive policies - ͞HistoƌǇ pƌoǀes that ǁhite ŵeŶ ǁith guŶs kill, those without arms or 
ǁith iŶfeƌioƌ ǁeapoŶs die. CoŵŵoŶ seŶse diĐtates that ǁe aŶd ouƌ allies staǇ ǁell aƌŵed.͟14 
With his approval rating rising to 68 points in May 1981, Reagan set about the continuation 
of Caƌteƌ͛s aƌŵs ďuild-up, instigating a five-year defence plan, which increased the budget to 
$1.6 trillion.15 With this increased budget, Reagan introduced new guidance directives which 
advocated the creation of plans to fight a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, a stance that 
convinced many of his willingness to fight in one.16 He urged that in such an event, the 
͞ŶuĐleaƌ deĐapitatioŶ͟ of the U““‘͛s politiĐal aŶd ŵilitaƌǇ leadeƌship should ďe the foĐus, 
stƌessiŶg that AŵeƌiĐa ŵust ͞pƌeǀail͟.17 
While his approval ratings steadily declined in the second half of 1981, the majority 
continued to support this decision.18 “eeiŶg Caƌteƌ͛s adŵiŶistƌatioŶ as too soft, theǇ ǁeƌe 
satisfied ǁith ‘eagaŶ͛s attitude, and the previously favourable US public opinion of the 
Soviet Union seen in the early 1970s waned throughout the deĐade to ŵatĐh ‘eagaŶ͛s 
stance.19 This aggressive posture saw the Reagan administration increase spending on 
nuclear weapons by 40 percent in an atteŵpt to aĐhieǀe ‘eagaŶ͛s aŵďitioŶs of ǁiŶŶiŶg a 
nuclear war. This push to increase arms brought with it new life for programmes of US civil 
defence.20 Deputy Under Secretary of Defence T. K. Jones, in a 1981 interview with the Los 
Angeles Times, stated that the American public could withstand and even survive a nuclear 
attaĐk. IŶ a ŵaŶŶeƌ ŵiƌƌoƌiŶg the pƌopagaŶdistiĐ optiŵisŵ of the ϭϵϱϬs, he said ͞Dig a hole, 
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Đoǀeƌ it ǁith a Đouple of dooƌs aŶd theŶ thƌoǁ thƌee feet of diƌt oŶ top … It͛s the diƌt that 
does it … If theƌe aƌe eŶough shoǀels to go aƌouŶd, eǀeƌǇďodǇ͛s goiŶg to ŵake it.͟21 The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of Management and Budget rejected such notions, but the 
administration chose to endorse a new programme of civil defence.22  
In 1979 the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had been established. 
It consolidated numerous disaster relief based agencies, including the Department of 
DefeŶse͛s DefeŶse Ciǀil PƌepaƌedŶess AgeŶĐǇ, ǁho ǁeƌe pƌeǀiouslǇ ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ Điǀil 
defence. Following the ‘eagaŶ adŵiŶistƌatioŶ͛s ďaĐkiŶg of a Điǀil defeŶĐe ďudget, FEMA 
initiated a seven-year plan estimated to cost $4.2 billion. The new civil defence plans 
included the mass evacuation of millions of civilians to the countryside, with people 
irrationally believing that a warning of nuclear attack would allow them a week to prepare.23 
FEMA acknowledged the messy absurdity of such a plan, but accepted it on the grounds of 
there being little other choice than to roll over and accept fate. The administration also 
toyed with the possibility of building shelters but rejected the idea as the project was 
estimated to cost $70 billion. Instead, FEMA elected for temporary shelters to be 
constructed in rural areas by evacuees. On top of this, government officials prepared 
instructions for sustaining the economy after a nuclear attack.24 
But FEMA͛s suƌǀiǀal guidaŶĐe ǁas ŵet ǁith ĐoŶfusioŶ fƌoŵ ĐƌitiĐs ǁho fouŶd the 
advice in the organisation's multitude of pamphlets to evoke a familiar sense of reassurance 
and optimism with theiƌ ͞Đalŵ, ĐhattǇ desĐƌiptioŶs of hoǁ to suƌǀiǀe ŶuĐleaƌ ǁaƌ͟, as 
columnist Ellen Goodman described them. She went oŶ to saǇ that ͞It͛s Ŷot suƌpƌisiŶg that 
the Reagan administration, which talks increasingly of nuclear-war-fighting as another 
option, is iŶ faǀouƌ of ďeefiŶg up Điǀil defeŶse plaŶŶiŶg.͟25 Congressman Edward Markey 
told the House of Representatives that no matter the level of planning, civil defence is 
ŵeƌelǇ ͞a ďaŶd-aid oǀeƌ the holoĐaust͟, ǁhile otheƌ ĐƌitiĐs agƌeed, as theǇ had iŶ pƌeǀious 
decades, that civil defence would never effectively protect the nation from nuclear war.26 
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While FEMA created survival guides that matched contextually contemporary 
understandings of the effects of nuclear war, which included succinct descriptions of fallout 
and other aspects of nuclear attack, they nonetheless fell afoul of the same reassuring 
optimism that can be seen to persist since 1950's Survival Under Atomic Attack. In fact, in 
their slightly later 1984 guide, Protection in the Nuclear Age, FEMA even said of evacuation 
that one should keep informed, claiming that ͞AŶǇ attaĐk oŶ the UŶited “tates pƌoďaďlǇ 
ǁould ďe pƌeĐeded ďǇ a peƌiod of gƌoǁiŶg iŶteƌŶatioŶal teŶsioŶ͟ ŵeaŶiŶg that ͞Ǉou ǁould 
have time to take a few preparedness measures which would ŵake eǀaĐuatioŶ easieƌ͟.27 
This perception of the chances of evacuation remained reminiscent of the optimism seen in 
the 1950s and 1960s as it attempted to normalise and reassure the public of the same 
survivability seen in both Survival and Fallout Protection. 
Prior to this resurgence under Reagan, civil defence planning had all but disappeared 
except in the form of non-official information guides. While there were several, the best 
eǆaŵple is CƌessoŶ KeaƌŶǇ͛s Nuclear War Survival Skills (1979), which provides the most 
detailed aĐĐouŶt of suƌǀiǀal tips. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ďaĐkhaŶdedlǇ ĐoŵpliŵeŶtiŶg KeaƌŶǇ͛s ďook, the 
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists stated that ǁhile it pƌeseŶts ͞elaďoƌate diagƌaŵs foƌ ďuildiŶg 
shelters; testing for radiation with a homemade meter; providing for ventilation, filtration of 
ǁateƌ aŶd saŶitatioŶ͟, it deals ͞oŶlǇ ǁith shoƌt teƌŵ suƌǀiǀal, tǁo ǁeeks oƌ so uŶtil the 
ƌadiatioŶ suďsides.͟28 BƌuĐe D. ClaǇtoŶ͛s Life After Doomsday: A Survivalist Guide to Nuclear 
War and Other Major Disasters (1980) ďoƌƌoǁed heaǀilǇ fƌoŵ KeaƌŶǇ͛s guide, ďut still laĐked 
advice about long-term survival. Summarising both books, the same Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists ƌeǀieǁ ƌeĐoŵŵeŶded that ͞the ďest aŶd ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ ŵost hoŶest puďliĐatioŶ is 
probably The Official Government Nuclear Survivors Manual: Everything that is Known about 
Effective Procedures in Case of Nuclear Attack͟, a guide iŶ ǁhiĐh eaĐh of its ϭϵϮ pages aƌe 
blank.29 As Bill Adleƌ, the guide's puďlisheƌ said of it, ͞We thought the AŵeƌiĐaŶ puďliĐ 
should be brought up to date on everything the Government is doing on its behalf. In our 
opinion, that knowledge may well be AŵeƌiĐa͛s oŶlǇ hope foƌ suƌǀiǀal.͟30 Published in 1982, 
                                            
27 Protection in the Nuclear Age, (FEMA, U.S. Government Printing Office 1984), pp.12-13. 
28 Gaddis “ŵith, ͚‘eǀieǁs: Gaddis “ŵith ƌeǀieǁs͛, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, (Vol.39, No.6, 
1983), p.29. 
29 ibid., p.29. 
30 Phil Gailey and Warren Weaver Jr., ͚BƌiefiŶg͛, The New York Times, (Dec 20 1983), 
http://nyti.ms/2aMpOtR, last accessed 07 Aug 2016. 
54 
 
the ďook͛s iƌoŶiĐ take oŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt adǀiĐe ƌeŵaiŶs ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀe of Điǀil defeŶĐe 
planning during the decade, as FEMA continued to publish guides of questionable expertise 
throughout the 1980s, even releasing the Guide for Increasing Local Government Civil 
Defense Readiness During Periods of Crisis as late as 1990.  
While Reagan built up arms and implemented civil defence initiatives to compensate 
for his insistence on a US victory in the nuclear war he predicted, his stance was met with 
unparalleled levels of anti-nuclear sentiment that would eventually go on to attract the 
attention of Reagan͛s suppoƌteƌs. The ƌesuƌgeŶĐe of aŶti-nuclear groups in the late-1970s 
brought with it a call for disarmament. This was considered by prominent peace activists 
Helen Caldicott and Randall Forsberg, as well as numerous church leaders, to be achieved 
most effiĐieŶtlǇ ďǇ eaĐh supeƌpoǁeƌ plaĐiŶg a ͞fƌeeze͟ oŶ theiƌ stoĐkpiles as this would 
allow for a halt to the arms race while maintaining a nuclear deterrent.31 But the movement 
gained a small amount of support from the American Roman Catholic Church who, defying 
their close connections to the Reagan administration, declared that to use nuclear weapons 
except in response to nuclear attack was immoral. Declaring nuclear weapons to be of 
paramount moral importance for humanity, many people who had previously ignored social 
activism now involved themselves with the freeze movement.  
In March 1982, Time ŵagaziŶe pƌiŶted aŶ aƌtiĐle ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith the ͞‘isiŶg feaƌs 
aďout the daŶgeƌs of ŶuĐleaƌ ǁaƌ͟, statiŶg that ͞AŵeƌiĐaŶs are not only thinking about the 
unthinkable, they are opening a national dialogue on ways to control and reduce the 
aǁesoŵe aŶd fƌighteŶiŶg ŶuĐleaƌ aƌseŶal of the supeƌpoǁeƌs.͟32 This coincided with a 
suďstaŶtial dƌop iŶ ‘eagaŶ͛s appƌoǀal ƌatiŶgs, ǁhiĐh had been steadily declining since late-
1981 and continued to do so, finally reaching just 35 points in January 1983.33 The freeze 
movement attained massive backing, with roughly one million people gathering in Central 
Park, New York City, to support the movement in June 1982.34 This short period has been 
cited as a peak of aŶǆieties suƌƌouŶdiŶg the ͞Likelihood of ǁaƌ͟. A poll ĐoŶduĐted 
throughout the 1980s revealed that while more general nuclear anxieties would peak in 
1983, 52 percent of those asked believed World War III was more likely in 1982 than had 
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been the previous year.35 This can be seen as the precursor to the events of 1983 which 
would see a dramatic rise in US-Soviet tensions and one final peak in nuclear anxiety. 
‘eagaŶ͛s aggƌessioŶ toǁaƌds the “oǀiet Union not only reinvigorated a campaign of 
civil defence that very closely mirrored that of the 1950s and 60s, but also brought with it an 
arms build-up that instilled in the public a sense fear capable of uniting large swathes of 
Reagan supporters and ĐƌitiĐs uŶdeƌ the ŶuĐleaƌ fƌeeze ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛s ďaŶŶeƌ. EǆpaŶdiŶg 
upon the movement's typical members like students, housewives and intellectuals, new 
members now filtered in from "respected elites", like mayors, statesmen and military 
officers.36 Reinvigorated civil defence programmes saw national leaders implicitly accept the 
myth that they could survive a nuclear war while also seeming reluctant to dedicate 
themselves to plans for expensive protection that they also recognised could be useless.37 
However, while the administration hesitated to implement civil defence initiatives that 
could further incite nuclear anxiety, Reagan maintained his course of potentially volatile 
nuclear arms spending which resulted in increased nuclear anxiety among the public 
regardless of the civil defence planning that continued to mirror the normalising attempts 
seen previously. 
 
The Mid-1980s 
 The fresh faced nuclear freeze movement did not concern themselves with the 
horrors of bomb tests or the effects of fallout. Instead, attacking the Reagan 
administration's foreign policy, they fought against the arms race.38 Ronald Reagan and his 
chief advisors did not respond well to the growing nuclear freeze movement. Instead, the 
PƌesideŶt Đhaƌged that it ǁas the ͞siŶĐeƌe, hoŶest people͟ who were being manipulated by 
͞soŵe ǁho ǁaŶt the ǁeakeŶiŶg of AŵeƌiĐa͟.39 Reagan claimed to support the idea of a 
freeze to nuclear weapons but only under the circumstances of nuclear parity. After all, his 
justification for the arms build-up had been that America was severely falling behind the 
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USSR in their nuclear capacity. But polls indicated that most Americans refuted this, 
believing the differences in nuclear stockpile sizes to be inconsequential.40 But on March 23 
1983, Ronald Reagan gave a public address to the people of America. In his speech he 
addƌessed Ŷuŵeƌous aspeĐts of his adŵiŶistƌatioŶ͛s ďelief iŶ “oǀiet ŵilitaƌǇ supeƌioƌitǇ, also 
noting that ͞a fƌeeze Ŷoǁ ǁould ŵake us less, Ŷot ŵoƌe, seĐuƌe aŶd ǁould ƌaise, Ŷot 
ƌeduĐe, the ƌisks of ǁaƌ.͟ As the speeĐh dƌeǁ to a Đlose, ‘eagaŶ Đalled upoŶ ͞the sĐieŶtifiĐ 
ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͟ to assist iŶ ĐƌeatiŶg a teĐhŶologiĐal ͞ŵeaŶs of ƌeŶdeƌiŶg these ŶuĐleaƌ 
weapoŶs iŵpoteŶt aŶd oďsolete.͟ 41 This now infamous speech was the first time the world 
heaƌd aďout ‘eagaŶ͛s “tƌategiĐ DefeŶĐe IŶitiatiǀe ;“DIͿ. 
 Among the scientific community that Reagan had so earnestly called upon, most saw 
his idea of space defence systeŵ ͞as aŶ eǆpeŶsiǀe faŶtasǇ͟.42 Considering the technological 
limitations of the period, this was a correct assessment. Reagan hoped that what critics had 
Đoŵe to Đall ͚“taƌ Waƌs͛ ǁould ďe Đapaďle of shootiŶg doǁŶ ŶuĐleaƌ ŵissiles oŶ a tƌajeĐtoƌǇ 
with the US or its allies with the use of laser technology. But this fantasy was far more real 
for officials in Moscow. The concept of SDI broke the conventions of Mutually Assured 
Destruction (MAD) not to mention calling into question the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 
1972 that severely limited the implementation of such systems.43 Regardless of its perceived 
impossibility among the US scientific community, for the Soviets, SDI posed a direct threat 
to nuclear parity. Reagan had already established himself as an aggressive opposing leader 
aŶd ďelieǀiŶg his speeĐh to sǇŵďolise “DI͛s geŶuiŶe iŵpleŵeŶtatioŶ, the “oǀiets feaƌed that 
it would allow for greater American superiority and new found first strike capabilities with 
the potential to negate any Soviet attempt to retaliate against a nuclear attack.44 
Furthermore, the possibility of starting an arms race in space was not a comforting thought 
for a nation that believed that since 1982 the Reagan administration had been pursuing a 
strategy of military superiority in an attempt to externally debilitate the Soviet socio-
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economic system.45 In fact, the USSR, believing Reagan to be unpredictable, became anxious 
that a US nuclear strike was imminent.46 
 In the US, the public responded to SDI. While some supported the expert belief of 
“DI as a ͞faŶtasǇ͟, the Washington Post-ABC News Poll conducted in April 1983 saw 54 
percent of people who had heard of SDI favour its development. Furthermore, in a New York 
Times-CBS Poll from the same month, 67 percent of people said that such a defence system 
͚“hould͛ ďe deǀeloped. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁhile people͛s ďelief iŶ ‘eagaŶ͛s iŶitiatiǀe ǁas Ŷot laĐkiŶg 
in the weeks and months after his speech, concerns persisted about the possibility of 
further technological development worsening the already burgeoning arms race. In the 
same Washington Post-ABC poll people were asked how the development of SDI would 
affect the rate of the US-Soviet arms race, to which 57 percent of people believed it would 
Đause it to ͚IŶĐƌease͛.47 In the public comments section of Time magazine people expressed 
ǀaƌǇiŶg leǀels of suppoƌt foƌ the iŶitiatiǀe, ǁith soŵe ďelieǀiŶg ‘eagaŶ͛s idea to ďe a 
͞shƌeǁd ŵilitaƌǇ stƌategǇ͟ ǁhile otheƌs ǁeƌe ĐalliŶg it ͞a false ƌoad foƌ peaĐe.͟48 While the 
US public seemed split on the idea of space defence with a small majority in support of the 
idea, ‘eagaŶ͛s plaŶ alloǁed hiŵ to take ͞oŶ the ƌole of the peaĐe-loǀiŶg ŶuĐleaƌ ĐƌitiĐ͟, a 
staŶĐe that ǁeŶt ďeǇoŶd the ŶuĐleaƌ fƌeeze ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛s Đall to stop the nuclear arms race. 
He successfully co-opted the morality of his anti-nuclear critics, promising to make nuclear 
missiles ͞iŵpoteŶt aŶd oďsolete͟ ǁhile ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg that the US should uphold its nuclear 
deterrent until such a defence system could be implemented.49 This was met with a 
dƌaŵatiĐ iŶĐƌease iŶ the PƌesideŶt͛s appƌoǀal ƌatiŶgs ǁhiĐh ƌose fƌoŵ ϯϱ poiŶts pƌioƌ to the 
“DI aŶŶouŶĐeŵeŶt to ϰϬ folloǁiŶg it. BǇ the eŶd of ϭϵϴϯ, ‘eagaŶ͛s appƌoǀal ƌatiŶg sat at a 
healthy 53 points and continued to rise.50 However, while Reagan had seemingly quenched 
the anxiety of the nuclear freeze movement by appealing to their moral sensibilities, he had 
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in fact initiated a political rhetoric that ran against the morals of those who now supported 
him. SDI was a sign of peace for the US, but Moscow recognised it as a threat, prompting 
increased levels of paranoia. 
 On September 1 1983, Soviet military authorities on high alert shot down a South 
Korean civilian airliner, KAL-007, that strayed in to their airspace, killing 269 people, 63 of 
whom were American. Refusing to admit the mistake, the Kremlin maintained that the 
plane had been a US attempt to provoke the USSR.51 Reagan, however, confounded by the 
͞aĐt of ďaƌďaƌisŵ͟, Đalled it ͞a Đƌiŵe agaiŶst huŵaŶitǇ͟ that ͞ŵust Ŷeǀeƌ ďe foƌgotteŶ͟.52 
But the attack arguably came in response to what the Soviets perceived as a threat that 
steŵŵed fƌoŵ ‘eagaŶ͛s haǁkish aŶd aggƌessiǀe attitude toǁaƌds aŶ iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ fƌighteŶed 
USSR.53 In the US the incident was reported with inflammatory and dramatic fervour.  
Time magazine echoed ‘eagaŶ͛s outĐƌǇ statiŶg, ͞it was clear that the Soviets had 
Đoŵŵitted a ďƌutallǇ pƌoǀoĐatiǀe aĐt, oŶe that deŵaŶded aŶ uŶaŵďiguous U.“. ƌespoŶse.͟ 
AttƌiďutiŶg ‘eagaŶ͛s “DI pƌogƌaŵŵe ǁith the saŵe peaĐe-seeking commendation as the 
nuclear freeze movement, Time also stated that ͞‘eagaŶ had ďeeŶ sigŶalliŶg a ƌelaǆatioŶ of 
teŶsioŶs oŶ the AŵeƌiĐaŶ side͟, poƌtƌaǇiŶg hiŵ as a ƌeasoŶaďle diploŵat.54 Arguably, as the 
pƌess so ƌeadilǇ adopted ‘eagaŶ͛s staŶĐe toǁaƌds the “oǀiets, theǇ disseŵiŶated ͞the 
faďulous ĐoŶteǆtualitǇ of ŶuĐleaƌ ǁaƌ͟ foƌ ǁhiĐh ‘eagaŶ had alƌeadǇ eǆpƌessed his 
preparedness for.55 This can be seen in opinion polls regarding the likelihood of nuclear war, 
as over the course of 1983 the number of people believing nuclear war with the Soviet 
Union to be at least somewhat likely increased from 37 percent to 43 percent.56 DeGroot 
notes that society cannot effectively function by living in constant fear; as such, few were 
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totally consumed by it, a notion that these statistics are indicative of.57 Nonetheless, they 
also indicate an undeniable rise in levels nuclear anxiety, and while the spike is not as 
dƌaŵatiĐ as the ϭϵϱϬs, it shoǁs hoǁ ‘eagaŶ aŶd his adŵiŶistƌatioŶ͛s aggƌessiǀe attitude 
and impressive political rhetoric were able to shift public opinion in his favour and against 
the Soviets.  
It cannot be said that Reagan was entirely responsible for an increase in perceived 
Soviet aggression through his own aggressive actions, but his attempts to end the arms race 
using SDI while simultaneously maintaining it gained him the support of his biggest critical 
gƌoup. These seeŵiŶglǇ peaĐeful aĐtioŶs alloǁed hiŵ to seeŵ like the heƌoiĐ, ͞ǁhite͟ 
American supporting peace against the now seemingly violent, ͞ďlaĐk͟ “oǀiets, ǁhose 
aĐtioŶs Ŷoǁ justified ‘eagaŶ͛s aggƌessioŶ. This sigŶ of “oǀiet aggƌessioŶ had a haŶd iŶ 
increasing nuclear anxiety, and while levels did not peak when compared to those seen in 
chapter one, it is still regarded by contemporary historians as the closest the two nations 
came to nuclear war since the Cuban Missile Crisis.58   
 
Conclusion 
Ronald Reagan had entered the Presidency with a simple political goal – to break the 
stalemate and defeat the Soviet Union. To accomplish his goal, he set out on a path of 
aggression and preparedness in an attempt to create a strong America capable of squaring 
off with the Soviets and winning an all-out nuclear war. This mind-set created a major divide 
in the country. Following the mass alienation of Caƌteƌ͛s suppoƌt ďase thaŶks iŶ paƌt to his 
foreign policy making, Reagan was able to enter the White House with major support for his 
decisive and simple politics. However, as he set about increasing arms spending to match 
what he perceived to be a superior Soviet Union, he reintroduced Civil Defence initiatives. In 
a return to the general belief among the administration that America could not only win a 
nuclear war but that its people could survive one, civil defence initiatives returned with the 
same persistent elements of reassurance and misguided optimism seen in the 1950s/60s. 
 ‘eagaŶ͛s eaƌlǇ aggƌessioŶ Đaused the ŶuĐlear freeze movement of the late 1970s to 
return with renewed fervour and support from large portions of the public that had initially 
supported ReagaŶ͛s aggƌessiǀe staŶĐe. Hoǁeǀeƌ, in his now infamous SDI speech in 1983, he 
                                            
57 Gerard DeGroot, The Bomb: A Life, (2004; Vintage Digital, 2011), p.320. 
58 Gaddis, The Cold War, p.228. 
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claimed his support for a nuclear freeze, but insisted that it must be done under the right 
circumstances. These circumstances allowed him to introduce SDI. While this garnered 
ŵuĐh ĐƌitiĐisŵ, it ĐoŶǀiŶĐed the ŶuĐleaƌ fƌeeze ŵoǀeŵeŶt of ‘eagaŶ͛s seeŵiŶglǇ legitiŵate 
struggle for peace while the Soviets reacted with what appeared to be aggression. The KAL-
007 incident had in fact stemmed from the paranoid Soviet view of ReagaŶ͛s “DI 
announcement but was successfully spun by Reagan, his administration and large portions 
of the US press to appear as Soviet aggression. With those previously against him now in 
suppoƌt of ‘eagaŶ͛s aŶti-Soviet attitudes, US-Soviet tensions descended into turmoil as 
1983 marked a less substantial but nonetheless important second peak in nuclear anxieties. 
While these anxieties never rose to match the levels seen in previous decades, they 
represent a return to a similar state of affairs. The US-Soviet tensions seen in the 1980s 
relaxed as Reagan opened negotiations in 1984 with the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, 
but regardless, they heavily impacted on popular culture and the growing medium of video 
games similarly to how public anxiety in the 1950s/60s impacted on the new medium of 
science-fiction feature films. As will be seen, the video games that took inspiration from the 
events of the early and mid-1980s astutely reflected the renewed nuclear anxiety brought 
aďout ďǇ the ‘eagaŶ adŵiŶistƌatioŶ͛s aggressive yet convincing political rhetoric.  
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Chapter Four 
Nuclear Apocalyptic Video Games 
 
Missile Command (1980) and Wasteland (1988) are two of the most influential and 
renowned video games of their time, with Missile Command  being the first video game to 
depict nuclear war and Wasteland  being the first detailed representation of a nuclear post-
apocalypse in video games. In a similar fashion to chapter two, this chapter will analyse 
nuclear apocalyptic culture in relation to the period's civil defence initiatives and nuclear 
anxieties to assess the extent to which Missile Command and Wasteland effectively reflect 
the shifting perceptions of nuclear war between the 1950s and 1960s and throughout the 
early to mid-1980s. This chapter will build upon the previous chapter's thematic analysis, 
utilising the established understandings of genuine nuclear anxieties versus 
unrepresentative civil defence initiatives in the period to inform the extent to which Missile 
Command and Wasteland are reflections of contextual nuclear anxieties. 
By 1980, video arcades were well established in the US. Previously, they had been 
filled with electromechanical games, such as the ever-popular pinball, but the introduction 
of video games into arcades came in 1971 with the release of Computer Space. The 
folloǁiŶg Ǉeaƌ saǁ the ƌelease of Ataƌi͛s PONG, the ǁoƌld͛s fiƌst hit ǀideo gaŵe.1 The 
success of PONG was eventually brought into homes on the Odyssey Magnavox console, but 
as development for home consoles became easier and easier the market was flooded with 
games, many of which were of sub-standard quality. In 1977, the console market crashed, 
but thanks to an investment from Atari in the form of a $6 million advertising campaign, by 
1978 sales had recovered. Soon, the burgeoning home console market competed against 
video arcades. While this competition would inevitably lead to a change in the video game 
industry and the eventual 1983 video game market crash, the period between 1980 and 
1982 seemed like a golden age as companies like Atari brought in billions of dollars in 
arcades and on home consoles.2 It was during this period that Missile Command was 
released to great success. But within the decade, long-play adventures and role-playing 
gaŵes ďeĐaŵe the Ŷeǁ iŶdustƌǇ faǀouƌite foƌ ŵost ͚seƌious͛ gaŵeƌs, aŶd as suĐh ƋuiĐk plaǇ, 
                                            
1 Mark J.P. Wolf, ed., The Video Game Explosion: A History from PONG to PlayStation and 
Beyond, (Greenwood Press, 2007), pp.35-36 
2 Ibid., pp.104-105. 
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arcade-esque games became less popular. While most of these took direct inspiration from 
J.‘.‘. TolkieŶ͛s The Lord of the Rings (1954-55), Wasteland (1988) offered a narrative 
fundamentally based in reality.3 
 
The Early 1980s - Missile Command (1980) 
Missile Command͛s pƌeŵise is a siŵple oŶe – defend your six cities from atomic 
annihilation. Players must do this against an array of missiles and nuclear weapons using an 
anti-ballistic missile system (ABM) to shoot them out of the sky. Once the player has shot 
down all the incoming threats, successfully protecting their cities, they move on to the next 
level. The game gets continually harder until the player is defeated. Possibly its biggest 
credit is its refined scope as it depicted an accurate and detailed representation of the Cold 
War and nuclear warfare.4 Considering the game's comparatively minimalist design by 
today's standards, it can be seen to effectively reflect nuclear anxieties brought about by 
Carter's arms build-up and is also representative of perceptions of nuclear war invoked by 
Reagan's aggressive foreign policy. However, due to this minimalism it must be noted that 
the gaŵe͛s ϴ-bit pixel design and limited colour palette restrict direct visual representations 
of reality. Instead, the specified weaponry the player must defend against will be assessed 
alongside their limited visual depiction and considered in relation to their historical and 
contextual representation. 
The game was published by Atari in 1980 and developed by David Theurer.  The idea 
oƌigiŶated afteƌ Theuƌeƌ͛s boss, Steve Calfee, was given the clippings from a magazine article 
aďout satellites fƌoŵ Ataƌi͛s head of ĐoiŶ-operated arcades, Gene Lipkin.5 Immediately, 
Theurer set out to create a Cold War game, capable of making people aware of the horrors 
of nuclear war.6 While developing Missile Command, Theurer had lived near the Ames 
Research Centre (ARC) in Mountain View, California. Here, he would hear the sound of U-2 
                                            
3 Williaŵ M. KŶoďlauĐh, ͚Gaŵe Oǀeƌ?: A Cold Waƌ Kid ‘efleĐts oŶ ApoĐalǇptiĐ Video Gaŵes͛, 
in Daniel Goldberg and Linus Larsson, ed., The State of Play: Creators and Critics on Video 
Games Culture, (Seven Stories Press, 2015), p.193. 
4 Ibid., p.185. 
5 Aleǆ ‘uďeŶs, ͚The CƌeatioŶ of Missile CoŵŵaŶd aŶd the HauŶtiŶg of its Cƌeatoƌ, Daǀe 
Theuƌeƌ͛, Polygon, http://bit.ly/1GFgH8S, last accessed 04 July 2016. 
6 KŶoďlauĐh, ͚Gaŵe Oǀeƌ?͛, iŶ Goldďeƌg aŶd LaƌssoŶ, ed., The State of Play, p.184. 
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plaŶe tests, ǁhiĐh he ǁould see ͞go stƌaight up aŶd souŶd like aŶ atoŵiĐ ďoŵď eǆplodiŶg.͟7 
In fact, Theurer was so affected by the entire creation of Missile Command that he had 
Ŷightŵaƌes oŶĐe a ŵoŶth foƌ a Ǉeaƌ afteƌ the gaŵe͛s deǀelopŵeŶt.8  The combination of 
Theuƌeƌ͛s heaǀǇ emotional investment in the development of the game, his intended 
message and the direct inspiration from the ARC combined to make Missile Command not 
just a landmark in nuclear apocalyptic fiction, but a landmark in both history and video 
games as well. 
Missile Command has garnered massive critical acclaim throughout the years as well 
as high levels of popularity. In fact, its revolutionary and addictive gameplay had made it 
popular even before its release: the Atari consumer division was located in the same 
building as the Missile Command team and Theurer noted that a couple of employees from 
the other office would often spend all day playing the game. As well as this, when the game 
ǁeŶt to Ataƌi͛s testiŶg laďs, Ed ‘otďeƌg, aŶ Ataƌi desigŶeƌ, ǁas suƌpƌised that soŵe testeƌs 
͞ǁould liteƌallǇ haǀe to ǁoƌship that gaŵe foƌ houƌs at a tiŵe. Theiƌ haŶds ǁeƌe sǁeatiŶg, 
aŶd it ǁas a defiŶite adƌeŶaliŶe ƌush.͟9 Its popularity spawned a re-release on the Atari 
2600 home console in 1981 and prompted the development of a two-player sequel, Missile 
Command 2, in 1982. Unfortunately, this never made it past the prototype stage. Beyond 
that, however, Missile Command has seen multiple iterations including, Missile Command 
3D (1995) for the Atari Jaguar, Missile Command (1999) for the PlayStation and PC and 
Missile Command (2007) for the Xbox 360. As well as this, the game has been published by 
multiple other companies for release on their own consoles throughout the years, including 
Sega and Nintendo. Clearly, there is little doubting Missile Command͛s populaƌitǇ. IŶ faĐt, it 
remains a relevant example of nuclear apocalyptic culture in contemporary video game 
culture, as seen in Fallout 4͛s ;ϮϬϭϱͿ iŶ-gaŵe, plaǇaďle paƌodǇ, ͚AtoŵiĐ CoŵŵaŶd͛.10 This 
popularity is unsurprising considering that the morbidity of nuclear apocalyptic culture has 
enticed audiences in times of particularly high nuclear anxiety, as we have seen. Here, 
                                            
7 ͚BloǁiŶg ThiŶgs Up͛, Dreamsteep, (scanned from Morph’s Outpost aŶd the Digital FroŶtier, 
May 1994), http://bit.ly/29lqLv9, last accessed 04 July 2016. 
8 Ibid. 
9 ͚Missile Command, The AƌĐade Video Gaŵe ďǇ Ataƌi, IŶĐ.͛, Gaming History, 
http://bit.ly/29jbmOi, last accessed 05 July 2016. 
10 Fallout 4, Rockville, MD: Bethesda Softworks, Bethesda Game Studios, 2015. 
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however, players experienced the interactivity of trying to stop an unstoppable nuclear war, 
thereby building upon the representations of nuclear anxieties seen previously. 
Despite the technological limitations of the early 1980s, Missile Command utilises a 
plethora of accurate representations of weaponry. As Theurer wanted a realistic depiction 
of nuclear war these representations include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 
multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) as well as the ABM system used 
by players to defeat these incoming warheads. While there are several other weapons 
accurately depicted, ICBMs, MIRVs and ABM are the clearest representations.  
Firstly, the control system of Missile Command is based on anti-ballistic missile 
systems, otherwise known as ABMs, which caused much contention during the 1960s. In a 
Life magaziŶe aƌtiĐle, DefeŶĐe “eĐƌetaƌǇ ‘oďeƌt MĐNaŵaƌa eǆplaiŶed ͞the logiĐ ďehiŶd the 
ABM sǇsteŵ͟, ǁhiĐh ǁas fiƌst seeŶ iŶ a siŵilaƌ ĐapaĐitǇ iŶ ϭϵϱϯ, iŶ the foƌŵ of the Nike )eus 
anti-aircraft missile system – the basis for operational ABM systems.11 McNamara 
championed ABM as a response to the nuclear advancement of China, as their lack of 
ŶuĐleaƌ deǀelopŵeŶt ŵeaŶt the ABM sǇsteŵ ͞ǁill ďe effeĐtiǀe aŶd ƌeŵaiŶ effeĐtiǀe foƌ 
ŵaŶǇ Ǉeaƌs to Đoŵe.͟ “elliŶg it as a ͞DefeŶse FaŶtasǇ͟ agaiŶst ChiŶa, MĐNaŵaƌa ƌespoŶded 
positiǀelǇ to a ƋuestioŶ ƌegaƌdiŶg ǁhetheƌ the sǇsteŵ ͞assuƌes that ǁe ǁill Ŷot ďe 
deǀastated ďǇ a ChiŶese attaĐk͟, statiŶg that ͞That is ĐoƌƌeĐt͟ ďut that ͞it iŶ Ŷo ǁaǇ 
thƌeateŶs the “oǀiet aďilitǇ to deteƌ aŶ AŵeƌiĐaŶ attaĐk.͟12 Nonetheless, most strategic 
analysts warned that the deployment of any significant ABM system could compel the 
Kremlin to act.13 Even the public expressed concern with 50 percent agreeing that an ABM 
system would cause people to believe a Soviet attack was likely.14 The Soviet doctrine 
therefore called for the development of an ABM system to maintain parity with the US. The 
SALT I treaty saw the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972 which limited each nation to two 
systems each – one for the defence of the capital city and other for ICBM missile silos.  
                                            
11 Scott Ritter, DaŶgerous GrouŶd: AŵeriĐa’s Failed Arŵs CoŶtrol PoliĐy, froŵ FDR to 
Obama, (Nation Books, 2010), p.148. 
12 ͚DefeŶse FaŶtasǇ Noǁ Coŵe Tƌue͛, Life, (Sept 29 1967), pp.28A-28C. 
13 Steve Weber, Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control, (Princeton University 
Press, 1991), p.100. 
14 Gƌahaŵ aŶd Kƌaŵeƌ, ͚The Polls: ABM aŶd “taƌ Waƌs: Attitudes Toǁaƌd NuĐleaƌ DefeŶse, 
1945-ϭϵϴϱ͛, The Public Opinion Quarterly, (Vol.50, No.1, 1986), p.128. 
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With articles discussing SALT I filling magazines throughout the early 1970s, ABM 
became a common feature of arms control in the period.15 While it cannot be said that 
Missile Command reflected concerns with ABM systems present in 1980, it certainly 
ĐoŶfƌoŶted the ŵisuŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs of the ͞DefeŶse FaŶtasǇ͟ that had eǆisted pƌeǀiouslǇ, as 
it depicted a flawed system that never allowed the player to win the virtual nuclear war. 
This strengthens the representation of destruction caused by the ICBMs and MIRVs. Unlike 
Five and Panic, this aspect of Missile Command reflects public anxieties established far 
earlier in the Cold War rather than contextual perceptions. This is understandable 
considering Theurer's intentions for the game as it builds upon established perceptions of 
nuclear war to strengthen his intended meaning. 
While the use of ABM as a control system in Missile Command related to anxieties of 
previous years, it nonetheless represents a contextual reality if not contextual nuclear 
anxieties. John Berton, a computer expert involved with the Ohio Supercomputer Graphics 
Project, was commissioned by the American Museum of the Moving Image to write 
descriptive texts for its 1989-90 exhibition, Hot Circuits: A Video Arcade. The exhibition 
comprised a wide selection of video game arcade cabinets intended to show the rapid 
success, artistry and overall importance of video games as a medium within the realm of 
moving images.16 ‘oĐhelle “loǀiŶ, the eǆhiďitioŶ͛s diƌeĐtoƌ, said of BeƌtoŶ͛s ĐoŶtƌiďution, 
that the desĐƌiptiǀe teǆts foƌ the aƌĐade gaŵes highlighted the featuƌes that ͞ŵade eaĐh 
gaŵe uŶiƋue, as ďoth a digital ŵediuŵ aŶd Đultuƌal aƌtifaĐt.͟ Of Missile Command Berton 
noted how it was the only game of the time to implement a separate control for aiming – 
the trackball.17 This control system not only attributed the game with a more fluid and 
fiŶessed gaŵeplaǇ, ďut ǁas Ŷoted ďǇ a ŵilitaƌǇ ƌeĐƌuiteƌ iŶ ϭϵϴϮ to ďe ͞pƌettǇ Đlose to the 
sǇsteŵ I use foƌ aiƌ defeŶse͟.18 In this regard, Missile Command, while representative of a 
previous era's nuclear anxieties nonetheless remained realistic in regards to its ABM control 
system. Considering this, it can be argued that the game prefigured future anxieties, as 
                                            
15 Erin R. Mahan, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States: 1969-1976, Volum XXXII, Salt I, 
1969-1972, (Department of State, United States Government Printing Office, 2010), pp.8-9. 
16 Rochelle “loǀiŶ, ͚Hot CiƌĐuits͛, iŶ J.P. Wolf, ed., The Medium of the Video Game, 
(University of Texas Press, 2001), pp.139-140. 
17 Ibid., p.149. 
18 Cited iŶ KŶoďlauĐh, ͚“tƌategiĐ Digital DefeŶse͛, iŶ Kapell aŶd Elliott, ed., Playing With the 
Past, p.283.  
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Reagan's SDI programme, which was essentially intended to be a modernised form of ABM, 
impacted such sentiment following 1983. 
While ABM is the defence system used by players, ICBMs are the most common 
thƌeat to the plaǇeƌ͛s Đities as they explode on impact, producing a pixelated mushroom 
Đloud, ͞the sǇŵďol of atoŵiĐ destƌuĐtioŶ.͟19 However, similarly to its portrayal of ABM, 
anxieties surrounding ICBMs date back well before 1980. The first successful test of an ICBM 
was conducted on 21 August 1957 by the Soviet Union, but the notion of missiles with such 
destructive power and range had been known of since the use of the German V-2 missile 
during WWII. In fact, the V-2 missile technology had become available to US missile and 
rocket development programmes following WWII, which they used to develop their 
ICBMs.20 Life magazine, in an article about the successful Soviet satellite launch, Sputnik, 
ƌepoƌted iŶ OĐtoďeƌ ϭϵϱϳ that ͞gettiŶg theiƌ satellite up ŵeaŶt that ‘ussia had deǀeloped a 
more poweƌful ƌoĐket thaŶ aŶǇ the U.“. had Ǉet fiƌed͟ aŶd doiŶg so ͞had solǀed iŵpoƌtaŶt 
problems of guidance necessary to aim missiles at U.“. taƌgets.͟21 Even President Dwight D. 
EiseŶhoǁeƌ ǁas Đited eǆpƌessiŶg ĐoŶĐeƌŶ that ͞the ‘ussiaŶs had pƌoďaďlǇ gaiŶed political 
adǀaŶtage.͟22 In fact, with the planned deployment of the Pershing II missiles in central 
Europe, a Time magazine article in December 1979 showed how conventional the discussion 
of such weapons had become, referring to the missiles as a "new bargaining chip" to be 
used in negotiations with the Soviets rather than specifying their destructive capabilities.23 
Beyond the manned bombing aircraft of previous years, ICBMs had symbolised destruction 
since their first instance therefore allowing Missile Command to reflect anxieties beyond the 
context of 1980 to mirror fears from throughout the previous twenty-three years and even 
beyond. Therefore, we can see the manner in which the game draws from the reality of the 
Cold War as a whole to strengthen its representation of nuclear anxiety in general. Drawing 
upon influences from a previous era is a persistent aspect of Fallout (1997), used to create a 
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20 J.D. Hunley, The Development of Propulsion Technology for U.S. Space-Launch Vehicles, 
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contemporary commentary in a similar vein to Theurer's intended message for Missile 
Command. 
MIRVs, on the other hand, are a more modern technological form of ICBMs, meaning 
that their portrayal in-game represents contextual nuclear-anxieties more effectively than 
the depiĐtioŶs of the ABM sǇsteŵ oƌ ICBMs. The ǁoƌld͛s fiƌst MI‘V ǁas the U“ MiŶuteŵaŶ 
III missile, the development of which began in 1966 and, following major contention in the 
US government, was completed in June 1970. What set this apart from the Minuteman I and 
II missiles, both of which were more typical ICBMs, was its ability to target three separate 
locations simultaneously, which was considered to dramatically increase the first strike 
opportunities of the US in an effort to reduce economic expenditure while maintaining a 
ǁeapoŶs sǇsteŵ Đapaďle of eŶsuƌiŶg peŶetƌaďilitǇ agaiŶst ͞the thƌeat of “oǀiet ABM 
sǇsteŵs͟.24 MIRVs were therefore considered to be the perfect modern weapons system 
due to their ability to overwhelm ABM defences.25   
In the same Life article that explained ABM, McNamara briefly stated that the MIRV 
sǇsteŵ ǁould alloǁ a ͞ƌedesigŶ of ouƌ stƌategiĐ foƌĐes͟ peƌŵittiŶg the U“ to ͞eǆhaust theiƌ 
[the U““‘͛s] defeŶĐes aŶd at the saŵe tiŵe ďetteƌ ŵatĐh the size of ǁeapons to the targets 
                                            
24 DaŶiel ‘uĐhoŶŶet, ͚MI‘V: A Bƌief HistoƌǇ of MiŶuteŵeŶ aŶd Multiple ‘eeŶtƌǇ VehiĐles͛, 
(National Security Archive, Defense Department, 1976), pp.8-9: Weber, Cooperation and 
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25 Scott Ritter, DaŶgerous GrouŶd: AŵeriĐa’s Failed Arŵs CoŶtrol PoliĐy, froŵ FDR to 
Obama, (Nation Books, 2010), p.151. 
Figure 6 - Screenshot from Missile Command, Sunnyvale, CA: David Theurer, 
programmer, Atari, 1980. 
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to ďe destƌoǇed.͟26 MĐNaŵaƌa͛s puďliĐ aŶŶouŶĐeŵeŶt did Ŷot iŵŵediatelǇ distƌaĐt the 
public from the contention surrounding ABM systems at the time, but it managed to garner 
criticism from newspaper correspondents and scientists.27 What brought this to the puďliĐ͛s 
attention was the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT II). SALT II began in 1972 with the 
aim of curtailing the manufacture of strategic nuclear weapons, such as MIRVs. Henry 
Kissinger attempted to set an overall aggregate cap on ICBMs and submarine launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in an attempt to limit the number of missiles the Soviet Union 
would be able to attach to their in-development MIRVs. Meanwhile, the US would be able 
to deploy as many MIRVs as it wanted as they were already a part of their ICBM forces.28 
However, this ploy failed and the Soviets were able to maintain the previous aggregate. In 
1974, the Soviets deployed their first MIRV, the SS-19 missile and as SALT II dragged on, only 
to eventually fail, magazines like Time continually reported on arms limitation talks, which 
now included the need to limit MIRVs on both sides.29 With this in mind, Missile Command͛s 
representation of MIRVs is therefore a reflection of the previous decade of contentious 
arms limitation talks which were consistently presented to the public. Furthermore, the 
game presents an accurate visual depiction of MIRVs' multiple warheads, as incoming 
missiles split in to multiple rockets, as seen in figure six, that can often overwhelm the 
player's ABM control system, just as they were realistically intended to do,. 
While each of these elements are needed to create functional gameplay in Missile 
Command, each can be seen to represent an aspect of nuclear anxieties from different 
periods of the Cold War. While its influences are therefore non-contextual, their persistent 
prevalence in the Cold War negates the need for direct contextual relation and thereby 
strengthens the game's overall representation of nuclear anxieties. For example, while ABM 
systems were not of critical importance in 1980, such systems were to come back into the 
puďliĐ eǇe iŶ ϭϵϴϯ thaŶks to ‘eagaŶ͛s “DI pƌogƌaŵŵe, theƌefoƌe eǆteŶdiŶg Missile 
Command͛s ability to represent nuclear anxieties. Obviously, Missile Command is severely 
limited in what aspects of nuclear war it can represent due to the technological limitations 
of 1980, but when we consider how successfully it represents the elements it focuses upon 
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it can be seen to effectively summarise both the political tensions and public anxieties of the 
1980s and previous decades. For this reason, Missile Command capably represents shifting 
nuclear anxieties in its use of weapons technology while also indicating a trend among 
nuclear apocalyptic video games in its use of non-contextualised perceptions of nuclear war 
to create a contextually reflective depiction of nuclear war, as similarly seen in Fallout 
(1997). 
 
The Mid-1980s - Wasteland (1988) 
 While Missile Command had a fairly simple premise, Wasteland is a far more 
complex video game. Released in 1988, published by Electronic Arts, developed by Interplay 
Entertainment and directed by Brian Fargo, Wasteland was the first detailed depiction of a 
post-apocalypse scenario in a video game.30 This depiction not only involved a post-
apocalyptic setting in which the player must survive, but the backstory grounds itself in 
genuine geo-political tensions to form clear similarities to real-life circumstances, similar 
Missile Command's representation of weapons technology. 
 The nuclear war of Wasteland takes place in 1998, ten years in the future from the 
gaŵe͛s ƌelease date. Geo-politiĐal teŶsioŶs ǁeƌe oŶ the ƌise as the U“ ͞Citadel “taƌstatioŶ͟ 
Ŷeaƌed ĐoŵpletioŶ. The “oǀiets ĐoŶteŶded that the Citadel ǁas iŶ faĐt a ͞ŵilitaƌǇ lauŶĐhiŶg 
platfoƌŵ͟, ĐausiŶg the ͞ƌight ǁiŶg goǀeƌŶŵeŶts iŶ the “outh aŶd CeŶtƌal AŵeƌiĐas͟ to allǇ 
ǁith the U“. Tǁo ǁeeks ďefoƌe the Citadel͛s opeƌatioŶal deďut, it tƌaŶsŵitted a distƌess 
sigŶal, kŶoĐkiŶg out all satellites. With ͞the gƌeat poǁeƌs ďliŶd͟ theǇ eaĐh ƌeleased ϵϬ 
perceŶt of theiƌ ŶuĐleaƌ aƌseŶals iŶ a ŵass paŶiĐ. “oŵeǁheƌe iŶ the ͞iŶhospitaďle͟ south-
western deserts of America, a group of army engineers survived the nuclear attacks by 
seeking refuge in a prison after evicting all the inmates into the desert. The engineers soon 
ďuilt aŶ outpost iŶ the pƌisoŶ ǁith ͞ŶeaƌďǇ suƌǀiǀalist ĐoŵŵuŶities͟ aŶd ƌeŶaŵed it the 
͞‘aŶgeƌ CeŶteƌ͟. IŶitiallǇ ďelieǀiŶg theŵselǀes the oŶlǇ suƌǀiǀoƌs, they eventually 
discovered others. ͞BeĐause theǇ had suĐh suĐĐess iŶ ĐoŶstƌuĐtiŶg a Ŷeǁ Đoŵmunity, they 
felt Đoŵpelled to help otheƌ suƌǀiǀoƌs ƌeďuild aŶd liǀe iŶ peaĐe.͟ Fƌoŵ this, ͞the Deseƌt 
‘aŶgeƌs … ǁeƌe ďoƌŶ.͟ The Ǉeaƌ is ϮϬϴϳ aŶd the plaǇeƌ ŵust eŵďaƌk iŶto the deseƌt to 
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͞iŶǀestigate a seƌies of distuƌďaŶĐes͟.31 Due to the gaŵe͛s eǆteŶsiǀe depth, this analysis will 
explore the clearest representational aspect of this backstory, Citadel Starstation, in relation 
to its context to assess the gaŵe͛s ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ of ŶuĐleaƌ aŶǆieties aŶd the shift iŶ 
perceptions seen since the early 1980s. 
 Much like Missile Command, Wasteland has garnered much critical acclaim 
throughout the years and is considered to be the spiritual predecessor to the Fallout series 
by both Brian Fargo and Fallout's director Tim Cain.32 Computer Gaming World (CGW), one 
of the most popular computer and adventure gaming magazines throughout the 1980s, 
described Wasteland pƌioƌ to its ƌelease ͞as a poteŶtial Mad Maǆ tǇpe adǀeŶtuƌe gaŵe͟, 
ďut pƌeǀieǁs of the gaŵe iŶ eaƌlǇ ϭϵϴϴ fouŶd that ͞the gaŵe is ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ supeƌioƌ to the 
origiŶal ĐoŶĐept͟ ǁith ͞a uŶiƋue plotliŶe all of its oǁŶ.͟33 By the time of its release, CGW͛s 
review deemed Wasteland to ďe a ͞oŶe of the ďest gaŵes͟ theǇ͛d ͞eǀeƌ plaǇed͟, eǀeŶ 
ŶotiŶg it to ďe a siŵulatioŶ gaŵe ǁith ͞sophistiĐatioŶ͟ aŶd the ǁiŶŶeƌ of theiƌ ͞AdǀeŶtuƌe 
Gaŵe of the Yeaƌ͟ foƌ ϭϵϴϴ.34 In fact, CGW reviewed the game extremely favourably again 
in 1991 and 1993, statiŶg that it ƌeŵaiŶed ͞the oŶlǇ deĐeŶtlǇ-designed post-nuclear game 
oŶ the ŵaƌket.͟35 Quite appropriately, however, prolific science fiction author Orson Scott 
Card noted in Compute! ŵagaziŶe that ǁhile ͞the ƌeal-life eleŵeŶt͟ of the gaŵe͛s ǀillages 
and settleŵeŶts ǁas ĐoŵŵeŶdaďle, ͞jokes like ŵutaŶt ďuŶŶies͟ that attaĐk the plaǇeƌs 
throughout the game ͞ĐaŶ get ďoƌiŶg͟.36 But regardless of some minor qualms, Card 
enjoyed the game, as did most others. In 1996, CGW ranked it as the ninth best game of all-
time and in 2000, gaming website IGN, ranked it the twenty-fourth best PC game ever.37 In 
                                            
31 Interplay Entertainment, Wasteland: Manual, (Electronic Arts, 1988), pp.1-2. 
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fact, as recently as 2012, the gaming website Eurogamer stated that ͞eǀeŶ Ŷoǁ, it offeƌs a 
uŶiƋue ‘PG ǁoƌld aŶd eǆpeƌieŶĐe͟.38 Clearly then, Wasteland is no stranger to acclaim, and 
as such its standing as the first post-apocalyptic video game along with its popularity make it 
an important source for analysis as a representation of shifting nuclear anxieties.  
Wasteland͛s ďaĐkstoƌǇ is liŵited iŶ its depth ďut ƌiĐh iŶ its usage of genuine geo-
political tensions and events. Knoblauch speculates that this is due to the likelihood that the 
audience would have had at least some understanding of Cold War tensions and nuclear 
arms race dangers.39 Regardless, the backstory attempts to ground an otherwise fantastical 
game in the socio-political context of 1983-1988, which Fargo himself has stated marks the 
fiǀe Ǉeaƌs of the gaŵe͛s leŶgthǇ deǀelopŵeŶt.40 While the manual states that the game took 
two years to develop, we will be using Faƌgo͛s tiŵesĐale as it pƌoǀides a Đleaƌeƌ piĐtuƌe of 
iŶflueŶĐes aŶd ĐoŵpaƌisoŶs. This is iŵpoƌtaŶt to Ŷote, as ŵost aspeĐts of the gaŵe͛s 
backstory relate to real-world events within this timeframe as opposed to the events of 
1988, meaning that it must be assessed in terms of its representation of the mid-1980s. 
Citadel Starstation, which is considered by the in-game Soviets to be a threat, 
appears in the opening cutscene of the game to be an SDI-like ABM system. While we have 
previously seen that the scientifiĐ ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͛s ƌespoŶse to ‘eagaŶ͛s “DI pƌogƌaŵŵe ǁas 
less than what was hoped for when Reagan called upon them for insight and assistance, 
Time ŵagaziŶe͛s ƌepoƌt oŶ ‘eagaŶ͛s “DI aŶŶouŶĐeŵeŶt outliŶed the pƌogƌaŵŵe, flaǁs aŶd 
all. This was the first time since the ABM Treaty of 1972 that attempts to defend against 
nuclear attack were actively considered, and Time were not fully convinced.41 Candidly, the 
aƌtiĐle stated that ͞‘eagaŶ͛s ǀideo-gaŵe ǀisioŶ of satellites … ŵight soŵe daǇ zap eŶeŵǇ 
missiles with laseƌs … But if his spaĐe-age plan proceeds, or even if the suggestion of a shift 
iŶ stƌategǇ is takeŶ seƌiouslǇ, the iŵpliĐatioŶs aƌe staggeƌiŶg.͟42 These staggering 
implications came in the form of a Soviet response that was less than pleased. Similar to the 
impact of MIRVs on ABM systems, the Soviets feared that a defence system such as SDI 
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39 KŶoďlauĐh, ͚Gaŵe Oǀeƌ?͛, iŶ Goldďeƌg aŶd LaƌssoŶ, ed., The State of Play, p.194. 
40 ͚Matt Chat ϵϬ: WastelaŶd aŶd Fallout ǁith BƌiaŶ Faƌgo͛. OŶliŶe Video Clip. YouTuďe. 
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could not only provide the US with improved first strike capabilities but could also create an 
arms race in space. While in reality the Soviet's panicked response was characterised by 
them shooting down KAL 007, in-game, the result of this anxiety goes beyond mere worries 
about the idea of SDI. Instead, satellites are knocked from the sky in a military panic as both 
the U“ aŶd U““‘ ͞eaĐh seŶt ϵϬ peƌĐeŶt of the ŶuĐleaƌ aƌseŶals skǇǁaƌd.͟43 In reality, while 
public belief in the system may have been mostly positive, as seen in the polls discussed 
previously, this did not stop fears from surfacing. In 1985, 75 percent of people agreed that 
buildiŶg suĐh a defeŶsiǀe sǇsteŵ ǁould Đause the “oǀiets to ͞go all-out to develop new 
kiŶds of ŶuĐleaƌ aŶd otheƌ ǁeapoŶs ǁe ĐouldŶ͛t defeŶd agaiŶst.͟44 Wasteland represents 
such concerns in its opening cutscene as Citadel Starstation is effectively destroyed by what 
are presented as Soviet weapons. Therefore, to some extent, this represents genuine 
nuclear anxieties and the shift from concerns regarding ABM in the 1960s, as portrayed in 
part in Missile Command. This differs from Missile Command as it reflects contextual 
perceptions of nuclear war, rather than utilising perceptions from previous decades. In this 
regard Wasteland, unlike Missile Command and Fallout, constructs its themes upon 
contextual concerns in order to represent reality. 
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While the ŵaŶual pƌoǀides a sŵall aŵouŶt of detail as to ǁhat ͚Citadel “taƌstatioŶ͛ 
is, the gaŵe͛s opeŶiŶg ĐiŶeŵatiĐ fills iŶ soŵe ďlaŶks. The first thing we see is the earth 
haŶgiŶg iŶ spaĐe as the ǁoƌds ͞Coŵputeƌ defeŶse iŶitiatiǀe aĐtiǀated͟ appeaƌ oŶ sĐƌeeŶ to 
the sound of an air-ƌaid siƌeŶ. We aƌe theŶ told that ͞DiploŵatiĐ solutioŶs to the ǁoƌld͛s 
problems fail and war erupts as some madŵeŶ pƌess ahead ǁith theiƌ iŶsaŶe dƌeaŵs.͟ “ooŶ 
missiles are launched around the planet as Citadel Starstation attempts to shoot them down 
before it is destroyed.45 Citadel Starstation can be seen to the right of the Earth, shooting 
down missiles in figure seven. While it cannot be said that in the alternate reality of 
Wasteland that the Soviets definitely developed new weapons to combat Citadel 
Starstation, it certainly depicts the destruction of it in one way or another, accurately 
representing concerns about Soviet defences if SDI were to be fully developed and 
deployed. 
While SDI remained an undeveloped programme in 1988, its representation in the 
opening of Wasteland is, like Missile Command, one of the few instances in which audiences 
could have seen such a defence system in action. In fact, as Knoblauch contends, there is a 
selection of games, including Missile Command, Strategic Defense Initiative (1987) and High 
Frontier (1987) that represents the workings of SDI for audiences that would otherwise have 
no inclination of its feasibility.46 It can be argued that Wasteland also achieves this, if only in 
a more limited sense. WheŶ KŶoďlauĐh͛s ǀieǁ of “DI-based video games is applied to 
Wasteland it can be seen as a representation of the understanding of SDI that audiences 
would have garnered from these games prior to 1988. Therefore, this representation in the 
opening cutscene grounds the game in the anxieties of the period as opposed to non-
contextual anxieties. 
While Wasteland͛s ďaĐkstory is limited in depth, the information that it does provide 
can be seen to be reflective of the socio-political context surrounding nuclear war anxieties, 
and while this study's scope limits the representational aspects that can be analysed, the 
backstory of Wasteland nonetheless consists of accurate representations of contextual geo-
                                            
45 Wasteland, ‘edǁood CitǇ, CA: EleĐtƌoŶiĐ Aƌts, IŶteƌplaǇ EŶteƌtaiŶŵeŶt, ϭϵϴϴ: ͚WastelaŶd 
IŶtƌo͛. OŶliŶe Video Clip. YouTuďe. AĐĐessed Ϭϵ JulǇ ϮϬϭϲ. http://ďit.lǇ/ϮϵXǆϭHD. 
46 KŶoďlauĐh, ͚“tƌategiĐ Digital DefeŶse͛, iŶ Kapell aŶd Elliott, ed., Playing With the Past, 
pp.290-291. 
74 
 
political tensions.47 Regardless, in reality, SDI threw the Soviet Union into a state of 
tremendous unease, characterised by the shooting down of KAL 007, whereas Wasteland 
represents this disquiet with the worst case scenario. While extreme, Wasteland can 
undoubtedly be seen to ground its fictional nuclear war in the Soviet anxiety that followed 
the announcement of SDI. Furthermore, just as Missile Command and other such missile 
defence games had depicted accurate representations of the fallibility of an ABM system, 
Wasteland represented the same notion in regards to SDI as scepticism towards the system 
was prevalent even if it was not resounding. Therefore, Wasteland͛s ƌepƌesentation of the 
political climate induced by the threat of SDI in the mid-1980s successfully contributes to its 
reflection of nuclear anxieties. 
 
Conclusion 
Missile Command͛s ĐoŶteǆtual teĐhŶologiĐal liŵitatioŶs foƌĐed the gaŵe to depiĐt 
only a small aspect of nuclear war. Nonetheless, it achieved major success in its 
representation of nuclear anxieties through the use of established, understood and 
genuinely threatening nuclear technology. The representation of Cold War weaponry thus 
contributes to its representation of shifting nuclear anxieties. However, in utilising weapons 
technology representative of previous anxieties, Missile Command can be seen to ground 
itself somewhat in the reality of non-contextual nuclear anxieties, a notion that Fallout will 
be seen to adopt far more liberally to form a contemporary commentary. 
On the other hand, Wasteland represents the technological progression of video 
games and as such is able to depict a far more detailed world. Indeed, while there are 
elements of the backstory not discussed here due to their limited relation to nuclear 
anxieties, we can see that it nonetheless grounds itself in reality with its mirroring of SDI as 
the cause of panic that incites nuclear war. The backstory is therefore representative of 
contextual nuclear anxieties despite the fantastical qualities of gaŵe͛s predominant post-
apocalyptic focus. 
It must be noted that the difference between representations of nuclear anxiety in 
Missile Command and Wasteland are largely due to their technological scope. Nonetheless, 
both succeed in representing contextual anxieties as well as the shifting perceptions of 
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nuclear war since the 1960s and throughout the early and mid-1980s, thereby continuing 
the trend of contextual representation seen previously in nuclear apocalyptic culture. 
Fallout, on the other hand, presents a far more detailed depiction of its themes yet fails to 
adequately represent its direct influences, and as a result misrepresents its foundation of 
nuclear anxiety, which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
The Fallout Franchise 
 
 As we have seen so far, nuclear apocalyptic culture has conveyed nuclear anxieties in 
a multitude of ways that often more accurately reflected the reality of such sentiment, 
while civil defence initiatives persistently portrayed guidance unrepresentative of reality. It 
is therefore interesting that following the end of the Cold War, while nuclear apocalyptic 
culture continued to gain popularity, a comparative lack of nuclear anxiety allowed for the 
misrepresentation of previously existing and particularly prevalent perceptions.  
 Such misrepresentations can be seen in Fallout (1997), which is a watershed game 
marking the mass popularisation of the nuclear apocalyptic genre in video games. We have 
seen so far that nuclear apocalyptic culture can be regarded as representative of nuclear 
anxieties throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Fallout, however, presents a 
departure from this trend. In a similar vein to Missile Command's utilisation of non-
contextual elements to represent nuclear anxieties, Fallout can also be seen to draw upon 
influences from throughout the conflict. However, as opposed to public perceptions being at 
the centre of its thematic focus, Fallout's influences are in fact the civil defence initiatives 
and nuclear apocalyptic culture we have analysed, which it utilises in order to form a 
contemporary commentary on deceitful governments and overly greedy, destructive 
capitalists.1 While the game successfully forms this commentary, it does so by focusing 
primarily on the perceptions of nuclear war we have seen to be of genuine nuclear anxiety: 
civil defence initiatives. This chapter will therefore assess Fallout͛s ďaĐkstoƌǇ aŶd ŵaŶual, 
similarly to the previous chapter, as a means of investigating the game's representation of 
its influences and the extent to which the series' utilisation of such influences create a 
contemporary commentary that misrepresents not only civil defence propaganda but also 
exploits it to form a caricature of genuine nuclear anxieties from during the Cold War. 
 Over the past two decades we have witnessed a surge in the popularity of the 
nuclear apocalyptic genre in video games, yet the manner in which historical perceptions of 
nuclear war have influenced these games has been given little consideration. The 
representation of history in video games is an area of study that has been growing 
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exponentially over the last few years as video games exit their infancy to stand alongside 
more established media, such as film. Kapell and Elliott exemplify this effectively, stating 
that ͞oŶ oŶe haŶd ǁe haǀe the studǇ of the past as a seƌies of faĐts aŶd ŵoǀeŵeŶts, aŶd oŶ 
the other we have a concept of the past considered as whole, in which those facts, 
ŵoǀeŵeŶts, aŶd eǀeŶts haǀe ĐoŵďiŶed iŶ a ĐeƌtaiŶ ǁaǇ to lead us to the pƌeseŶt daǇ.͟2 The 
Fallout series can be seen to embody this notion as it attempts to represent the past in 
order to create a divergent, fantastical timeline to form a contemporary commentary 
dealiŶg ǁith goǀeƌŶŵeŶt pƌopagaŶda aŶd tƌust. IŶ Kapell aŶd Elliott͛s edited ǁoƌk, “Đhulke 
discusses the Fallout seƌies, statiŶg that the gaŵes͛ ͞settiŶg aŶd Ŷaƌƌatiǀe aƌe ƌeplete ǁith 
misconceptions and stereotypes that dominated American popular culture during the Cold 
Waƌ͟, ǁhiĐh seƌǀe to ƌeiŶfoƌĐe the lessoŶs of the Cold Waƌ ͞ďǇ shoǁiŶg the dǇstopiaŶ ǁoƌld 
that ŵight haǀe eǆisted if diffeƌeŶt deĐisioŶs ǁeƌe ŵade at iŵpoƌtaŶt juŶĐtuƌes.͟3 However, 
it can be argued that while Schulke is not wrong, Fallout͛s pƌiŵaƌǇ iŶteŶtioŶ is as a 
ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ ĐoŵŵeŶtaƌǇ Đƌeated ďǇ ͞ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiŶg͟, ǁhat Noǀeŵďeƌ Đalls, ͞Đoŵpleǆ 
ideas about the mid-twentieth-ĐeŶtuƌǇ UŶited “tates.͟4 In creating this commentary, Fallout 
can indeed ďe seeŶ to utilise ͞ŵisĐoŶĐeptioŶs aŶd steƌeotǇpes͟ fƌoŵ the Cold Waƌ, ďut iŶ 
doing so creates a caricature that prevents it from effectively representing the combination 
of ͞faĐts, ŵoǀeŵeŶts, aŶd eǀeŶts͟ that haǀe ͞lead us to the pƌeseŶt daǇ.͟5 
 
Backstory & Cinematic 
Tim Cain, the creator of the Fallout seƌies, said of the fiƌst gaŵe that it ͞is ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh the 
spiritual successor to Wasteland͟ as BƌiaŶ Faƌgo͛s oǁŶ ϭϵϴϴ post-apocalyptic video game 
͞had eǀeƌǇthiŶg iŶ it that ǁe ǁaŶted to haǀe iŶ the Fallout͟.6 Fargo, who was the director of 
Interplay Entertainment during Fallout͛s deǀelopŵeŶt, said that upoŶ ƌeĐeiǀiŶg the gaŵe͛s 
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͞ǀisioŶ doĐuŵeŶt͟ he ƌealised that ͞siǆ out of teŶ thiŶgs ǁeƌe ƌight out of Wasteland.͟7 The 
major difference with Fallout͛s world is that near the end of the 1940s "our world and the 
world portrayed in Fallout each began to go in its own direction."8 In Fallout fan lore, this is 
kŶoǁŶ as the ͞DiǀeƌgeŶĐe͟. Despite the DiǀeƌgeŶĐe, the ϭϵϱϬs seeŶ iŶ Fallout's world 
differed very little from our own.9 EǀeŶtuallǇ, the DiǀeƌgeŶĐe led to a ͞futuƌe as eŶǀisioŶed 
ďǇ AŵeƌiĐaŶ populaƌ ŵedia ďetǁeeŶ the late ϭϵϯϬs aŶd the eaƌlǇ ϭϵϲϬs͟ as soĐietǇ 
remained in a cultural stasis until 2077. In a world filled with nuclear powered cars and ͚Mƌ. 
Handy' personal robots designed to complete household chores, the divergent timeline 
thrust the world into an eventual energy crisis that resulted in worldwide nuclear war, 
otheƌǁise kŶoǁŶ as the ͞Gƌeat Waƌ͟.10  The majority of this information is covered in the 
introduction which provides us with a brief backstory and some crucial imagery in assessing 
Fallout͛s representation of nuclear anxieties. 
                                            
7 BƌiaŶ Faƌgo, ͚Matt Chat ϵϬ: WastelaŶd aŶd Fallout ǁith BƌiaŶ Faƌgo͛. OŶliŶe Video Clip. 
YouTube. Accessed 011 Aug 2016. http://bit.ly/29JRmnj. 
8 Noǀeŵďeƌ, ͚Fallout aŶd YesteƌdaǇ͛s Iŵpossiďle Toŵoƌƌoǁ͛, iŶ Kapell aŶd Elliott, ed., 
Playing With the Past, p.298. 
9 ͚DiǀeƌgeŶĐe͛, Nukapedia: Fallout Wiki, http://bit.ly/2aTq7rf, last accessed 04 Aug 2016: 
Cited iŶ Noǀeŵďeƌ, ͚Fallout aŶd YesteƌdaǇ͛s Iŵpossiďle Toŵoƌƌoǁ͛, iŶ Kapell aŶd Elliott, ed., 
Playing With the Past, p.298. 
10 Fallout, IŶteƌplaǇ EŶteƌtaiŶŵeŶt, ϭϵϵϳ: ͚Gƌeat Waƌ͛, Nukapedia: Fallout Wiki, 
http://bit.ly/2aTHWq7, last accessed 04 Aug 2016. 
Figure 8 - Screenshot from Opening Cinematic, Fallout: A Post Nuclear Role Playing Game, 
Beverly Hills, CA: Interplay Entertainment, 1997. 
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 ͞Waƌ. Waƌ Ŷeǀeƌ ĐhaŶges.͟ These words ring out as the opening cinematic begins. 
From its opening moments, Fallout relies on the player's acceptance of this statement. As 
we have seen, if one were to view civil defence initiatives as representational of nuclear 
anxieties regarding war then this statement holds true as throughout this thesis it has been 
demonstrated that civil defence initiatives changed their perception of nuclear war very 
little, if at all. As such, in regards to the game's predominant influences of civil defence, 
discussed in relation to the manual below, this statement can be seen to support Tim Cain's 
commentary on deceitful governments that, in his vision, purposefully maintained 
misperceptions of war to propagate its unchanging nature.  
Afteƌ soŵe pƌeliŵiŶaƌǇ eǆaŵples of ǁaƌ thƌoughout histoƌǇ, ǁe aƌe told that ͞IŶ the 
21st ĐeŶtuƌǇ, ǁaƌ ǁas still ǁaged oǀeƌ the ƌesouƌĐes that Đould ďe aĐƋuiƌed.͟ This Đaused 
ChiŶa to iŶǀade Alaska, the U“ to aŶŶeǆ CaŶada aŶd the ͞EuƌopeaŶ CoŵŵoŶǁealth to 
dissolve into quarrelling, bickering nation-states, bent on controlling the remaining 
resouƌĐes oŶ Eaƌth.͟11 The similarities between this and Wasteland are immediately 
apparent. Using geo-political tensions following a shortage of resources, Fallout creates the 
structure in which its nuclear war occurs. But the vagueness of Fallout͛s stoƌǇ pƌovides us 
with little contextual representation beyond concerns regarding the US dependence on 
foreign oil during the 1990s.12 KŶoďlauĐh highlights that ǁhile the ďaĐkstoƌǇ͛s foĐus oŶ aŶ 
energy crisis can be seen to resemble the energy crisis of the 1970s, Fallout ignores the 
ideologiĐal stƌuggles of the Cold Waƌ iŶ faǀouƌ of aŶ eŶeƌgǇ Đƌisis, effeĐtiǀelǇ tailoƌiŶg ͞its 
Ŷaƌƌatiǀe to gaŵeƌs uŶfaŵiliaƌ ǁith Cold Waƌ daŶgeƌs.͟13 While this notion of familiarity of 
Cold War knowledge will be discussed below, it is for this reason that merely assessing the 
backstory, similarly to that of Wasteland's, provides us with few analytical avenues. Instead, 
the visual depiction of nuclear anxieties represented in the opening cinematic provides 
better analytical comparisons to help understand Fallout͛s ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ of ŶuĐleaƌ aŶǆietǇ 
in the 1950s.  
                                            
11 Fallout: A Post Nuclear Role Playing Game, Beverly Hills, CA: Interplay Entertainment, 
1997. 
12 Paul L. Joskow, 'U.S. Energy Policy During the 1990s', National Bureau of Economic 
Research, (Cambridge, MA, 2001), p.13: p.27. 
13 KŶoďlauĐh, ͚Gaŵe Oǀeƌ?͛, iŶ Goldďeƌg aŶd LaƌssoŶ, ed., The State of Play, p.199. 
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The opening cinematic is a pre-rendered cutscene and is thus capable of portraying a 
far more detailed depiction of nuclear destruction than is possible in the 2D, isometric plane 
on which gameplay takes place, effectively summarising the themes and motifs present 
throughout the game.14 While destruction is conveyed with far more fidelity than was 
possible in Wasteland͛s ŶuĐleaƌ apoĐalǇpse, the ďest depiĐtioŶ Đomes at the start, as figure 
eight shows. As the camera pans out from a still-broadcasting television we see a futuristic 
rendition of Bakersfield, CA. As the television flickers, running pre-Great War adverts and 
news segments, in the background we see grey and brown buildings still standing, yet 
almost totally decimated by a nuclear explosion that clearly took place long before. As can 
be seen in figure eight, the decimation portrayed in the Fallout opening is similar to the 
design of destruction seen in both Collier’s ͚Hiƌoshiŵa U.“.A.͛ aŶd alike speculative articles, 
such as Pageant ŵagaziŶe͛s ͚Tǁo A-Boŵďs Blast U.“. CitǇ͛, as seeŶ iŶ figuƌes nine and ten. 
The similarities between these iŵages Ŷot oŶlǇ ƌepƌeseŶt the gaŵe͛s satiƌiĐal attitude 
towards the depiction of nuclear war in the 1950s, but more importantly, these references 
                                            
14 ͚A Thoƌough Look At Fallout͛. OŶliŶe Video Clip. YouTuďe. AĐĐessed Ϭϱ Aug ϮϬϭϲ. 
http://bit.ly/13Ttfuu. 
Figure 10 - Quentin Reynolds, ͚Tǁo A-Bombs Blast U.S. 
City', Pageant Magazine, (Feb 1951), p.12. 
Figure 9 - 'Side of the Hudson River this afternoon reported a 
thunderous explosion in the direction of New York', John 
Lear, ͚Hiroshiŵa U.S.A.͛, Collier’s, (August 5 1950), p.14. 
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to other imaginations of disaster ground the game in reality, beyond the mere portrayal of 
destruction resembling a believable nuclear war. 
In this regard, the Fallout opening cinematic portrays an accurate image of 
destruction, drawing from the articles that effectively mirrored both the reality of nuclear 
anxiety in the 1950s and the actuality of an atomic ďlast. Just as ͚Hiƌoshiŵa U.“.A.͛ dƌeǁ oŶ 
imagery of World Waƌ II, desĐƌiďiŶg pƌopeƌtǇ daŵage ͞as it oĐĐuƌƌed iŶ Hiƌoshiŵa aŶd 
Nagasaki͟, it ĐaŶ ďe seeŶ that Fallout employs these established depictions for its own 
nuclear holocaust.15 Therefore, here Fallout portrays a realistic version of nuclear depictions 
that once mirrored nuclear anxieties to establish itself as a representation of such culture. 
As well as this, the opening's bleak emptiness is reminiscent of the solitude seen in Five. 
The introduction video also highlights some products of Fallout͛s pƌe-Great War 
world. Fallout depiĐts a ǁoƌld that Ŷeǀeƌ stopped eǆpeƌieŶĐiŶg the ͞AŵeƌiĐaŶ High͟, as 
O͛Neill teƌŵs the post-war public consensus that society was good and anything could be 
accomplished with enough effort.16 For this reason, the products advertised on the 
television in the opening cinematic embody the futuristic visions of the 1950s thereby 
strengthening the representation of anxieties by grounding it in the period's futuristic 
imaginings. The Mr Handy robot is an effective reflection of 1950s science-fiction stories, as 
seen in Forbidden Planet (1956), which Tim Cain cites as one of the biggest influences for 
                                            
15 JohŶ Leaƌ, ͚The “toƌǇ of this “toƌǇ͛, Collier’s, (August 5 1950), p.11. 
16 O͛Neill, American High, p.7. 
Figure 11 - Screenshot from Opening Cinematic, 
Fallout: A Post Nuclear Role Playing Game, Beverly 
Hills, CA: Interplay Entertainment, 1997. 
Figure 12 – Ford Nucleon concept drawing, 1958. 
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the design of robot technology.17 While the depiction of such technology is as fictional now 
as it was in the 1950s, it nonetheless realistically represents visions of the future from the 
period to construct a satirical yet grounded and believable historical representation. This is 
similar to how Missile Command utilised weaponry from across the Cold War period to help 
strengthen the game's reflection of anxieties.  
Mr. Handy can be seen to represent more intentionally fictional motifs of the period, 
but the second pre-war advert strengthens its representation further by using a conceptual 
design intended to be real once the technology became available. The advert depicts a 
͚ChƌǇslus Coƌǀega͛ Đaƌ, as seeŶ iŶ figuƌe eleven.  The Corvega is an atomic powered 
automobile inspired by Foƌd͛s ϭϵϱϴ desigŶ pƌototǇpe foƌ a ŶuĐleaƌ poǁeƌed ǀehiĐle Đalled 
the Ford Nucleon, shown in figure twelve.18  This ǁas Foƌd͛s ǀisioŶ of the futuƌe as theǇ 
hoped nuclear reactors would one day decrease in size allowing them to power individual 
appliances that could be fuelled at recharging stations. Ford even hoped such stations 
would replace petrol stations.19 As November highlights, while absent in Fallout, these 
recharging stations found their way into the series in the form of Fallout 3͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ ͚‘ed 
Rocket͛ fuelliŶg statioŶs, although due a sigŶifiĐaŶt laĐk of histoƌiĐal ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ iŶ 
Fallout 3, as discussed below, this fails to capture the same representation of the era.  
While these visions of the future from the perspective of the 1950s do little to 
represent contextual nuclear anxieties, by utilising visions of the future the game 
successfully grounds itself in the past allowing for a more believable representation of 1950s 
nuclear anxieties that can be seen above in the imagery of the opening cinematic. However, 
while the opening cutscene drew from reflective cultural influences, the game's intended 
commentary is structured around civil defence initiatives of the 1950s which are most 
succinctly represented in the manual. 
 
                                            
17
 Tiŵ CaiŶ. ͚Matt Chat ϲϳ: Fallout ǁith Tiŵ CaiŶ Pt. Ϯ͛. OŶliŶe Video Clip. YouTuďe. AĐĐessed 
02 Aug 2016. http://bit.ly/2aCsqyX: Forbidden Planet, Dir. Fred M. Wilcox, (Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, 1956), Film. 
18 Noǀeŵďeƌ, ͚Fallout aŶd YesteƌdaǇ͛s Iŵpossiďle Toŵoƌƌoǁ͛, iŶ Kapell aŶd Elliott, ed., 
Playing With the Past, p.ϯϬϯ: ͚ChƌǇslus Coƌǀega͛, Nukapedia: Fallout Wiki, 
http://bit.ly/2aJTx6W, last accessed 05 Aug 2016. 
19 AlaŶ Belloǁs, ͚The AtoŵiĐ Autoŵoďile͛, Damn Interesting, http://bit.ly/2aFZb9D, last 
accessed 05 Aug 2016. 
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Manual 
As with Wasteland, the Fallout manual, appropriately named the Vault Dǁeller’s 
Survival Guide, offers insight into the game's representation of civil defence initiatives used 
in forming Fallout's commentary. The manual is designed to resemble a nuclear war survival 
guide from the ϭϵϱϬs, ǁhile also utilisiŶg eleŵeŶts of the ͚DuĐk aŶd Coǀeƌ͛ pƌopagaŶda aŶd 
otheƌ oǀeƌlǇ optiŵistiĐ iŵageƌǇ. This is a suĐĐiŶĐt ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ of the saŵe ͞Cold Waƌ 
pƌopagaŶda that litteƌs the ǁastelaŶd͟ iŶ Fallout, thus making it a more accessible method 
of analysis without delving into the deeper themes the game has to offer.20 This section will 
not analyse all themes within the Fallout game-world, but by refining the focus we gain 
better insight into the extent to which Fallout, for the purposes of social commentary, 
inaccurately reflects the same levels of nuclear anxiety depicted in 1950s propagandistic 
civil defence, as were seen in chapter one to be unrepresentative of actual anxieties. 
The Vault Dǁeller’s Surǀiǀal Guide is designed to reflect the propagandistic 
͞ŵisĐoŶĐeptioŶs aŶd steƌeotǇpes͟ of ϭϵϱϬs AŵeƌiĐaŶ ŶuĐleaƌ Đultuƌe, pƌeseŶt thƌoughout 
the game.21 The representation of these cultural misconceptions can be seen largely to 
ƌefleĐt Điǀil defeŶĐe iŶitiatiǀes iŶ oƌdeƌ to foƌŵ a ĐoŵŵeŶtaƌǇ. As CaiŶ stated, ͞A ďig paƌt of 
                                            
20 “Đhulke, ͚‘efightiŶg the Cold Waƌ͛, iŶ Kapell aŶd Elliott, ed., Playing With the Past, p.266. 
21 Ibid. 
Figure 13 – Image from Chris Taylor, Vault Dǁeller’s Surǀiǀal Guide, (Interplay 
Entertainment, 1997), p.'1 – 3' 
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Fallout ǁas Ǉou doŶ͛t tƌust Ǉouƌ oǁŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt. We ŵade it Ƌuite Đleaƌ that the 
government ǁas lǇiŶg to Ǉou.͟22 However, in order to accomplish this, the representation of 
nuclear apocalyptic culture representative of nuclear anxieties seen in the opening 
cinematic is dropped. Instead, the manual reflects elements reminiscent of what we have 
seen to be persistently unrepresentative civil defence initiatives, exaggerating the reality of 
nuclear anxieties and misrepresenting large parts of history as a result. For example, Cain 
said that the ŵaŶual eǀeŶ ͞had a page desĐƌiďiŶg otheƌ ŵaŶuals Ǉou Đould buy from Vault-
TeĐ ǁhiĐh ŵade light of all the hoƌƌiďle thiŶgs that Đould happeŶ afteƌ ŶuĐleaƌ ǁaƌ.͟23 
Survival information, as we have seen, did not make light of nuclear war. While nuclear 
survival guides and videos often contained erroneous and overly optimistic misinformation, 
they were intended to help, even if only through reassurance. But government guidance 
lacked stringent organisation and as such it was rare that audiences were compelled to 
believe them. After all, as we have seen in chapter one, Duck and Cover contributed to a 
greater sense of fear rather than reassurance among children. When we compare the Vault 
Dǁeller’s Surǀiǀal Guide with other such guides and propaganda, Tim Cain's intended 
contemporary commentary is clearly visible. However, in forming a narrative basis for a 
game that grounds itself in a period of genuine nuclear anxiety by using civil defence 
initiatives that cannot be seen to represent real nuclear anxieties, we are presented with an 
incomplete and unrepresentative portrayal of history in this regard. 
The best example of this can be seen in the use of Fallout͛s ďƌaŶd iĐoŶ, ͚Fallout BoǇ͛, 
sometimes known as 'Vault Boy'. In multiple images throughout the manual, Fallout Boy can 
be seen to reflect the artistry seen in nuclear war survival propaganda from the early Cold 
War as shown in figure thirteen. Fallout boy is most recognisably similar to the Duck and 
Cover propaganda films that utilised cartoons to influence nuclear understandings among 
children. However, due to its eaƌlǇ puďliĐatioŶ, ϭϵϱϬ͛s Survival Under Atomic Attack sees the 
most appropriate comparison of this propaganda as it can be seen to present a similar sense 
of misinformation that the Fallout manual strives for. As previously discussed, Survival 
adopts a tone of reassuring optimism, stating that even if one were injured by radioactivity 
͞Youƌ ĐhaŶĐes of ŵakiŶg a Đoŵplete ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ aƌe ŵuĐh the saŵe as foƌ eǀeƌǇdaǇ 
                                            
22 Tiŵ CaiŶ. ͚Matt Chat ϲϳ: Fallout ǁith Tiŵ CaiŶ Pt. Ϯ͛. OŶliŶe Video Clip. YouTuďe. AĐĐessed 
02 Aug 2016. http://bit.ly/2aCsqyX. 
23 Ibid. 
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aĐĐideŶts.͟24 The Fallout manual essentially attempts to reflect this style by juxtaposing in-
depth iŶfoƌŵatioŶ, suĐh as hoǁ a ŶuĐleaƌ ďlast Đauses ͞heat fƌoŵ fusioŶ aŶd fissioŶ" which 
"iŶstaŶtaŶeouslǇ ƌaises the suƌƌouŶdiŶg aiƌ to ϭϬ ŵillioŶ degƌees C͟, ǁith ƋuiƌkǇ iŵages of 
Fallout Boy, such as him showering to scrub away the effects of radiatioŶ. This piĐtuƌe͛s 
ĐaptioŶ ƌeads that ͞IŶ the eǀeŶt of eǆposuƌe to ƌadiatioŶ, Ǉou ŵust shoǁeƌ ǁith a laƌge 
aŵouŶt of ǁateƌ as sooŶ as possiďle. Latheƌ, ƌiŶse aŶd ƌepeat.͟25 Meanwhile, the 
information provided is reminiscent of the only element of civil defence initiatives that we 
have seen to change with the times: their presentation of contextual understandings about 
the effects of nuclear war.  
What this juxtaposition fails to capture is the sense of reassurance and optimism 
found in such initiatives, even when compared to FEMA's Protection in the Nuclear Age. 
Instead, the information provided about nuclear war offers facts more in line with modern 
understandings of nuclear attack without providing the same reassuring advice.26 While this 
is indeed indicative of civil defence's persistent representation of developing nuclear 
knowledge, it means that the manual fails to reflect the reassuring tone of civil defence 
initiatives from any period of the Cold War. Rather than portray the same optimism in the 
ŵaŶual͛s faĐtual guidaŶĐe, the Fallout BoǇ ĐaƌtooŶs aƌe the oŶlǇ ƌeal offeƌiŶg of 
reassurance, presented similarly to the Duck and Cover public film. The issue here is that 
these images go beyond the childishness of Bert the Turtle hiding from a stick of dynamite 
                                            
24 Survival Under Atomic Attack, (United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p.5. 
25 Chris Taylor, Vault Dǁeller’s Surǀiǀal Guide, ;IŶteƌplaǇ EŶteƌtaiŶŵeŶt, ϭϵϵϳͿ, p.͛ϭ – ϯ͛: p.͛ϰ 
– Ϯ͛. 
26 ͚NuĐleaƌ WeapoŶ Theƌŵal EffeĐts͛, Federation of American Scientists, 
http://bit.ly/2afrxM5, last accessed 02 Aug 2016. 
Figure 14 - Images from Chris Taylor, Vault Dǁeller’s Surǀiǀal Guide, ;IŶterplay EŶtertaiŶŵeŶt, ϭ99ϳͿ, p.͛ϯ  ϭϱ͛: p.'ϰ – 2' 
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or a man protecting his neck from a nuclear blast with a newspaper.27 For example, figure 
fourteen shows Fallout Boy leaning over a glowing object that has just melted the skin from 
his haŶds. The ĐaptioŶ foƌ this ĐhildishlǇ states ͞If aŶ oďjeĐt has eŶough illuŵiŶositǇ to ƌead 
at Ŷight, do Ŷot touĐh.͟28 Tim Cain noted that after he watched the Duck and Cover film that 
his perceptioŶ of the eƌa ǁas that ŶuĐleaƌ ǁaƌ aŶd ƌadiatioŶ ǁas ͞goiŶg to ďe ŵuĐh, ŵuĐh 
ǁoƌse thaŶ this ŵoǀie is lettiŶg oŶ. “o ǁe kiŶd of adopted Fallout BoǇ as ouƌ ŵasĐot.͟29 But 
when viewing this film now, it is itself retrospectively inane beyond its reassuring intent. 
Furthermore, when compared with the portrayal of Fallout Boy in the manual, it shows 
IŶteƌplaǇ͛s ŵasĐot to ďe a ĐaƌiĐatuƌe of suĐh iŶitiatiǀes. As figuƌe fifteen shows, even the 
Beƌt the Tuƌtle ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ĐoŵiĐ depiĐted a more accurate depiction of severity and fear 
than Fallout even attempted. It must not be forgotten that the purpose of this juxtaposition, 
as Tiŵ CaiŶ said, is to eǆaggeƌate iŶ oƌdeƌ to ͞ƌaise the ĐoŶsĐiousŶess of the plaǇeƌs͟ to 
ŵake ͞theŵ look at theiƌ oǁŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶts aŶd theiƌ own society just a little more 
ĐƌitiĐallǇ.͟30 But the use of Fallout Boy takes the perception of nuclear war seen in civil 
defence initiatives beyond the reality of its erroneousness. In doing so, this evokes a far 
more absurd and jovial misrepresentation of history oddly juxtaposed with real facts. 
Theƌefoƌe, the gaŵe͛s atteŵpted ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ of ŶuĐleaƌ aŶǆieties is doŶe 
                                            
27 United States Federal Civil Defense Administration, Bert the Turtle says Duck and Cover, 
(U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951). 
28 Chris Taylor, Vault Dǁeller’s Surǀiǀal Guide, ;IŶteƌplaǇ EŶteƌtaiŶŵeŶt, ϭϵϵϳͿ, p.͛ϯ – ϭϱ͛. 
29 Tim CaiŶ. ͚Matt Chat ϲϳ: Fallout ǁith Tiŵ CaiŶ Pt. Ϯ͛. OŶliŶe Video Clip. YouTuďe. AĐĐessed 
02 Aug 2016. http://bit.ly/2aCsqyX. 
30 Ibid. 
Figure 15 - Federal Civil Defense Administration, Bert the Turtle Says Duck and Cover, 1951. 
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through the juxtaposition of the manual's misrepresentation of reassuring civil defence 
initiatives and comical cartoons to create an intentionally dark yet comic tone, summarised 
iŶ the gaŵe͛s ǀisioŶ stateŵeŶt - ͞Life is Đheap aŶd ǀioleŶĐe is all that theƌe is͟.31 Of course, 
this comical tone is perfectly acceptable in parody, but it misrepresents civil defence 
initiatives to make them seem almost villainously deceitful rather than merely 
unrepresentative of anxieties in the period. However, the reflection of civil defence seen 
here reinforces the game͛s insistence that "War never changes". After all, viewing history 
exclusively through the lens of persistent civil defence planning over the course of the 
conflict suggests this notion to be true. This thereby strengthens Cain's commentary on 
deceitful governments as the politicians of the Fallout universe intentionally presented war 
as unchanging for the sake of the same normalisation we have seen in civil defence 
throughout this study. In this regard, Fallout can be seen as a continuation of nuclear 
apocalyptic culture representative of contextual nuclear anxieties as seen throughout this 
thesis, as its comic tone reflects the lack of public anxiety regarding nuclear war that came 
with the end of the Cold War.32 Although, while it is not for this study to say that any 
representative failure detracts fƌoŵ the gaŵe͛s iŶteŶded ĐoŵŵeŶtaƌǇ oŶ the aspeĐts of 
American life that Tim Cain had sought to question, it does combine its unrepresentative 
influences to create a caricature of actual nuclear anxieties. Therefore, in attempting to 
form Cain's commentary, Fallout exaggerates the reality of civil defence initiatives, 
themselves unrepresentative of nuclear anxieties in the Cold War, to such an extent as to 
effectively be seen as a misrepresentation of the game's historical influences.  
 
Legacy 
Fallout's historical misrepresentation would be of little concern if the game had not 
been the success it became and continues to be. After all, the legacy of Fallout is one of 
popularity. Despite continued uncertainty from Interplay and two near cancellations, the 
first game was a major success and Fallout 2 (1998) was released just one year later.33 The 
                                            
31 Chris Taylor, Fallout: A GURPS Post Nuclear Adventure – Vision Statement (or why this 
game is damn cool), (Interplay Entertainment, 1996), p.1. 
32 Robert T. Schatz and Susan T. Fiske, 'International Reactions to the Threat of Nuclear War: 
The Rise and Fall of Concern in the Eighties', Political Psychology, (Vol.13, No.1, 1992), p.7. 
33 ͚Fallout ClassiĐ ‘eǀisited͛. OŶliŶe Video Clip. YouTube. Accessed 06 Aug 2016. 
http://bit.ly/2aqjFpm. 
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new team responsible for the development of the sequel was a subsidiary of Interplay 
Entertainment, Black Isle Studios, who expanded dramatically on the lore of the Fallout 
universe. However, Fallout 2 provided fewer specifics about the pre-war world. A wasteland 
ǁaŶdeƌeƌ͛s eǆplaŶatioŶ of it goes thus – ͞I kŶoǁ little aďout the ǁaƌ, ďut it doesŶ͛t ƌeallǇ 
matter. A lot of people died when a lot of atomic bombs went off and nearly destroyed the 
ǁoƌld.͟34 But since the release of Fallout 2 and the spinoff game Fallout Tactics, the 
popularity of the franchise grew, helped considerably by Bethesda Softworks who acquired 
the Fallout license from Interplay Entertainment in 2004 following some less successful 
Fallout spinoffs, such as Fallout: Brotherhood of Steel (2004). The game development sector 
of Bethesda Softworks, Bethesda Game Studios released Fallout 3 on October 28 2008 to 
critical and commercial acclaim, selling almost 10 million copies.35  Since then the Fallout 
series has seen huge success, with Fallout: New Vegas (2010) selling in excess of 8 million 
copies and Fallout 4 (2015) selling almost 12 million.36 But Bethesda did not please fans of 
the first two games. The originals had been developed in line with the PC market of 1997 to 
Đƌeate gaŵes foƌ ͞Oldeƌ, ŵethodiĐal ƌole-playing enthusiasts with roots in pen and paper 
ƌole plaǇiŶg.͟ Fallout 3 needed to sell to younger, contemporary gamers.37  As such, 
Bethesda shifted the plaǇeƌ͛s ǀieǁ fƌoŵ aŶ isoŵetƌiĐ plaiŶ to a fiƌst-person perspective that 
modernised the game dramatically. This change necessitated the inclusion of a greater 
degƌee of fidelitǇ aŶd detail iŶ the gaŵe͛s poƌtƌaǇal of the post-apocalypse as players could 
now come face-to-face the wasteland itself, rather than viewing it from a distance. 
While the original Fallout stands as the watershed moment of the nuclear 
apocalyptic genre in video games, Fallout 3͛s dƌaŵatiĐ ĐhaŶge of stǇle aŶd suď-genre, 
shifting it from a role-playing strategy game to a role-playing, first-person, action game, 
allowed for a second watershed in popularity. ͞Bethesda uŶdeƌstood ǁhat ǁas [ŵoŶetaƌilǇ] 
ǀaluaďle … aďout the Fallout series was its visual iconography. The pip-boy, the crushed 
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 Fallout 2: A Post Nuclear Role Playing Game, Beverly Hills, CA: Interplay Entertainment, 
Black Isle Studios, 1998. 
35 ͚Fallout ϯ͛, Metacritic, http://ďit.lǇ/ϮaKjUts, last aĐĐessed Ϭϱ Aug ϮϬϭϲ: ͚Fallout ϯ͛, 
VGChartz, http://bit.ly/2arsxrZ, last accessed 05 Aug 2016. 
36 ͚Fallout: Neǁ Vegas͟, VGChartz, http://ďit.lǇ/ϮaTVϰKǇ, last aĐĐessed Ϭϱ Aug ϮϬϭϲ: ͚Fallout 
ϰ͛, VGChartz, http://bit.ly/2azk1c7, last accessed 05 Aug 2016. 
37 ͚A Thoƌough Look At Fallout͛. Online Video Clip. YouTube. Accessed 01 Aug 2016. 
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optiŵisŵ of the settiŶg, the daƌk huŵouƌ, the uŶsettliŶg gothiĐ aƌĐhiteĐtuƌe.͟38 However, in 
doing so, Fallout 3 not only left behind many fans of the original format but also large 
elements that grounded the original Fallout's nuclear apocalyptic influences, seen in the 
opening cinematic, in the reality of the 1950s. 
Take for example Fallout 3's opening cinematic. It is extremely similar to the original, 
but instead of being provided with the same backstory about the energy crisis that plunged 
the world into distrust and eveŶtual deǀastatioŶ, ǁe aƌe ŵeƌelǇ told that ͞afteƌ ŵilleŶŶia of 
aƌŵed ĐoŶfliĐt, the destƌuĐtiǀe Ŷatuƌe of ŵaŶ Đould sustaiŶ itself Ŷo loŶgeƌ.͟39 This opening 
instead focuses on the vaults that saved a small number of the population. The camera 
similarly zooms out at the start of the game's opening cutscene, but this time from a bus 
ƌadio. Heƌe ǁe aƌe shoǁŶ a posteƌ adǀeƌtisiŶg the ŵilitaƌǇ that states ͞EŶlist TodaǇ!͟ aŶd 
another for the Vault-TeĐ ǀaults that ƌeads ͞A Bƌighteƌ Futuƌe UŶdeƌgƌouŶd!͟ Both of these 
can be seen in figure sixteen. This however is the closest equivalent to the world building 
                                            
38 ͚A Thoƌough Look At Fallout͛. OŶliŶe Video Clip. YouTuďe. AĐĐessed Ϭϭ Aug ϮϬϭϲ. 
http://bit.ly/13Ttfuu. 
39 Fallout: A Post Nuclear Role Playing Game, Beverly Hills, CA: Interplay Entertainment, 
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http://bit.ly/2aWD43q. 
Figure 16 - Screenshot from Fallout 3, Rockville, MD: Bethesda Softworks, Bethesda Game Studios, 2008. 
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seen in the original Fallout that we are provided with, and while this can be seen to 
minimally reflect advertisements for fallout shelter seen in the early 1960s, there is little 
ǀisual eǀideŶĐe iŶ this siŶgle posteƌ to iŶfoƌŵ the audieŶĐe of the gaŵe͛s iŶteŶded 
commentary.40 The prevalent aspect that remains from the original is the same depiction of 
total destruction and bleak emptiness, as well as the opening line, "War. War never 
changes."41  
It has been stated by contemporary critics, in reference to Fallout 3, that the 
"disparity of destruction and reality is what drives the humour of Fallout.͟42 But humour 
overpowers fact in this regard as very little remaiŶs of the oƌigiŶal gaŵe͛s liŵited liŶks to 
ƌealitǇ. But peƌhaps CutteƌŵaŶ͛s ǀieǁ, that Fallout 3 ͞ƌelies aŶd plaǇs oŶ alƌeadǇ 
iŶteƌŶalized histoƌiĐal kŶoǁledge, tƌopes͟ aŶd ͞allusioŶs͟, assists iŶ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg this?43 If 
we view it as a sequel, then the lack of historical grounding makes slightly more sense, as its 
pƌedeĐessoƌs estaďlished theiƌ audieŶĐe͛s kŶoǁledge of Fallout͛s theŵes. But ǁheŶ ǀieǁiŶg 
Fallout 3 as a seminal moment not just for the Fallout franchise but for the nuclear 
apocalyptic genre in video games as a whole then the opposite becomes true. As Fallout 3 
relied heavily on the contemporary video game market to sell, it seems plain that a large 
portion of its audience would lack this internalised knowledge. Therefore, rather than 
reiterate the oƌigiŶal ďaĐkstoƌǇ, ͞Bethesda ǁas aďle to tap iŶto a pƌe-existing lexicon of 
motifs that make brand recognition for Fallout alŵost iŵŵediate͟, effeĐtiǀelǇ ŶegatiŶg the 
need to tackle the same themes as the original despite attempting to utilise them.44  
We can see from this that the removal of historical grounding in the introductory 
cinematic relieves the game of the same commentary previously inspired by civil defence 
initiatives. Furthermore, the continued use of the franchise's motto - "War. War never 
changes"- can be seen as another factor of this expected internalised knowledge.45 As the 
original game based itself around civil defence initiatives that can be seen to persist in their 
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misrepresentation of nuclear anxiety, the motto reinforced a perception of the unchanging 
nature of war and by extension the commentary on deceitful governments. However, its use 
in Fallout 3 attempts to adhere to this aspect of the original game's social commentary as it 
presents the same imagery of government propaganda in its introduction (as well as in the 
manual, which is discussed below) without grounding it in the historical reality of civil 
defence. Instead, it utilises reminiscent imagery to build its own world and create the 
humour the series is known for rather than connect its world with the same historical 
context as the original game. 
 The game therefore expects a certain degree of internalised knowledge from its 
audience, utilising the same historical representation and juxtaposition to promote its 
humour above its commentary, essentially further misrepresenting the nuclear anxieties 
that the franchise is built upon. Furthermore, in removing this commentary the game does 
not reflect contextual nuclear anxieties, and thereby fails to represent the shifting 
perceptions of nuclear war that we have seen to be a persistent element of nuclear 
apocalyptic culture. This is especially prevalent considering the manner in which nuclear 
anxieties returned in a limited sense since 1997 thanks to nuclear weapons testing in North 
Korea, as 60 percent of people agreed North Korea's nuclear programme to be a "Major 
Figure 17 – Image from Vault Dweller's Survival Guide, (Bethesda Softworks, 2008), p.9. 
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threat" in 2006.46  
In regards to the manual, this visual brand recognition, in the form of Fallout Boy, is 
almost instantaneous, but the same expectations of internalised knowledge can also be 
seen here. Fallout 3͛s ŵaŶual, also Đalled the Vault Dǁeller’s Surǀiǀal Guide, does not utilise 
the representation of civil defence initiatives to the same effect as the original. In fact, what 
remains of these images are now presented as advice merely about surviving in the post-
apocalyptic world, rather than preparing for nuclear war itself, as seen in figure seventeen. 
This can be seen to fail in its reflection of civil defence initiatives as at no point throughout 
this thesis have we found civil defence guidance to offer advice on living in the post-
apocalyptic world, merely surviving the initial war. Even Fallout Boy lost what resemblance 
he had to Bert the Turtle: no longer depicting survival propaganda; he can instead be seen in 
various comical poses that relate to unlockable player skills in the game, as shown by figure 
eighteen. Even the Fallout Boy seen in the hazmat suit is merely a device to depict the 
gaŵe͛s iƌƌeǀeƌeŶt seŶse of huŵouƌ. 
Furthermore, the manual no longer resembles a survival guide despite being called 
one. Firstly, there is a complete lack of information reflective of any era of civil defence 
beyond the satirical imagery seen in figure eighteen. Secondly, in the place of this 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ǁe fiŶd the gaŵe͛s ďaĐkstoƌǇ. This ƌeŵoǀes the ŵaŶual aŶd thus the gaŵe 
from its historical origins even further. While it could be said that the removal of this from 
the opening cinematic is once again an expectation of internalised knowledge, its inclusion 
here practically negates this notion, as well as acting as a replacement for the limited 
historical representation seen in the original's caricature. Furthermore, this section of the 
manual, which initially presents itself as a narrative, also refers to the game of Fallout 3 
itself, soŵethiŶg the oƌigiŶal Ŷeǀeƌ did. Heƌe ǁe ĐaŶ see ƌeŵaƌks aďout the gaŵe͛s 
pƌoŵotioŶ of fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe, ǁhiĐh state that ͞That͛s ƌeallǇ the ŵost important thing 
to remember about Fallout 3 – it͛s Ǉouƌ gaŵe, so plaǇ it the ǁaǇ Ǉou ǁaŶt.͟47 Whereas the 
original manual attempted to represent the game as a legitimate world and setting, Fallout 
3 not only removes large aspects of representative imagery and information, but also breaks 
the plaǇeƌ͛s iŵŵeƌsioŶ iŶ this fiĐtioŶal ǁoƌld ďǇ ƌeŵiŶdiŶg theŵ that it is just that. This 
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breaks the conventions the nuclear apocalyptic culture previously analysed, as in each case, 
the film or game's representation of nuclear perceptions can be seen to treat the subject 
matter as a legitimate aspect of their fiction rather than outwardly admitting its fictitious 
nature. 
While it ĐaŶ ďe aƌgued that the gaŵe͛s ďaĐkstoƌǇ aŶd histoƌiĐal ƌoutes aƌe 
internalised thanks to its predecessors, the game represents a new beginning for the 
franchise, reliant on new audiences. While this lack of grounding in history in no way 
hindeƌs oŶe͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐe of the gaŵe, it ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ ŵisĐoŶstƌues ǁhat eǆpeƌieŶĐed Fallout 
players could call 'internalised knowledge' about both the game-world and reality. 
Therefore, even considering the first game's misrepresentation of its historical influences 
and therefore the history of nuclear anxieties generally, Fallout 3 distances itself even more 
from its original thematic basis. Because of this, Fallout 3 lacks the same commentary as Tim 
Cain's original, causing it to fail in its reflection of shifting nuclear anxieties, an intrinsic 
aspect of previous nuclear apocalyptic culture. This means that one of the most popular 
video games in recent history has the potential to propagate misrepresentations of nuclear 
anxiety during the Cold War and in its own contextual period.  
 
Conclusion 
 ͞We ŵaǇ laugh at this iƌoŶiĐ plaǇ of eleŵeŶts, ďut ǁe ĐaŶ also ǀieǁ it as a ĐƌitiĐisŵ 
of goǀeƌŶŵeŶt pƌopagaŶda.͟48 From its broader representation of government policy and 
military action, Fallout (1997) can indeed be seen as a wider commentary on such notions 
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and therefore a continuation of nuclear apocalyptic culture representing contextual nuclear 
anxieties, which in Fallout's context are predominantly absent. Because of this absence, the 
game utilises nuclear apocalyptic culture and civil defence initiatives to influence its 
commentary. However, when we take the game as a representation of history, which is 
unavoidable given that its influences can be seen to represent public and state perceptions 
of nuclear war in the second half of the twentieth century, it fails to appropriately represent 
the past. Reflections of representative nuclear apocalyptic culture can be seen in the 
opening cinematic, but predominantly Fallout draws from civil defence initiatives which we 
have seen to be unrepresentative of nuclear anxieties. In forming Cain's commentary on 
deceitful governments, it creates a unrepresentative caricature of these initiatives. While 
the juxtaposition of optimistic propaganda and a bleak existence represent to some extent 
the absurd nature of civil defence initiatives, such as Duck and Cover, overall the game lacks 
any representation of nuclear anxiety that had proliferated society and culture, exploiting its 
influences without representing them. 
The Fallout series has gone on to gain unprecedented levels of popularity thanks to 
the humour created by the juxtaposition of destruction and optimism that was established 
by the original. But the expectation of internalised knowledge from its audience, despite 
dƌaŵatiĐallǇ alteƌiŶg the ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ of the seƌies͛ theŵes, detaĐhes Fallout 3 from its 
historical origins. While the quality of the game itself remains unaffected by this, audiences 
new to the series or new to nuclear apocalyptic culture in general, would lack this 
internalised knowledge. Furthermore, while the original game can be seen as a continuation 
of nuclear apocalyptic culture representative of nuclear anxieties, Fallout 3 bucks the trend 
by removing elements that reflected civil defence initiatives, merely utilising the brand 
recognition of the original, therefore failing to form a contemporary commentary that 
reflects contextually shifting nuclear anxieties. As Bethesda set out to alter the style of the 
series for contemporary audiences, it is foolish to expect that any internalised knowledge 
should be present. Instead, the same juxtaposition seen in the original Fallout that used civil 
defence initiatives to create a commentary on the government and erroneously represent 
nuclear anxieties is here replaced by brand recognition, utilising the series' motifs to create 
comedy not commentary. Therefore, one of the most popular forms of contemporary 
nuclear apocalyptic popular culture no longer represents the facets of reality analysed 
throughout this thesis in the way that such culture can be seen to do during the Cold War. 
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Fallout lacked the ability to draw upon contextual nuclear anxieties in the same way 
that nuclear apocalyptic culture had done so throughout the conflict. Instead, influenced 
predominantly by misrepresentations of nuclear anxiety, Fallout created a contemporary 
commentary about deceitful governments, greedy capitalists and their insistence that "War 
never changes", while neglecting to represent the realities of its thematic basis. The issue is 
that while Fallout and its sequels are considered by many contemporary academics and 
critics to be representative of propagandistic civil defence initiatives, the original forms a 
caricature unrepresentative of the past, while its subsequent sequels remove themselves 
from their historical grounding altogether, thereby assuming the role of misrepresenting 
nuclear anxieties; the same thing that Cold War civil defence initiatives can be seen to be 
guilty of. 
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Conclusion 
 This thesis has aimed to explore representations and misrepresentations of nuclear 
anxiety via the medium of contextually contemporary popular culture. As we have seen 
throughout the course of this study, nuclear apocalyptic culture is, more often than not, 
best understood as being representative of its contextual nuclear anxieties, both in medium 
and message. When viewed chronologically and critically analysed, these representations 
effectively demonstrate the shift in perceptions of nuclear war that occurred over the 
course of the Cold War, from early divisions between official optimism and public pessimism 
to the desire for an end to the conflict in the late 1980s. Therefore, it has been argued that 
nuclear apocalyptic culture, while often erroneous in its facts, is an effective representation 
of nuclear anxieties present during the Cold War, reflective of shifting perceptions and fears 
of nuclear war. This study has therefore demonstrated that both film and video games not 
only have the capacity to be representative of a particular viewpoint in history but also that 
their historical accuracy is crucial in determining a context for that viewpoint that might 
otherwise go unnoticed. It is by assessing both film and video games, despite their 
difference in medium, as forms of contemporary culture in the periods discussed that this 
thesis has established a greater understanding of the manner in which nuclear-apocalyptic 
culture, regardless of medium, can be seen to influence the genre as a whole. However, this 
trend in representative nuclear apocalyptic culture came to an end following the Cold War 
as post-conflict popular culture eventually ceased to represent contextual nuclear anxieties, 
despite utilising a wide array of previously representative cultural influences. This thesis 
therefore demonstrates that post-conflict nuclear apocalyptic culture fails to continue the 
trend of accurate representation thanks to the popularisation of such imagery. 
 This thesis began by considering speculative magazine articles which depicted 
portrayals of destruction as a reflection of the public's pessimistic attitudes towards nuclear 
war, contrasted against the governmental attempts to assuage these fears via official 
literature. It has been argued that these predominantly pessimistic depictions provide us 
with a greater insight into the manner in which nuclear anxieties existed and how public 
opinion altered over the course of the conflict, rather than the optimistic attempts of the 
Government initiatives to educate the public about nuclear war, which failed to reflect 
either genuine public concern or shifting anxieties across the Cold War. Instead, these 
represent governmental perceptions of nuclear war, highlighting the principal importance 
97 
 
placed on normalisation. Survival Under Atomic Attack and Duck and Cover are two prime 
examples of how such initiatives failed in their reflection of public anxiety, and when 
compared to FEMA's survival guidance in the 1980s, little can be seen to have changed 
other than the scientific understandings about nuclear attack. Instead, such initiatives 
presented readers with a sense of reassuring optimism regardless of changing public 
sentiment. 
 Films also tapped into these expressions of nuclear anxiety and began to explore the 
science fiction themes and apocalyptic scenarios previously popular in both books and 
magazines. Five (1951) presented a bleak and depressing vision of the apocalypse, imbued 
with signs of biblical societal renewal and reflected in the pessimistic sentiment towards 
nuclear war among the US public. Panic in Year Zero (1962) ditched such pessimism in 
favour of moral questions representative of the concerns of the public during the fallout 
shelter debates. A few decades later, just as films had once represented the most 
contemporary form of nuclear apocalyptic culture, with greater technological progression 
came video games. Missile Command (1980) tapped into a plethora of non-contextual 
weaponry to form a nonetheless contextual representation of nuclear anxieties that had 
shifted since the early 1960s to focus on bringing the threat of nuclear war to an end. 
Wasteland (1988) abandoned this focus and instead utilised public sentiment toward 
Reagan's SDI programme and the perceived threat of Soviet aggression established during 
the KAL-007 incident to ground the game's fantastical fiction in reality. When we look at 
each of these examples of nuclear apocalyptic culture individually, we can see the manner in 
which they represent contextual nuclear anxieties, and when viewed together they can be 
seen to chart the changes in nuclear anxieties over the course of Cold War.  
 However, while the Cold War ended at the start of the 1990s and the threat of 
nuclear war subsided, nuclear apocalyptic culture, continuing on from Missile Command and 
Wasteland, continued to experience unprecedented popularity in video games post-conflict. 
Fallout (1997) represents a watershed moment in nuclear apocalyptic culture. The game's 
success catapulted the series to heights unattained by previous nuclear apocalyptic culture 
as the franchise continues to grow in popularity. However, as nuclear anxieties waned, 
Fallout had few contextual anxieties to be influenced by. Instead, in an attempt to create a 
commentary on its own time, Fallout drew from nuclear apocalyptic culture we have seen 
previously, such a Five's empty world, Panic's misguided violence, Missile Command's use of 
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non-contextual influences and Wasteland's fantastical yet grounded backstory. However, 
while these influences formed the game's depiction of nuclear devastation, as seen in the 
opening cinematic, it primarily utilised governmental civil defence initiatives at the centre of 
its commentary. While this commentary remains strong and reflective of the contextual lack 
of nuclear anxieties, it is created by exploiting civil defence initiatives. For example, 
distorting such initiatives, Fallout Boy is reminiscent of Bert the Turtle, yet the juxtaposition 
of morbidity and comedy caricatures governmental advice to appear deceitful for the sake 
of its commentary. Fallout is therefore a piece of nuclear apocalyptic culture influenced by 
misrepresentations of historical nuclear anxiety for the sake of commentary, which can 
conversely be seen to represent contextual nuclear anxiety. While nuclear apocalyptic 
culture was further popularised by Bethesda, who purposefully restructured the series to 
monetise the brand and motifs of the original Fallout, expectations of the audience's 
internalised knowledge allowed for the removal of a contemporary commentary. Therefore, 
it has been argued that nuclear apocalyptic culture no longer reflects contextual nuclear 
anxieties as Fallout's misrepresentations of history have been proliferated greatly by its 
sequels, which could now be regarded as the most popular representation of nuclear 
anxieties in the Cold War despite in fact being a misrepresentation of such sentiment. 
 In conclusion, this study has shown that nuclear apocalyptic culture can be regarded 
as representative of contextual nuclear anxieties and therefore indicative of changes in 
anxiety over the course of the Cold War. However, if one were to view public nuclear 
anxieties during the Cold War exclusively through persistently unrepresentative civil 
defence initiatives it could indeed be said that "War never changes."1 While this conceit is 
arguably a part of the Fallout's intended commentary on deceitful governments, when 
viewed in regards to Bethesda's Fallout 3 and its sequels, the series can now be seen to rely 
on the player's acceptance of this statement as a part of the series' expectations of 
internalised knowledge. Yet no evidence for the unchanging nature of war can be found 
here and as such the players' perceptions of it are unsubstantiated. Consequently, while the  
Fallout franchise - an example of contemporary nuclear apocalyptic popular culture - can be 
viewed as unrepresentative of nuclear anxiety in the Cold War, as well as contemporary 
nuclear anxieties, it now also stands to propagate the acceptance of government 
                                            
1 Fallout: A Post Nuclear Role Playing Game, Beverly Hills, CA: Interplay Entertainment, 
1997. 
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propaganda as a representation of reality. After all, without accepting the realities of public 
nuclear anxiety during the second half of the twentieth century, the notion that "War. War 
never changes" is given false credence by the continuing popularity of the Fallout series; a 
franchise whose persisting success and popularity gives undeserved legitimacy to its 
portrayal of nuclear anxieties.  
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